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PREFACE
The au thor’s analysis of the effect of civ il-m ilitary , relations 
on the conduct of the Germ an campaign in the W est in 1940 is based 
upon th ree  case studies. Chapter T provides the background for the 
c iv il-m ilitary , re la tions existing in the Third Reich in 1940 and in tro ­
duces the m ajor personalities in the case studies which follow. . Each 
of the next th ree  chapters describes a sep ara te  m ilita ry  situation 
during the Germ an cam paign in the West in 1940 and the c iv il-m ilita ry  
environment, in which,it developed. These th ree  cases w ere selected 
because each has posed difficult and con troversia l problem s of. in te r ­
pretation for h isto rians. The fifth and .last chapter provides a cumu­
lative analysis of the th ree  cases and briefly  extends the Nazi debacle 
to its conclusion.
Chapter II appeared in slightly  different form  in an a r tic le  in 
the M archT962 issue of Military. Review entitled "Sichelschnitt, 
Evolution of an Operation P lan . " That paper was f irs t  undertaken, as 
a re se a rc h  project in a .‘'G raduate P rob lem s" course in H istory at 
the U niversity of Omaha and was prepared  for publication with p e r­
m ission  of the D epartm ent of H istory  and the Graduate Council, the 
U niversity  of Omaha. The maps in C hapters II, III, and IV w ere 
prepared  from  sketches by. the author and .are based on re se a rch  
connected with th is study.
The author exp resses his appreciation for the guidance and 
assis tan ce  provided him by D r. A. Stanley T rickett, P ro fesso r and 
Chairm an.of the D epartm ent of.H istory, U niversity  of Omaha. 
Without Dr. T rick e tt’s w ise counsel and .encouragem ent this 
endeavor would not have been possible.
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INTRODUCTION
"We .live in an age in which m ilita ry  influence in both'foreign 
and dom estic policy is  m arked and is growing, and there  is  little  hope 
that th is .tendency will be rev e rsed  in the fo reseeable future.
Germany, m ore than any. other m odern nation, has had a wide 
v arie ty  •of problem s.in  its  c iv il-m ilita ry  re la tionsh ips. "No other 
officer corps achieved such high standards of professionalism , and the 
officer corps of no other m ajor power was in the end so com pletely 
p r o s t i t u t e d . " 2  Each phase in the development of the Germ an State had 
its  co ro lla ry  in civ il-m ilitary , re la tions. During the Im perial period, 
the collaboration between Chancellor B ism arck,. W ar M inister Roon, 
and Field M arshal von Moltke illu s tra te s  the success that may be 
achieved through civilian control of national destin ies when accom ­
panied by com petent m ilitary, advice. The political upheaval of the 
Re publican, period shows the difficulty, of maintaining civilian contro l 
during, periods of political turm oil. The v irtu a l m ilita ry  d ictatorship  
of the W orld War *1 period illu s tra te s  the chaotic re su lts  of purely 
m ilita ry  control of political decisions. The disin tegration  of the 
G erm an Arm ed .Forces (W ehrm acht) during the Nazi era  indicates the
^Gordon A. Craig, The P o litics of The P ru ss ian  Army 1640- 
1945 (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , . 1955), p. xix.
; ^Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State-The Theory 
and .Politics of Civil-M ilitary. Relations (Cam bridge: The Belknap 
P re s s  of H arvard U niversity P re ss , 1957), p. 98.
1
2equally catastrophic re su lts  to be expected when political-leaders 
ignore the warnings of professional so ld ie rs . In.Nazi Germany, the 
absence of a c iv il-m ilita ry  equilibrium  resu lted  in d isto rtion  of the 
perspective and judgment of so ld iers and sta tesm en alike,, "leading.to 
a bellicosity  in. peace and a weakness in w ar which contributed to 
th e ir  ultim ate downfall. "3
The thesis that, follows concerns itse lf only with the Nazi 
period of Germ an h is to ry --in  particu lar, the Germ an m ilita ry  cam ­
paigns in F rance and F landers in 1940. The c iv il-m ilita ry .re la tio n ­
ships during this period re flec t the com plete lack of rapport between. 
H itler and the G eneral Staff. The resu lting  unclear division of 
responsib ilities and conflicting, authority precipitated  a host of inex­
cusable e r ro rs  in m ilita ry  and political management. These factors, 
together with H itle r’s propensity .for d irecting  local m ilita ry  actions 
fa r  beyond his competence, contributed to the eventual defeat of the 
Germ an Arm ed F orces by the Allied .Powers.
3Ib id .. p. 99.
CHAPTER I
HITLER REMOVES THE MILITARY OPPOSITION
The sto ry  of c iv il-m ilita ry  re la tionsh ips in .the Third R eich  
during the years 1933-1940 .is an account of one m an’s conquest of a 
m ilita ry  organization. . It describes the diabolical process by which 
H itler, ’’the one tim e corporal, outm aneuvered the strongest G eneral 
Staff and gained absolute control of the m ost form idable m ilita ry  
machine that the world had ever seen.
The G eneral Staff with w hich 'H itler had to deal was the p ro­
duct of the European development of the G erm an State. The precepts 
and .traditions of the G eneral Staff w ere adm ired  and em ulated by 
every m ilita ry  power. . It was the model to which the United.States 
turned in 1898 to m odernize its  own arm ed  fo rces .
The G eneral Staff developed by-the elder Moltke and von Roon 
subscribed to a policy of com plete divorcem ent of m ilita ry  and politi­
cal a ffa irs . M ilitary  plans w ere prepared  without reg ard  to the ir 
political im plications. Although co rporate  anonymity .in m ilita ry  
command was the trad ition  of the G eneral Staff, the highest .level of 
individual com petence and responsib ility  within the corporate  le ad e r­
ship was developed. By adherence to the s tr ic te s t  m oral and .inte.l.lec- 
'tu a l--a s  well as ca s te --s tan d ard s , the G eneral Staff operated .with
■^Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for-Europe (New York: 
Colophon Books, H arper and Row, 1963), p . . 83.
3
4se lfless  devotion to the sovereign and sta te . These w ere the traditions 
developed.by the G eneral Staff as answ ers to the basic problem s of 
m ilitary- command in,the dem ocratic-capita.list-technologica.l society 
of the tim es. ^
The high standards and trad itions of the G eneral Staff did not
long survive the ir exposure to Adolf H itler. The F ueh rer corrupted
the Germ an m ilitary, leaders  as he corrupted  everything e lse in.the
Third.Reich. The collapse of the Germ an Arm y in .1945 was the re su lt
of the fa ilu re  of the Germ an G eneral Staff to control H itler , while this
was s till possible. The Germ an genera ls rea lized  th is too la te—to
th e ir anxiety and chagrin. . W alter Goer.litz, in his H istory of The
Germ an G eneral Staff
draws a p icture of men .like Beck or H aider o r von M odel or even 
Rommel in the end, to rtu red  by th e ir consciences and th e ir fears , 
caught up upon the te rr ib le  wheel of H itlerian  Satanism , unable 
e ither to acquiesce or to oppose, bound by oaths which o thers had 
betrayed and dedicated to a national end which o thers had turned 
into a. thing of loathing and putrefaction. 3
■When P residen t Hindenburg. en trusted  the G erm an Chancellor­
ship to Adolf H itler on January 30, 1933, the Germ an A rm y  (R eichsw ehr) 
was .limited by the T reaty  of V ersa illes  to a to tal strength  of 100, 000 
men. ■ Although the political d irection  of m ilita ry  affa irs  was constitu­
tionally, vested, in the Reich .M inister fo r  Defense, G eneral [la ter Field 
M arshal] W erner von Blomberg, the re a l control of m ilita ry  power 
was vested in the Army. High Command (Qberkommando des H eeres -
^W alter G oerlitz, H istory of The Germ an G eneral Staff, 
tran s . B rian Battershaw  (New York: P raeg er,. 1962), p. ■ vii.
,^Ibid., p. ix.
5OKH). The OKH staff, which succeeded the old Germ an G eneral Staff 
(G rosse G eneralstab), staunchly m aintained the old Germ an m ilita ry  
trad itions.
An. im m ediate and natu ra l antagonism  sprang up between 
Adolf H itler and the politically conservative G eneral Staff who looked 
upon the new Chancellor as a demagogue and an upstart. For his part, 
H itler hated the older type of officer as rep resen ta tiv e  of a ro tten  and 
incom petent upper c lass. 4
A product of the m asses and a man of passion, whose chief 
experience of war had been as a battalion runner, H itler sponta­
neously d istru sted  these u ltra -ra tio n a l, a r is to c ra tic  professional 
so ld ie rs . Yet he needed them, for they controlled the decisive 
force in the s ta te ; they alone could provide the foundation of 
G erm any7s m ilita ry  re su rrec tio n . ^
P rio r  to obtaining the C hancellorship, H itler had established 
his own private arm y for political purposes. The Brown Shirts 
(Sturm abteilunq - S. A .), while useful enough in s tre e t battles, w ere 
incapable of opposing the R eichsw ehr. Although E rnst Roehm, leader 
of the S. A. and Hit.ler7s confidant from  the days of the B eer Hall P u tsch , 
recom m ended a d irec t assau lt on the G eneral Staff as a m eans of 
obtaining im m ediate and com plete contro l of Germany, H itler p re ­
fe rre d  the ind irec t approach. Unsure of his power while P residen t 
Hindenburg was s till alive, Chancellor H itle r adopted the tactic of 
infiltration. However ind irec t H itle r7s approach was, the te s t of 
strength  between sword and sw astika had begun.
4Wilmot, op. c it. , p. 83.
^Ibid.
6Though concerned with the rowdy tac tics of the new German 
.Chancellor, the generals felt secu re  in th e ir  trad itional p rerogatives. 
W ith-President Hindenburg as C om m ander-in-Chief, the G eneral Staff 
relaxed in th e ir  headquarters on the B en d le rs trasse  and observed the 
m achinations of the Nazis with detachm ent. The genera ls made a 
fata l e r ro r  at this tim e in not realiz ing  the-threat posed to the ir 
secu rity  by Adolf H itler. . As Field M arshal von Blom berg testified  at 
N urem berg, "Before .1938-1939 Germ an generals did not oppose 
H itler. There was no reaso n  to oppose him,- since he produced the 
re su lts  they, desired . "6
From  1934 to 1938, the aim s and objectives of H itler and the
generals la rgely  coincided. The Nazi politicians, and G eneral Staff,
and the resu rg en t Germ an in d u stria lis ts  cooperated effectively;in the
rearm am en t of Germany.
The rem ilita riza tio n  of the Rhineland in .1936 struck  many of the 
genera ls as a dangerous gamble, but when it cam e off successfully  
they w ere delighted. There w ere prom otions and big responsib ili­
tie s  for everyone. Even the cautious and high-principled Chief of 
the G eneral Staff, G eneral Ludwig Beck, was tem porarily  won 
over. Open opposition to the F uehrer was n o n -ex is ten t;. those few 
who s till doubted his leadersh ip  held th e ir peace. '
H itle r’s full support of clandestine rearm am ent in-violation of 
the V ersa illes  Treaty, the im petus he gave to the nationalistic o rien ta­
tion of the Nazi Party , and the deference with which he in itially  trea ted  
the sen io r generals had the combined effect of convincing the m ilita ry
6W illiam L . . Shirer, The R ise and Fall of The Third Reich 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 374.
^Telford Taylor, Sword and .Swastika (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1952), p., 7.
7lead ers  that the new Chancellor was pursuing.goals.com m on.to-their 
own. . This is not to contend that the G erm an G eneral Staff unanimously 
subscribed  to ■ the National Socialist Revolution. Individual or co llec­
tive responsibility, for Nazi success cannot be attributed  to the generals. 
T here w ere many who w ere uneasy about the activ ities of the brown- 
shir.ted te r ro r is ts .  It can be said,, however,, that a p rim ary .p re req u i­
site  to the se izu re  of power by the Nazi conspiracy, was the consent 
given by/the Germ an m ilitary ,'leaders.
’ C losely.'interlocked with the Junker a ris to c racy  and carry ing  
enormous prestige with the business and professional c lasses, 
an unm istakable m ilitary , frown would have had prodigious effect 
' throughout Germany, . . .  If the sen io r generals had had a 
modicum of devotion to the Republic and firm ness of purpose 
the re  is Tittle doubt but that they-could have laid .Hitler low. °
One of the f irs t  m ajor c r ise s  between H itler and the G eneral 
Staff involved the position of the S. A. Captain E rnst Roehm, leader of 
the S. A... and recen tly  appointed a cabinet m em ber by H itler, proposed 
that the Army, Navy, A irforce, S. A ., and Schutzstaffe.l (S. S .) be 
m erged into one national defense organization. 9 The prospect of the 
elite Germ an officer corps being m erged with the brown-shir.ted 
row dies of the S. A ., the specia l troops of GoeringTs Luftwaffe, and 
H im m ler’s Gestapo oriented.S. S. a larm ed the generals and they 
quickly gained Hit.l.erfs agreem ent to quash-Roehm’s grandiose plans.
For this, however, they paid a high price.
^Ibid. , p. 68.
9 John W.. W heeler-Bennett, The N em esis of Power ’, The 
G erm an Army, in P o litics (London0. M acm illan and C o ., Ltd. , 1953), 
p p ..307-308
8To indem nify the P arty .fo r the w ithdraw al of Roehm’s plans, the 
Defense se rv ices  agreed to adopt the P a r ty ’s emblem, the eagle 
with the Swastika, upon the ir headwear and uniform  as a sign of 
th e ir allegiance,, an action which, w hatever the leading men might 
think about it, had a g reat sym bolical effect both on the se rv ices 
and the population in general.
Besides accepting.the National Socialist Party, em blem as part 
of the uniform  insigna of the Arm ed F orces, the G eneral Staff, on 25 
May 1934,. issued an eight point d irective to the Army, entitled "The 
Duties of the G erm an,Soldier. " This d irective was a bonus paid by the 
A rm y,for the abolition of the S. A,. The d irec tive  was w ritten  in the 
new Volkisch style and "said proudly that the A rm y’s f irs t  duty was to 
protect ’The R eich ,’ the people now united .in National Socialism , and 
its living,space. . . . H itler could have asked for no m ore generous 
avowal of support. "H
By thw arting the plans of Roehm to in tegrate  the Reichswehr 
into a national organization under his own .leadership, the G eneral 
Staff achieved only an in terim  objective. In th e ir view, the en tire  S. A. 
organization had to be shattered  in o rder to a ssu re  that the Reichswehr 
was the sole instrum ent of arm ed power in H itle r’s Germany. The 
Arm y prodded .Hitler into destroying.the S. A. in o rder to establish  the 
primacy, of the R eichsw ehr, and .for this they again paid , a high price. 
The generals agreed to support H itler and the Nazi Party . Thus., in a 
sense,, the G eneral Staff precipitated  the "Blood Purge" of June 30th, 
1934.
^ H e rb e r t  Rosinski, The G erm an Army {London; The 
H ogarth P r e s s , . 1939), p.. 221.
11-Craig, pp . c it . , pp. 476-477.
9The Army, . . .  was pressing, for. the purge, but it did not want 
to -so il its own hands. That m ust be done by, H itler, Goering, and 
H im m ler, with, th e ir  black-coated.S. S. and GoeringTs special 
police. 12
This tac it agreem ent to a m assac re  without precedent in 
Germ an h isto ry  was the Undoing of the Germ an m ilita ry  lead ers . "The 
action.of the Reichswehr on th is occasion has been rightly  described  as 
the m ost-fatal in a..long,succession of unwise steps. "13 At the tim e, 
however,, it appeared to have m any,appealing advantages for the Army 
as well as for the N azis, H itler sought to placate the generals without 
whose support he could not succeed, The price the generals placed on 
th e ir  support of H itler was the assu rance  that they alone would d irec t 
the arm ed .m ilita ry /fo rces of the Third Reich. The purge of the S. A ., 
and the m urder of E rnst Roehm, was to be th e ir  p ractica l guarantee. 
The agreem ent between the Army and the Nazis by which the generals 
would accept H itler as Hindenburg*s su ccesso r, provided he would 
break with and "se ttle" the S. A., and .left wing of the Nazi P arty , "was 
made plain and accepted in  conversations between Blomberg and 
F r i t s c h ^  on the one side,, and .Hitler and his deputy [Rudolf] Hess, on 
the other, during, a c ru ise  on the Robert Ley in the beginning of June 
[1934]. "15 xt was von Blomberg h im self who suggested the "deal" 
with H itler. B lom berg 's position was in full accord with the principles
l^S h ire r, op. c i t . , p. • 220.
l^R osinski, op. c it . , pp.- 223-224.
-^Colonel G eneral F re ih e rr  W erner von F ritsch , Com m ander- 
in-C hief of the Germ an .Army.
15Rosinski, op. c it. , pp. 222-223.
10
he had .expressed  th a t,, although it was a point of honor for a P ru ss ian  
officer to be co rrec t, it was "the duty of the Germ an officer to be 
crafty . "16
■ By. purging, the S. A ., H itler appeared to have placed him self 
in the hands of the m ilita ry  lead ers . The preem inence of the G eneral 
Staff was tran sito ry , how ever,. for one month a fte r the purge the S. S . , 
under-H im m ler,. was made independent and ..responsible only to H itler. 
This highly disciplined and elite  force becam e much m ore powerful 
than Roehm1 s Brown Shirts had ever been and a powerful r iv a l to the 
Army. ^
By forcing H itler to destroy  Roehm and the S. A.., the Army 
fu rther increased  the F ueh rer Ts enm ity/toward the G eneral Staff. . E rnst 
Roehm had been H itle r!s m ost intim ate friend and com rade of long 
standing. Although the two had had m any.disagreem ents before the 
purge, the F ueh rer was not to forget the men who p ressu red  him into 
his crony 's m urder. "The 4th , F ebruary  .1938, 16 was H itle r 's  revenge 
for the 30th June 1934. "1^ -"The officer corps only deluded itse lf  in 
thinking that . . .  it got r id  fo rever of the th rea t of the Nazi movement
• l^H erm ann Rauschning, The Revolution of N ihilism ; Warning 
to The W est,. t r a n s . . W. E .. Dickes (New York: . Alliance Book C o rp ., 
1939), p. 123.
l^S h irer, op. c i t . , p. 226.
l^On 4 F ebruary  1938, H itler announced that he would person­
ally  assum e the office of.Defense M inister, with G eneral W alter von 
B rautchitsch as C-in-C  Arm y and G eneral Wilhelm K eitel as Chief of 
Staff of the newly crea ted  Ober.Kommando W ehrm acht, OKW. Goering 
was advanced to F ield .M arshal.
l^R osinski, o p .. c it . , p .. 224.
11
against its  trad itional prerogative and power. . . . For the moment, 
however,, the generals w ere smugly confident. "20
The sense of honor and-decency upon w hich‘the Germ an 
G eneral Staff had prided itse lf for generations was forever'.lost by .-its 
open condonement of the m assac re  of th e S , A. Com plicity■ in .this 
m assac re  was the f ir s t  step of the Reichsw ehr ""towards its adapta­
tion to the m oral standards of the Third-Reich. "21 The slaughter of 
G erm ans "for the defense of the S tate1' included the bru tal m urder of 
two leading G erm an officers, G enerals von Schleicher and von .Bredow, 
who w ere branded.as tra ito rs .
Only, the voices of the e igh ty-five-year-o ld  F ield M arshal von 
M ackensen and of G eneral von H am m er stein, the fo rm er Comman- 
d er-in -C h ief of the Army, w ere ra ise d  in p ro test against the 
m urder of the ir two fellow officers and the charges of treason  
which had been the excuse for it. 22
By obtaining the collusion of the m ilita ry /lead ers  in the politi­
cal m urder of two of the ir sen io r colleagues, the Nazis had gone fa r in 
th e ir  efforts to-corrupt the high princip les of the G eneral Staff. Two 
days a fte r the Blood Purge of the S. A ., F ield  M arshal von Blomberg, 
M inister of War, publicly,indicated the G eneral StaffTs "agreem ent"
'^Oshiper, op. c it. , p. . 226. The S. A. was never com pletely 
elim inated,, although i t  was said in. B erlin  that this was only, because 
it was m entioned.in the H orst W essel Song. . It ceased, however, to 
be a m ilita ry  force of any. consequence or future. . See Craig, op., c it. , 
p . . 47 8, fn.
^iRos.inski, op. c it . , p. 225.
• 22sh irer, op. c it. , p. - 225.
12
with the Nazis by issuing, an o rd er of the day to the A rm y/"expressing
the.High Commandos satisfaction  with the tu rn  of events. ”23
P residen t von Hindenburg died om2 August 1934. H itler,
by m eans of. astu te political m aneuvering and .the support of the
R eichsw ehr, m erged .the offices of P resid en t and .Chancellor under
the title  F uehrer and .R eichskanzler. In so doing, he him self assum ed
suprem e power in the Third Reich. H itler lost no tim e tightening
even m o re  the political and m oral fe tte rs  binding the G eneral Staff
to the asp ira tions of the Nazi Party .
That sam e m orning [that H itler assum ed power] von Blomberg and 
the heads of the th ree  se rv ices w ere summoned to H itle r’s study 
and o rdered  to sw ear an oath which he him self had drafted out on a 
slip  of paper;, an oath of allegiance not to the constitution,, as 
hitherto, not to the Fatherland, but to the F uehrer personally.
The following day every m em ber of the Germ an Arm ed F orces was 
likewise obliged to d ec lare ; "I sw ear by God this holy oath: that I 
will render unconditioned obedience to the F uehrer of the Germ an 
Reich and People, Adolf H itler, the Supreme Commander of the 
A rm ed .F o rc e s ,. and will be ready as a brave so ldier, to stake my 
life at any tim e for this oath. "24
P rio r  collaboration between the m ilita ry /lead ers  and the p rin ­
cipals of the Nazi Party, led d irectly /to  the signing .of the oath. By 
signing the oath,, the Germ an m ilita ry /lead ers  becam e an inextricable 
part of the Nazi m achine. . H itle r’s d es ire  for absolute m ilita ry  pow er--
23ifrich
24wilmot, op. c it. , p. 84; Craig, op. c it. , p. 480, gives 
von Blomberg. c red it for drafting, the oath for H itler. The taking of the 
oath was reported  in the 3 August edition .of the V oelkischer B eobachter, 
which repo rted : "Following the taking of.the oath, the Arm ed F orces 
gave th ree  cheers for the new Com m ander-in-Chief, whereupon the two 
National anthem s w ere played. " [Lied der.-Deutschen and H orst W essel 
L ied] See T ria ls  of. War C rim inals before the N uernberg M ilitary  
T ribunals under Control Council Law N o .. 10. --N uernberp , October 
1946--A p ril 1949 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing. Office,
1951),, X. . (H ereinafter re fe rre d  to as TWC),. "Document NOKW-3132, 
P rosecution  Exhibit 419. " p.. 473.
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his determ ination to be Supreme Com mander of the W ehrm acht- -was
c lo ser to realization . F rom  that day on, the autonomy of the G eneral
Staff was doomed.
That oath was to be the co rn er-s to n e  of his [H itler’s]  power, the 
rock  upon which every attem pt at m ilita ry  opposition to the Nazi 
reg im e was broken. . In obedience to it Germ ans in arm s, w ere to 
c a rry  out manifold acts of aggression  and spoliation, tortim e, 
and m urder throughout the length and breadth of Europe. 25
The g en e ra ls7 "deal" with H itler concerning.the purge of the
S. A ., the acceptance of the Nazi symbol for the W ehrm acht uniform, 
and the A rm y’s loyalty oath to the F u eh rer had by the fall of 1934 
severe ly  com prom ised the G eneral Staff. The R eichsw ehr, however, 
was not yet the com plete c rea tu re  of the Nazis. Other c r ise s  would 
a r ise , other disputes would occur, other deals would be made, and 
m ore hum iliation would be heaped upon the generals before H itler would 
com pletely dominate the H eeresleitung. T hree m ajor m ilita ry  figures 
rem ained in the F u eh re r’s way in 1934 and had to be elim inated before 
his control of the officer corps could be absolute. These th re e --F ie ld  
M arshal W erner von Blomberg, M inister of D efense; G eneral F re ih e rr  
W erner von F ritsch , C om m ander-in-C hief of the A rm y; and G eneral 
Ludwig Beck, Chief of the G eneral S taff--w ere to be rem oved by H itler 
for opposing his d es ire  for a new war. Von Blomberg and von F ritsch  
wou.ld.be the f ir s t  to go. . It turned out that H itler arranged  th e ir d is ­
m issa l within.days of each other.
On 5 November .1937, H itler convened a sec re t conference in 
B erlin  at which he expressed  his intention to go to w ar in o rd er to obtain
25wi.lmot, op. c i t . , p . . 84
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lebensraum  for Germany. . Attending the conference w ere a sm all 
group of high ranking officials including Blomberg, F r its c h ,, and 
Goering ,as well as A dm iral E rich iRaeder, C om m ander-in-Chief of 
the Germ an Navy, and .the German F oreign 'M inister, Baron .Konstan­
tin von Neurath. The conference lasted  for-four hours during .which 
. H itler spoke on the necessity, for Germany To go to war-to solve the 
Germ an economic and social problem s and ..left no doubt as to the 
: identity, of his f ir s t  intended v ictim s. 26 'H itler Inform ed.his genera ls; 
"For the im provem ent of our m ilitary .and political situation it  m ust be 
our.-first.aim , . . . to conquer Czechoslovakia and .A ustria .sim ul­
taneously, . . . 1127
Neither B lom berg.nor F ritsch.w anted w ar; they both strongly 
. opposed .H itler’s thesis . They, stated  .that Germany was not yet ready 
. for w ar and.that F rance and England would im m ediately oppose any 
Germ an move tow ard.Czechoslovakia. 28 "One re su lt of the d iscus­
sion was unm istakable. . Everyone knew w here he stood. H itler had 
plainly declared  his wish for another w a r , . while his W ar-M inister and 
the C om m ander-in-C hief of his.A rm y,m ade it equally' c lea r that they 
-wanted nothing.of the kind. "29 Three months a fte r th is  November
Taylor, Sword .and Swastika, pp. 139-140.
2?t w C, op. c it .D o c u m e n t  386-PS ,. Prosecution:,Exhibit 
' 1033,. "Notes on the CJonference in the Reich C hancellery on ,5 Novem­
ber 1937. from  16.15-2030 hours, " p. 511.
^ T a y lo r ,, Sword and.Swastika, p.. 145,
29Goerlitz,*. op. c it . ,, p.. 310.
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m eeting, Blomberg and F ritsch  w ere out of office, th e ir involuntary 
departure the re su lt of H itle r 's  anger at th e ir  o p p o s i t i o n . - 30
Field M arshal von Blomberg was a widower who unwisely 
m arried  a ,s e c re ta ry  in the .War -Ministry-'without knowing that she had 
a police reco rd . The police d o ssie r on the g irl,, which cam e into 
Goering;vs possession, "showed that the bride of the Field M arshal 
and.C om m ander-in-C hief had a police reco rd  as a prostitu te and had 
been.convicted of having posed for pornographic photographs. "31 
N either G eneral F ritsch  nor G eneral Beck cam e to-Blom berg’s de­
fense in th is m atte r. Blomberg, by his close association-w ithdhe 
Nazi leaders  and by wearing Nazi decorations on h is Army uniform 
had alienated many of his m ilita ry  asso c ia tes  and had no tru e  friends 
in the officer corps. G eneral F ritsch , when inform ed of the scandal, 
went d irec tly  to -Hitler and demanded B lom berg 's resignation. 32 
G eneral Beck, , hearing of the police d o ss ie r on B lom berg 's wife, told 
G eneral Keitel, "one cannot to le ra te  the h ighest-ranking so ld ier 
m arry ing  a w hore. "33
Om 25 January 1938, Goering brought the evidence against 
Blomberg to H itler who,, upon reading the charges, becam e enraged.
30Tay.lor,. .loc. cit.
3^-Shirer, op. c i t . , pp.. 312-313. As a young.girl, Blom­
berg 1 s new wife had been a rre s te d  fo r her ac tiv ities in her m o th e r 's  
"m assage salon," which, as was common in Berlin, was a cover for 
a brothel. See also Taylor, op. c it. , p. .146.
■ 32^/hee.ler-Bennett, o p .. c it. , p. 367.
33"E xtract From  D iary of G eneral Jodi, 1937-1938, " TWO, 
D ocum ent. 1780-PS, P rosecution Exhibit 1034, p . . 594. (H ereinafter 
re fe rre d  to as Jod.l diary. )
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A pparently what, disturbed the F uehrer the m ost was the thought that 
"his F ield M arshal had deceived him and made him, who was an offi-
ing H itler about B.lombergTs wife, made a personal call on the Field 
M arshal to break the news to him. Blom berg appeared to be genuinely 
am azed at his w ife’s background and offered to divorce her at once. 
Goering inform ed him that th is was no longer enough as F ritsch  and 
Beck w ere demanding his d ism issa l. 35 On 25 January, 1938 H itle r 
summoned Blomberg to an audience and inform ed him he was through 
as M inister of Defense and, ironically  enough, asked him to nominate 
his su ccesso r. Passing  over G eneral F ritsc h -- th e  .logical su c c e s so r--  
who, he considered, -had abandoned him .in his hour of need, Blomberg 
nom inated Goering and G eneral Keitel, in that o rder, as his successo r. 
The F uehrer thanked him for his long .service,, expressed  his sympathy 
for the fallen Field M arshal, and bade him farew ell with the prom ise 
to re ca ll him to active duty when he was needed in tim e of war. 36 
"Like so many other prom ises, of H itler, th is one was not kept. Field 
M arshal von B lom berg’s nam e was strick en  fo rever from  the Army 
r o l l s , . and not even when w ar cam e and he offered his se rv ices  was he 
re s to re d  to duty in any capacity. "37
cia.1 w itness at the wedding, .look .like a fool. "34 Goering a fte r inform -
34sh irer, op. c i t . , p. 313. 
35Ibid.
33W heeler-Bennett "  367-368; see also Shirer,
op. c it . , p. .314, and T ayloi, Swastika, p. 149.
37Shirer, loc. cit.
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The behavior and m otives of the several, ac to rs  in .this w eird 
sequence rem ain, somewhat obscure to th is day. . It has not 
infrequently been suggested that Goering (or Goering and 
H im m ler) deliberate ly  .lured Blom berg into the m arriag e  in 
o rd er to bring about his d ism issa l. The factual basis for-th is 
appealing inference is slender. 38
The d ism issa l of von B lom berg--the f irs t  Field M arshal of 
the T hird R eich—did, however, elim inate G oeringTs riv a l for the 
highest m ilita ry  rank. The charges against von Blomberg, also 
enabled .F ritsch  and.Beck (with no pangs of conscience) to abandon 
th e ir  m ilitary, superio r whom they suspected was too close to H itle r; 
it also enabled H itler to rem ove a senior so ld ier in o rd er to c lea r the 
way, for his own assum ption of suprem e m ilitary, command and.sim ul­
taneously se t the stage for his attack o n .F ritsch  whom he considered 
his m ost dangerous opponent.
Colonel G eneral F re ih err-W ern er von F ritsch , the Com m ander- 
in-C hief of the Army, and a gifted and unbending,officer of the 
old school (Ta typical G eneral Staff c h a ra c te r ,'T A dm iral Raeder 
called him) was the obvious candidate to succeed Blom berg as 
M in ister of. War and C om m ander-in-C hief of the Armed F orces. 39
Unlike Blomberg, who had become tainted through .his close 
association  with the Nazis, F ritsch  had the resp ec t of the G erm an 
g enera ls . G eneral A lbert K esselring, who had collaborated closely 
with F ritsch  in the old Truppenam t days and.at the War Academy, 
considered him "the paragon of what a man and officer should be. "4C>
33Taylor, Sword and Swastika, p. ,147.
30S h ire r ,. loc. cit.
40Fie.ld M arsha l A lbert K esselring , A. Soldiers Record 
(New York: . W illiam M orrow & C o . 1954), p. 20.
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Having sha ttered  the aplomb of the officer corps by. d is ­
m issing the M inister of Defense, for m arrying, a whore, H itler con­
tinued his assau lt on the citadel of the General. Staff by; accusing the 
C om m ander-in-C hief of the Arm y of hom osexual ac tiv ities. Though 
. com pletely innocent of the charges, G eneral F ritsc h ’s constant p re ­
occupation with his duties and his au s te re  living habits made him 
especially  vulnerable to accusations of th is type. . In addition, 
"F ritsch  was a .lifelong bachelor who was not known to have ever had 
much to do 'With the opposite sex, and a v ery  re se rv ed  man. "41- 
G eneral F ritsch  once w rote "I never go out, I decline a ll [invitations 
from ] foreign am bassadors as a m atte r of principle, and I  never 
invite them  m yself. "42 In answ er to a co rresp o n d en ts  question as 
to the extent of Arm y influence in politics, F ritsch  replied  "The 
Arm y does not mix in politics. "43 The Nazis had ..little to fear from  
F ritsc lF s political asp ira tions. However, the constant and hopeful 
ru m o rs  abroad that the Army would soon have to -"se ttle"  H itler 
associated  F ritsch  with those opposing the F ueh rer ; hence the 
genera.lTs rem oval was both inevitable and predictable.
The charges against F ritsch  presum ably w ere passed to 
H itler'by  Goering or H im m ler. 44 The police d o ssie r presented to 
the F ueh rer alleged that the general had engaged in a homosexual act
44-Tay.lor,. Sword and.Swastika, p. 155.
42craig , op. c it . , p.. 490.
43Kielmansegg, F ritsch p ro ze ss , p. 30.,. quoted in .C raig ,
loc. c it .
44T aylor,. Sword and Swastika, p. ,154.
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with a young man [Lustknabe] in a dark alley  near the Potsdam  r a i l ­
way, s ta tio n ,. and had since been paying blackm ail to an.underw orld 
ch a rac te r who had caught him in the act. . When Inform ed of the 
charges by H itle r 's  adjutant, Colonel Hossback, "the ta c itu rn .P ru s ­
sian nobleman was stupefied. . 'A. lot of stinking..lies I1 he blurted 
out. "45
Hitler, seized upon'the charges against F ritsch  as a golden 
opportunity, to destroy  the p restige of the Army High Command.without 
alienating,the officer corps as a-whole, 46 and on 26 January [the day 
afte r B lom berg 's d ism issa l]  he summoned the C om m ander-in-C hief 
for a personal interview .
In the presence of H im m ler and Goering, H itler confronted 
F ritsch  with the charges against him, and brought the general face to 
■face with, his accuser who prom ptly identified him. When the F uehrer 
demanded F ritsc h 1 s resignation, the g en era l—.livid with ra g e --re fu se d  
and demanded a m ilita ry  court m artia l. H itler, for his part, vetoed 
. F r itsc h !s request for a court m artia l, curtly, d ism issed  the general 
a fte r ordering him on indefinite .leave, and thereby, effectively, r e ­
moved him from  office pending resolu tion  of the charges. 47
The scene in the B en d le rs trasse  on the re tu rn  of von. F ritsch  
from  the Reichskanzlei m ust have reca lled  a .s im ila r  occasion 
ju st five years before, when, . on January 28,. 1933, von 
Schleicher cam e back from  his d ism issa l as Chancellor. . Then,
4^Shirer, op. c i t . , p. 315; see also G oerlitz, op, c i t . ,
p.. 313.
.46W heeler-Bennett, op. c it. , p. 369.
V lbid .
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-as now, the generals raged ..furiously, together-; then, as now,
. they,■■imagined.'a■ vain-thing. 48
The atm osphere in B erlin  during.the la s t days of January 
.■ 1938 was filled with, tension ."not unlike that on the eve of the purge in 
. .1934;. and the a ir  w as filled with ru m o rs to the effect that the Arm y at 
. long, la s t was prepared  to m ake its stand against the tyrant." 49 Unlike 
von Blomberg, who had ..lost the confidence of. the Army,, von .F ritsch  
■ was a highly respected  senior officer. It is  quite possible that had he 
ra ise d  the c ry  to revolt, the m ajority  of the officer corps would have 
followed him. . In. 1.926, F ritsch  had urged ..General Seeckt to employ 
fo rce  to prevent his d ism issa l. . L ater, in June, 1938, F ritsch  agreed 
that he too had e rred  in not re s is tin g  his d ism issa l with violence. 50 
Thus, F ritsch  joined the distinguished .company, of G roener who 
adm itted that he should have acted in 1932,. and of H am m erstein who 
reg re tted  not having acted in January. 1933.
G eneral Beck, Chief of the G eneral S taff,. who might have 
p ersuaded .F ritsch  to revolt, did not try . Von. F ritsch  was confused 
. and in a s ta te  of. shock. He s till did not re a liz e  that H itler was behind 
the m onstrous conspiracy against the Arm y. 51 It. is  difficult to
48Ibid.
49Craig, op. c it. , p . . 493.
50Kie.lmansegg, F r  it s c hpr o z es s , p. 122; quoted in Craig, loc. c it.
54Craig, op. c i t . , pp. 493-494; see  also -Shirer, op. c it . , p. 3.17 
and G oerlitz, op. c i t . , p. 3.15.. W heeler-Bennett, op. c it. , p . 3 6 9 ,  m aintains 
that Beck wished to organize an Army ■Putsch  against H it le r . . Wolfgang 
F oerster,. who had.the generaU s private papers, does not support this 
th esis . Quoted in. Shir er, op. c i t . , p. 3.17, F oerster. says; "It was c lear to 
these men [F ritsch  and his close assoc ia tes , including Beck] that a m ili­
ta ry  Putsch would mean civil w ar and was by-no m eans su re  of success."
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speculate what went through the mind of. von F ritsch  as he debated the 
a lternative  courses of action that might be used to combat the evil 
charges levied against him by H itler. He may rightly  have discounted 
his .chances of success in a Putsch against the Nazis. The Germ an 
people w ere s till much, enam oured of "P e r  F u eh re r , " and the re  was 
also good reason  to believe that the .Army, would be opposed not only 
by the S. S.. and.the Gestapo, but by G oeringTs Luftwaffe and the German 
Navy a s  well in any move against the F u eh re r . 52 Then, too, the re  was 
F r its c h Ts oath to the F ueh rer taken in August 1934—no G erm an .officer 
could.in honor break such;an oath. Shaken and confused by-the enorm ity 
of the conspiracy, against him, F ritsch  quietly su rren d ered  and sub­
m itted his resignation  .as H itler had .demanded.
F ritsch  had his.day. in .court however. His fellow g en e ra ls- -  
led by?the venerable von 'R undstedt--saw  to that. The m ilitary, court of 
honor presided over by Goering.who was prom oted to the rank of Field 
.M arshal, opened .in Berlin, on TO .March T938. Serving w ith Goering . on 
the court w ere the C om m anders-in-C hief of the Arm y and N a v y -  
G eneral W alter von B rauchitsch, also new.ly appointed; A dm iral 
R aeder; and two  ^ sen ior professional judges of the Supreme. War T r i ­
bunal. The tr ia l  was alm ost im m ediately  suspended upon rece ip t of 
news of the A ustrian  plebescite ; but it resum ed on 17 M arch 1938 and 
concluded the following.day. . "The Tribunal announced the acquittal 
of F ritsch  Tfor proven innocence1 and the proceedings w ere closed. "53
52Q oerlitz,. .loc.. c it .
^^Taylor, Sword and .Swastika, p.. 158; see also Shirer, 
op. c i t . , pp. 320-321.
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. F r its c h Ts personal honor and reputation  w ere vindicated by 
his acquittal, but the N azi’s purpose was achieved. Another m ajor 
obstacle to H itle r1 s control over the W ehrm acht was rem oved. The 
German, generals did not yet rea lize  "that what had actually, come to 
pass was the com plete subjection of the A rm y to the will of H itler. "54 ; 
The rem oval of Blomberg. and. F ritsch  and the re la ted  reshuffle of 
Arm y as w ell as other governm ent . l e a d e r s ^  w ere not im m ediately 
m ade- public. On. 4 F ebruary  1938, however, public announcement was 
made to the high level changes. The 6 .'February 1938 edition of the 
V oelkischer Beobachter announced, under date line of. 4 February, 
the re tirem en t of Blomberg an d .F ritscF  "on grounds of health..;" - -  
"The F uehrer takes over the suprem e command of the Arm ed .F o rc e s ; " 
--"A rm ed  F o rces Office becomes High Command of the A rm ed.F roces 
and is placed under the F uehrer as his P erso n a l M ilita ry  S taff;" - -  
"G eneral K eitel [is designated] Chief of the High: Command of the 
Arm ed F o r c e s " G e n e r a l  Goering is designated Com m ander-in- 
Chief of the A ir Force and is  designated F ield  M arshal; "--and, 
"G eneral von B rauchitsch is designated C om m ander-in-C hief of the 
Army. "56
It was Ludwig BeckTs tu rn  to reckon with H itler. As the 
m ilita ry  leader of the abortive 20 July. 1944 Putsch against H itler,
54Goer.litz, op. c it. , p. ■ 319.
55including U lrich von H assell, A m bassador of Italy;, and von 
N eurath ,. the Foreign M in iste r who was rep laced  by von.Ribbentrop.
56"E xtract from  V oelkischer Beobachter, 6 February, 1938." 
TWC,, Document NOKW-31.15, P rosecution  Exhibit 1439.
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Beck has become a .legendary-figure and a hero of the anti-N azi fo rces. 
He had se v e ra l opportunities to oppose H itler before the war, but in 
each .instance he stopped -short of taking violent action. G eneral H aider 
te s tif ied  at N urem berg that even at the tim e of his resignation  as Chief 
of Staff im.1938 Beck s till believed .that the A rm y  "should not aim  at a 
revolutionary, change, but that an.evolution would .still bring.about 
H itle r’s rem oval. 57 H aider said he told. Beck at the tim e that he did 
not understand creatures, .like H itler and advised: "With such a man or
beast you can com pete only, by using,force.
Although. Beck had w elcom ed H itle r’s coming to power and in 
the early .days of the NSDAP had publicly extolled the F u eh re r , . the 
F ritsch  affair had opened his eyes,, and by; 1938 he was to ta lly  against 
H itle r’s policy. ^9 ,Even if Beck had not opposed ..Hitler for political 
reasons, he would have been com pelled to oppose him on m ilita ry  
grounds. H itle r’s increasing  .disposition to m eddle with m ilita ry  plans 
and the growing tendency of OKW and the F u eh re r’s personal staff to 
in te rfe re  with. Army, m a tte rs  g rea tly  angered Beck and aroused his 
d is tru s t. He finally severed  a ll re la tions with-Jodi and:.Keitel and
57"Excerpts from  Testim ony of F ranz H aider,, taken at 
Nurnberg, Germany, 25 F eb ru a ry  1946, 1415-1730, by Captain.Sam 
H arris , JAGD, ’P lo ts.to  Overthrow the Nazi Government, .1938-1940, ’" 
Nazi Conspiracy - and A ggression, Supplement B (Washington: U. S. 
Government. P rin ting  Office, 1948), p. 1551. (H ereinafter re fe rre d  
to as Haider Testim ony,.)
58Ibid.
^ T a y lo r , Sword.and Swastika, p . . 198; see also W heeler- 
Bennett, op. c it . , p. . 392.
thereby, fu rther isolated .him self from  the seat o f  P o w e r .  60 The only 
m eans he had.left to combat the steady encroachm ent of the Nazi 
reg im e was von Brauchitsch, but "Beck soon rea lized  th is was a 
slender reed  to lean on and no re la tion  of mutual confidence developed 
between the two. "61 "B rauchitsch unquestionably belonged to the old 
school. . . .  He was by no m eans a convinced National Socialist, but 
like all the generals he had to accept the fact of. H itle rTs enormous 
popularity. "62 Von Brauchitsch had no d es ire  to place him self in 
charge of a movement to oppose or re s tra in  H itler,, for he was con­
vinced that H itler had the support of the Germ an people. - "Why in 
heavens name, " von B rauchitsch  demanded after the w a r , , "should I, of 
a ll men in the world,, have taken action against H itler ? The German 
people had.elected him,, and the w orkers,, like all Germ ans, w ere p e r­
fectly  sa tisfied  w ith.his successfu l policy. "63
Although Beck could not approach H itler except through von 
B rauchitsch, he could, as Chief of Staff, w rite  staff studies expressing 
his views. - In. June .1937, Beck re tu rned  from  a v isit to F rance and 
thereupon issued a detailed staff mem orandum  expressing the folly of 
German, involvement in a p rem ature war. This memorandum  was a 
lengthy and .critica l evaluation of the H itlerian  thesis of. "inevitable
60Goerlitz, op. o it. , p. 323.
6^-Taylor, Sword and Swastika, . p. 196.
^ ^G o erlitz ,. op. c it. , p. 324.
63w heeler-B ennett, op .. c it. , p.. 400,. quoting from  m em or­
andum of Otto John.
war,. "64 N q w , .  in the spring  of 1938, Beck composed a se r ie s  of 
m em oranda to von B rauchitsch which strongly  m aintained that an 
attack  on .Czechoslovakia would provoke a world w ar that Germ any 
could not. expect to win. 65 BeckTs belief was sustained by the m ajority  
. of the G eneral Staff. In 1938, m ost of the sen ior Germ an officers be­
lieved that while Germany was m ilita rily  capable of defeating either 
Poland or Czechoslovakia,, she was not in a position to engage in a 
w ar with F rance. They also believed that an attack on Czechoslovakia 
would .force F rance and England to honor th e ir  trea ty  obligations to 
that country, and would th e re fo re  be tantam ount to an attack on these 
countries as well. The anxiety of the G erm an G eneral Staff was eased 
th e re fo re  when. H itler said, afte r the A ustrian  Anschluss in .March 1938, 
that "there is no h u rry  to solve the Czech question because A ustria  
has-to be digested f irs t. "66
H itler, however, in a se c re t m eeting with K eitel on 21 April 
1938, d iscussed  the . political and psychological facto rs involved in  
preparing  world opinion for a G erm an m ilitary, move against Czecho­
slovakia. L ater, on 21 May 1938, the C zech 's partia lly  m obilized th e ir  
fo rces and moved troops toward the G erm an fron tier. This placed 
H itler in a defensive position diplom atically. Greatly, angered, H itler 
boiled ..inwardly for a week and th e n ,. on 28 May. 1938, determ ined that
6 ^ Taylor, Sword and Swastika, p. 144.
6^w heeler^Bennett, op, c i t , , pp. ■ 392-393.
66 jod l diary, undated en try --fro m  context apparently  
w ritten  on o r about 11 M arch 1938.
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Germany, m ust attack Czechoslovakia before the end of the year. On
30 May 1938, he issued OPERATION PLAN GREEN. 67
The F uehrer signs directive green, where he sta tes his final 
decision to destroy  Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates 
m ilita ry  preparations all along the line. . . . The whole con­
tra s t  becomes acute once m ore between the F u e h re r s  intuition 
that we m ust do it this year and the opinion of the A rm y.that we 
cannot do it as yet, as m ost certain ly  the W estern Pow ers will 
in te rfe re  and we a re  not as yet. equal to them. 68
The issuance of OPERATION PLAN GREEN (FALL GRUEN) 
was the signal to Beck that tim e was fast running out for those who 
would deter-H itler from  war. He therefo re  increased  his efforts to 
intensify the resis tan ce  to-H itler. He prepared  m ore mem oranda,, set 
up se c re t m eetings with-the senior g e n e ra ls ,. and made m ore frequent 
contacts with key civilian opponents of H itler.
On..16 July, .1938, Beck, in the .last of his m em oranda to von 
Brauchitsch, proposed that the Com m ander-in-Chief call a meeting of 
a ll the senior generals, read  them his memorandum, and .then lead 
them to the Chancellery, w here—with-a united front--they. would demand 
of H itler that he stop preparations for aggressive war. 69 Beck con- 
vcluded.his memorandum with the w ords: "In o rder to safeguard our
position before h istory  and to keep the repute of the Supreme Command 
of the Arm y.unstained, Thereby place ori reco rd  that I refuse to approve 
any w arlike adventures of the National Socialists. "70 Beck told.von
67jbid.
68jod.l diary,. 30 May 1938.
O^Tavlor,. Sword.and Swastika, pp.. 197-199; see also 
G oerlitz, oo. c it. , p. 328.
70Goer.litz, op. c it. , p.. 329.
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Brauchitsch that if H itler refused  to stop his plans for war, the 
generals should resign  .in a body. ^
The meeting, was arranged  for 4 August 1938. Beck had 
prepared  a rousing,speech for von B rauchitsch to read  to the generals 
incorporating details from  his m em orandum . Von Brauchitsch, 
however,, declined to speak ,. and it fell upon.Beck to read  his own 
mem orandum  of 16 July which he did .in a very  im pressive  m anner. 
For his part, von B rauchitsch made only, a few rem ark s  describ ing 
the situation m ere ly  as "serious.
:None of the generals p resen t voiced a dissenting, view, but 
neither did .any of them  a r ise  to .lead the assem bled  group .to the 
F uehrer do p resen t an Arm y ultim atum . One of the sen io r generals 
present, G eneral Wilhelm Adam, however, ex-chief of the Truppenam t 
and the C om m ander-in-C hief-designate of the w estern  fo rces in case 
of w ar, stood.up to support BeckTs views and--com plaining about the 
inadequacy of the w estern  d efenses--p red ic ted  that his fo rces would 
be speedily overrun by the French in case of w ar. ^3
Beck g rea tly  desired  von < B rauchitsch to dake the g en era lTs 
case to the Fuehrer, but the C om m ander-in-C hief would not do so. In 
his sum m ary .at the conclusion of the m eeting, "he stated  the fact that,
^ S h ir e r ,  op., c it. , p.. 368.
^ y ^ e e le r -B e n n e tt ,  0p. ci t . , p p .. 402-403; see also Shirer, 
op. c it , > p. 369,. and T a y lo r ,. Sword and Swastika, pp. 200-201.
^ T a y lo r , . Sword and Swastika, p.. 201.
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with two exceptions, a ll p resen t w ere opposed to war, but he made 
no appeal for action. "74
H itler quickly, learned of BeckTs m em orandum  and its p resen ­
tation to the assem bled genera ls. H aider, in his p re - t r ia l  in te rro g a­
tion at N urem berg, told.of the m em orandum  and H itle r^  reaction  to it:
Adolf H itler,, who had his sp ies everyw here, heard about the 
m em orandum. Of course it took a,few days before it was presented 
to H itler, but a lready ,H itler had asked where it was. . Then 
B rauchitsch subm itted the m em orandum  to him. I was not p resen t 
at th is conference. B rauchitsch told me . . ."he handed the 
mem orandum  to H itler and in broad outline expressed  the warning 
of a policy leading.to w ar. . . . H itler said that he,, as resp o n si­
ble leader of Germany, m ust decline a ll assum ptions that his policy 
would bring about a conflict. . . . Hit.lerTs m ain in te re s t was who 
got this m em orandum . He wondered who might have read  it, . . . .  
B rauchitsch replied  that only, the genera ls and som e higher officials 
of the OKH had learned about the m em orandum . "75
Upon learning, that BeckTs m em orandum  had been read  to a ll the 
sen io r generals, H itler was furious. Having always d istru sted  the "Old 
School, " he had come to feel that he could expect g rea te r  support from  
the younger officers like Guderian and M anstein. "In private conversa­
tion .H itler had. declared  that he would take Czechoslovakia with the old 
generals, and then take F rance with a new crop, "76 -He decided to 
assem ble the "new crop" to lis ten  to his philosophy and counteract the 
effect of BeckTs memorandum.
On 10 August 1938, H itler took, an extrem ely, unorthodox step.
He invited the Arm y Chiefs of Staff (except Beck), the Luftwaffe Group 
Chiefs of Staff,, and sev era l other general staff o ffice rs--b u t none of
74w heeler-B ennett, op. c it . , p. 403. 
^^Halder Testim ony, pp. 1549-1550.
76Taylor, Sword and Swastika, p . . 202.
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the com m anding.generals or sen ior o ffic e rs—to the Berghof, his r e s i ­
dence on the Qbersalzburg. above B erchtesgaden. This breach of 
protocol was a d irec t rebuff to the sen io r officers concerned. In the 
Germ an A rm y ,. where protocol m eant so much, it was an enormous 
affron t—one w hich .F ritsch , for example,, would never have to lerated .
After .lunch, the F uehrer spoke for th ree  hours on world 
politics, discussing each; European country individually and at some 
length. . During the harangue, the assem bled o ffice rs—ranging in rank 
from  Lieutenant Colonel to - Lieutenant G enera l--lis ten ed  politely. At 
its  close, however, the generals challenged the F u e h re r s  conclusions 
concerning the possibility  of A nglo-French nonintervention, the 
suprem acy of Germ an industry, and the streng th  of G erm anyTs w estern  
defenses. On the subject of G erm anyTs w estern  defenses, G eneral 
Adam’s opin ion--expressed  at the 4 August m eeting of the g en e ra ls --  
was presented to the F u eh re r. H itler becam e furious and .launched 
into one of his famous d ia tribes, b itterly  chastising .the officers m ost 
of whom had never experienced, such an exhibition. G eneral Jod.l 
described the luncheon and its  afterm ath  in his journal en try  of .11 
August .1938:
The subsequent attem pts.to  draw the F u eh re r’s attention.to the 
defects of our preparation, which a re  undertaken by. a few generals 
of the Army, a re  ra th e r  unfortunate. . . . The F uehrer becomes 
very  angry and fla res  up. . . . .  The cause of th is despondent 
opinion, which unfortunately enough i s  held very  widely within the 
Arm y G eneral Staff,, is  based on various reasons. F irs t  of all it 
[the General. Staff] is re s tra in ed  by old m em ories* political con­
sidera tions play a part as well, instead  of obeying and executing 
its  m ilita ry  m ission. That is certainly, done with technical devo­
tion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they 
do not believe in the genius of the F u eh rer. . And.one does perhaps 
com pare him with. C harles XII. And since w ater flows downhill, 
th is defeatism  may. not only possibly cause som e im m ense political
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damage,, for the opposition between the genera l’s opinion and that 
of the F uehrer is common ta,]fk, but may. also constitute a danger 
for the .m orale  of the troops. 77
P r io r  to 'th is  tim e, H itler perhaps had not rea lized .ju st how 
fa r the w ater had indeed "run downhill. " His solution, however,, was 
a sim ple and d irec t one—shut off the w ater. This meant that Beck 
had to be rem oved from  office. Three days a fte r the 15 August 1938 
Jueterbog, review , at which H itle r re ite ra te d  his intention to "solve 
the Czechoslovakian question by force, " Beck resigned --ask ing  von 
B rauchitsch to resign  with h im . Von B rauchitsch declined, however, 
saying. "I am a so ld ie r; it is my duty, to obey. "78
H itler promptly, accepted Beck’s resignation  but insisted  that 
his departu re  be kept sec re t. F rom  m isguided patrio tism  and loyalty, 
and showing,unbelievable political naivete, Beck agreed. . As a. resu lt, 
no publicity was accorded the event. U lrich von H assell observed that 
Beck was "pure Clausewitz, without a spark  of Bluecher or Yorck. "79
In view of the failu re of Beck’s appeal to the generals and the 
rep resen ta tions that w ere circulating  in.London at the tim e, it was 
tru ly /a  tragedy, that Beck did not make an im m ediate public announce­
ment of his resignation. 80 The news of an open and violent d isagreem ent
77Jodi diary, 11 August 1938.
7 8 U lrich von. Has sell, The von,H assell D iaries 1938-1944 
(London: . Hamish Hamilton, 1948), pp. 21-22.
79yon H assell, op. c it. , p.. 347.
80on 18 August 1938, Ewald von K leist-Schwenzin was sent to 
England w here he spoke to S ir Robert. V ansittart, Chief:Diplomatic 
Advisor to the Government, and Winston Churchill. Vom K leist’s thesis 
- - th a t England and.F rance m ust strongly oppose H itle r’s dem ands upon 
Czechoslovakia, as the Germ an G eneral Staff,, led by Beck, did not want 
w ar and was opposed to H itle r’s w arlike in tentions—was passed to the 
B ritish  Foreign Secretary, and the P rim e  M inister who rece.ived.it with 
extrem e skepticism . W heeler-Bennett, op. c i t . , pp. 41.1-412.
31
betw een,H itler and his Chief of Staff at th is p a rticu lar tim e would have 
lent g rea t credence to von K leist’s v is it to the B ritish  lead ers  and 
"might have prompted Neville Cham berlain to think twice before reac h ­
ing for his um brella. "81
BeckTs successo r. G eneral F ranz Haider, was a strong 
opponent of H itler. When Beck resigned, he told the m em bers of the 
Germ an res is tan ce  group--w ith  whom he had been in .contact--that 
H aider was equally, determ ined to oppose H itle r’s plans for aggressive 
w ar. 82 in ■ his testim ony at N urem berg, H aider described  the situation 
at the tim e he was appointed Chief of the G erm an G eneral Staff:
If [the invasion of the Sudetenland] was to be prevented, action had 
to be taken. , With methods of m em oranda and resignation, nothing 
could be achieved. All that rem ained.w as the possibility  of force. 
Thus, the re s is tan ce  group, which at that tim e existed and became 
stro n g er in the OKH, ^was forced n ecessa rily  on the path of a m ili­
ta ry  revolt. After Beck had re tired , the C om m ander-in-C hief of 
the Army had asked me w hether I wanted to become his: su ccesso r. 
A fter a .sh o rt tim e for consideration, during which J  d iscussed  
m atte rs  with Beck, I answ ered: "If I take over th is office, I am
only, doing it in o rder to exploit alT possib ilities of that position 
for a fight against H itler and his reg im e. ” The C om m ander-in- 
Chief shook my hand, and that is how I became his chief of s t a f f .
Franz Haider cam e from  a professional m ilitary, fam ily in
Bavaria. His father had been a distinguished general. Am artillerym an ,
F ranz H aider served  as a staff officer to Crown P rince  Rupprecht of
81 T ay lo r,. Sword and Swastika, p. 204.
83 "E xtract from  Testimony, of. Defense W itness F ranz Haider, " 
Document. 3798-PS, P rosecution  Exhibit .1451, T ria ls  of War C rim inals 
before the Nuernburq M ilitary  T ribunals under Control Council Law 
No.. 10. --N uernburq, October .1946-A pril .1949 (Washington: U. S. 
Government P rin ting  Office, 195.1), X. p. 549.
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B avaria in the F irs t. World War. He served  in the Truppenam t from  
1926 until 1931 when he. re tu rned  to Munich to become chief of staff, 
f ir s t  of a division, and .later a corps. H ere also, he subsequently 
commanded the 7th Division until his appointment to the G eneral Staff 
as an ass is tan t to Beck. Besides his reputation as a believing 
C hristian, he was the f irs t  Bavarian and the f ir s t  Catholic to be 
appointed Chief of Staff: A man of wide in tellectual in te re s ts  with a 
specia l bent for botany, and m athem atics, H aider was re luctan t to con­
cede that his duty might some day. compel him to become the f irs t  Chief 
of the G eneral Staff to plan the overthrow of the G erm an governm ent. 85
■ Haider rapid ly  became the cen ter of the plot to rem ove H itler, 
and it was he who prepared  the detailed m ilita ry  plans for the P u tsch . 
Th‘e P u tsch—a counter plan to Fall G ruen--w as prepared  with infinite 
ca re  and was to be executed .on Ha.lderTs o rder in lieu of OPERATION 
PLAN GREEN at such tim e as H itler o rdered  the A rm y.into Czecho­
slovakia.
C o-consp ira to rs with Haider w ere G eneral Stulpnagel,
H aider's  chief of p lan s; > Count Wolf von H elldorf,, Chief of the B erlin  
Police ; Count F ritz  von Schulenburg, the Deputy Chief of the B erlin  
P o lice; G eneral Erwin von W itzleben, Com mander of the B erlin  M ili­
ta ry  Area, and HI C o rp s ; G eneral Count .Erich von Brockdorff-Ahlefeld, 
Com mander of the Potsdam  G arrison ; and G eneral E rich  Hoepner, 
Commanding G eneral of an arm ored  division in Thuringia. T here were,
8^Whee.ler-Bennett, op. c it . , p. 405 fn. 
85Qoerlitz, op, -cit. , p. 331.
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in addition to these m ilita ry ;lead ers , D r., C arl G oerdeler,, ex -m ajor of 
L eipzig ; Johannes P o p itz ,, P ru ss ian  ‘M inister of F inance;. D r. H jalm ar 
Schacht, P residen t of the Reichsbank; U lrich  v o n H a sse ll,, ex-A m bas- 
s a d o r ,to Italy;, and other le s s e r  known figures who had become d isen­
chanted with.the F u e h re r^  plans for the Third.Reich. Allied with the 
p lo tters and.supplying.them w ith.inform ation and a se c re t co u rie r 
se rv ice  w ere A dm iral C anaris, Chief of the Abwehr {'Secret P o lice] 
and his deputy, Colonel Hans O ster, . Deeply.involved.in the plotting 
and in tim ately  aw are of a ll the plans w ere Hans Gisevius,. an official 
of the P ru ss ian  .M inistry of In terio r, and .Erich Kordt, Chief of 
Ribbentrop’s s e c re ta r ia t in the Foreign Office. 8®
The plan of the "Haider P lot" was a sim ple one. . Upon rece ip t
by Haider of H itle rTs o rder to execute OPERATION PLAN GREEN,
G eneral W itzleben's troops would, surround the governm ent buildings
in Berlin, a r re s t. H itler-in  the Chancellery, and hold him for tr ia l  as
a w arm onger before the Germ an Peoples Court. 87
It had been planned to occupy, by m ilitary, fo rce the Reich. Chancel­
lory. and those Reich offices, p a rticu la rly  M inistries, which w ere 
adm inistered  by< Party, m em bers, and close supporters of H itler, 
with the express intention of avoiding bloodshed, and then trying 
the group before the whole Germ an nation.
The case  against. H itler had ..already been prepared  by D r. E rnst 
Sack of the Judge Advocate GeneraUs D epartm ent. . A. panel of psychia­
tr is ts ,  under the chairm anship of P ro fe sso r  D r. K arl Bonhoeffer, had
8^ H aider Testimony, pp. 1551-1563; see a ls o ‘W heeler-Bennett, 
op. c it. , p. 407; S h irer, op. c it. , pp. 375-405; and G oerlitz, op. c it .
87Ha.lder Testimony,, loc.. c it. ; see  also G oerlitz, op., c i t . , p. 334.
^^Halder Testimony, loc.. c it.
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prepared  to dec lare  H itler Insane based upon his actions and .his p rio r 
m edical reco rd . H itle r!s case h isto ry  on file at the Pas ewalk m ed ica l 
hospital, w here he had once been a patient,, suggested his ce rtifica tio n -- 
but nothing had ever been done about it* 89
; Exactly what was to happen a fte r the A rm y’s se izu re  of power 
was not c lear. H aider’s ultim ate intention, however, was to establish  
a ca re tak e r m ilitary, governm ent until another civil government could 
be formed. . H aider likened th is "transition  period" to the tim e : "Seeckt 
had taken over the executive p o w e r ^ O  and .the Reich Government had 
re tire d  for a period. " In H aider’s view, "Such a .tran s ito ry  period 
was n ecessa ry  in o rd er to give the G erm an people a chance to make 
up th e ir  minds and .to show to the G erm an people what so rt of pnen 
w ere at the head of the G erm an state. The m a teria l for this enlighten­
ment of the people had been collected by o ther people like C a n a r i s . " 9 1  
To be head of sta te  during, the transition  period, Haider had initially  
selected  v o n .F ritsch --b u t von F ritsch  politely refused. 92 Haider then 
settled  on von.B rauschitsch whom he did not bring into the plotting, 
however, until a very  la te date to avoid exposing.the C om m ander-in- 
Chief to the r isk  of H itler ’s p rem aturely 'd iscovering  , the plot. . As 
Haider la te r  testified , "I had to keep my C om m ander-in-C hief apart.
89W heeler-Bennett, op. c it*, p. 407.
90.1923-1924, under the W eimar Republic.
91 Haider Testimony, pp. 1552-1553.
92Goerlitz, op. c it. , p .. 335.
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I had .to keep him c lear of th is. 1 may. play with my own head, but not 
someone e lse ’s. "93
The te rr ib le  tensions of the Czechoslovakian c r is is  in la te 
Septem ber 1938 provided an ideal psychological environm ent for the 
proposed Putsch to oust H itler. Never again would such an opportunity 
p resen t itself.
For/the f i r s t  tim e--and  it was to be the la s t—the G eneral Staff 
had the chance of strik ing  a blow,, and discontent w ith 'H itler was 
so w idespread as to prom ise such.an excellent chance of success. 
The m asses had cheered H itler rap tu rously  when he brought 
them peace and bread. The m asses w ere now wavering, for he 
was bringing them peace no longer. 94
To arouse  enthusiasm  for his w arlike declaration  against
Czechoslovakia, H itler o rdered  the parade of a m otorized division in
B erlin  on.2.7 Septem ber 1938. The B erlin e rs  did not want w ar and w ere
in no mood for a parade. . Consequently, the m arching,troops received
.little  attention and le ss  applause from  the .few apathetic specta to rs .
W illiam L.. S h ire r ,. an eyewitness to the event, re la ted : "At the urging
of a policeman, I walked down the W ilhelm strasse  to the R eichskanzler-
platz w here H itler stood on a balcony of the Chancellery, reviewing the
troops. There w eren’t two hundred people there , H itler looked grim ,
then angry, and soon went inside,, leaving his troops to parade by
unreviewed. "95 G eneral von W itzleben, com m ander of the troops on
parade, " la te r confessed.that he was tem pted to unlim ber his guns
93H aider Testimony, p. 1553, 
94Qoerlitz, op. c it. , pp.. 334-335. 
95sh irer, op., c i t , , p. 399.
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right th e re  before the Chancellery, and then go in and lock ’ that 
fellow1' up. ”96
Haider considered th ree  conditions essen tia l to a .successfu l 
revolutionary, action, "The f irs t  condition is a c lea r and reso lu te  
leadership . The second condition is the read iness of the m asses of 
the people to follow the idea of the revolution. The th ird  condition is 
the right choice of time.. "97 The Chief of Staff believed that in.Sep­
tem ber 1938 the f ir s t  two conditions existed. Accordingly, he had 
arranged  with Jodi to give him at leas t five days1 notice of the o rder 
to Germ an troops to m arch  toward the Czech border. Jodi prom ised 
OKH that at least forty-eight hours notice would be provided. 98 This 
gave Haider enough tim e to com plete his plans and make la st minute 
dispositions of the troops for the Putsch . In H aider’s opinion, H itle r’s 
o rder to the Army to invade Czechoslovakia would be incontrovertible 
proof to the people of the la t te rTs d esire  for war, and would be an 
appropriate tim e for the P u tsch . All the requirem ents for a successful 
revolt would thus be met.
The tensions in the Allied capitals and in Berlin increased  as 
Septem ber .1938 drew to a close. On 24 September, Neville Cham ber­
lain re tu rned  to London from  Godesberg where he had received H itle r’s 
newest demands on.Czechoslovakia. These demands w ere promptly 
transm itted  to the Czech government which im m ediately ordered  general
96Goerlitz, op. c it . , p. 338. 
97nalder Testimony, p. 1557. 
96jod.l diary, 8 September, 1938.
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m obilization. . The French governm ent called  up.400, 000 re se rv is ts  in 
addition,to those already"on duty, and the B ritish  H ighS eas F leet put 
to sea. . W ar■ appeared.im m inent.
On: 27; September, the th ird  condition for a. successfu l Putsch 
-- th e  right tim e--w as sa tisfied ; H itler issued  the order, for the G er­
man troops to occupy th e ir  attack positions for the invasion, of Czecho­
slovakia. 99 Also on the 27th H aider,, as he testified  la te r  at N urem ­
berg, "initiated" von Brauchitsch into the plan. M eantime, the Germ an 
people w ere g reatly  disturbed by the ru m o rs of w ar as evidenced by 
public reaction  to the parade o rdered  by H itler [page 35 su p ra ] . By 28 
Septem ber, the H aider cabal was convinced that the tim e was ripe  to 
execute the P utsch . , Haider,, th e re fo re ,. summoned v o n  Witzleben, 
Schacht, and Hans Gisevius to his apartmentlOO.in a quiet sec to r of 
B erlin  to d iscuss th& final act. 101 The Putsch was about to be executed 
when, on the 29th the news of the pact of Munich arrived . At Munich, 
H itler, M ussolini, D alad ie r,, and Cham berlain had reached an ag ree ­
ment subsequently announced by the B ritish  P rim e M inister as "Peace 
in our tim e. " The consp ira to rs against H itler w ere stunned. Once 
again the F u eh rer was spared  by. a ,s troke  of that evil good fortune that 
appeared.to  guide his destiny. . H aider described  the situation, in b itter 
w ords:
99 jodl diary, 27 Septem ber 1938.
^90ga]_^ e r  n0j- yet mGved to the luxurious v illa  in Grune- 
wald that was la te r  provided him by H itler as his official residence.
lOi-Halder T estim ony; see also Hans Bernd Gisevius, To The. 
B itte r End (Boston: Houghton M ifflin Company, 1947), p. 287.
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The nation was ready to assen t to a .revo lu tionary .ac t for fear of 
w ar, . . . The choice of tim e was good because we had to expect 
. , . the o rder for execution of a .m ilitary , action. T herefore we 
w ere firm ly  convinced that we would be successful.
■ But now cam e M r . , Cham berlain, and with one stroke the 
danger of w ar was avoided. H itler re tu rned  from  Munich as an 
unbloody v ic tor glorified by.Mr. Cham berlain andJVL D aladier, 
Thus,, it was a m atte r of course that the Germ an people greeted  
and.enjoyed his successes. Even in the c irc le s  of H itle rTs 
opponents—the sen io r officer co rp s—those successes of H itle r^  
made an enormous im pression . . . . With the stroke of a pen, 
an open victory, was attained. The c r itic a l hour for force was 
avoided. 1 ^
At H alderfs p re - tr ia l  in terrogation  at Nurem berg, the in te r­
rogato r asked .the ex-Chief of Staff, "Do I understand you to say that if 
Cham berlain had not come to Munich, your plan would have been 
executed,, and H itler would have been deposed?" H a id e r^  response 
was, "I can only say, the plan would have been executed, I do not know 
if it would have been.successful. "103
The success of the Munich conference convinced H itler that 
not only was his intuition in political m a tte rs  infallible but that the 
tim e was ripe for a .fu rth er re s tr ic tio n  of the authority of the generals. 
"H itler was now wholly the autocrat. He was sh o rt-c ircu itin g  both the 
custom ary diplom atic channels and the G eneral Staff, the .latter now 
having perforce abandoned its  advisory function and sunk to the level 
of a m ere  executive tool. "104
Von B rauchitsch and .Haider found th e ir  spheres of authority
i
m ore constricted  daily, and the re  was little  they could do about.it.
lO ^jjalder Testimony, p. 1558. 
1Q3Ibid.
lO^Goerlitz, op. c it . , p. 340.
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The G erm an people and--to  a .le s se r  ex ten t--the  Germ an A rm ed  F orces 
w ere delighted by H itle r’s bloodless v ic to ry  at Munich. The notion that 
H itler was infallible becam e w idespread. The F u eh re r’s p restige 
soared  and the generals w ere pow erless to counter his increasing  
incursions into th e ir previously inviolate prerogatives. Obviously, a 
Putsch was now im practicab le ; yet the only rem aining weapon against 
H itle r’s po.licies--the wholesale resignation  of the G eneral Staff--w as 
wholly antithetical to the education, custom s, and trad ition  of the 
Germ an officer corps. The initiative had passed to H itler, and the 
moment for revolt had gone--never to re tu rn .
. At a m eeting with Keitel, Jodi, von Brauchitsch, Haider, 
Goering, and.R aeder—held om23 May .1939 in his study, in.the 
R eichskanzlei- - th e  F uehrer announced his intention 'ho attack Poland 
at the f ir s t  suitable opportunity. "105 The G eneral Staff was d irected  
to p repare  OPERATION PLAN WHITE (F all W eiss) in detail. Behind 
a .sc reen  of diplom atic and political camouflage,, the m ilita ry  planning 
was completed, and on 1 Septem ber 1939 the forces of the Third Reich 
attacked-Poland. On 3 Septem ber, B rita in  and F rance declared  war on 
Germany, and World .War II had begun. The lightning success of the 
W ehrm acht’s Blitzkreicr in Poland fu rth e r whetted H itle r’s appetite for 
aggression, and he immediately, in itiated plans for attacking the Allies 
in the w est. The generals, however,, w ere not im m ediately taken into 
th e ir  le a d e r ’s confidence and rem ained ignorant of his s tra teg ic  aim s.
105uExtract from  Testim ony of. Defense W itness F ranz 
H aider, " p. 716; see also W heeler-Bennett, op. c it. ,  p.. 438.
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By 1939, because of the many, c r ise s  of confidence, H itler-and 
his General Staff w ere not communicating well. Lacking positive s t r a ­
tegic guidance from  the Chief of State, the G eneral Staff was preparing 
only for. defensive action in the w est. , Even;when the battle of Bzura 
was concluded in Poland, H itler and von B rauchitsch had not had an 
exchange of views on what- action the F ueh rer was contem plating in .the 
west. .G eneral Heinrich won ..Stulpnage.1,, Chief of the Operations Section 
of the G eneral Staff,: had prepared  an appreciation of Germ an offensive 
opportunities against 'France.,, and had concluded that the Germ an Army 
would not be adequately  equipped to break through the Maginot .line 
before 1942. In addition-, the G eneral S taff,. inhibited by-H itler’s recen t 
assu rance to Holland and Belgium, did not consider going through these 
countries to attack F rance. Accordingly, at the end of the Polish  cam ­
paign, the plans of the G eneral Staff w ere geared to placing the Army 
in a.defensive posture.-106 -Von.Brauchitsch was therefo re  totally 
unprepared for H itle r’s decision of 27 Septem ber 1939,. followed, by the 
OKW directive on 9 October which announced his plans to attack in the 
west. H itler mentioned G2 November 1939 as a possible date for com ­
mencing hostilities. “Without any previous consultation with;the 
Com m ander-in-Chief, he [H itler] not only o rdered  offensive m easures 
in the w est but even decided. on the tim ing and method to be adopted.
All these w ere m atte rs  which should on no account have been settled  
without the concurrence of the Com m ander-in-Chief. n107 The G eneral
106E rich  vomM anstein, Lost V ictories (Chicago;: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1958), p. 83 1
IQ^Ibid. , p . , 84.
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Staff was .left with the technical d irection  .of a w ar plan in which it had 
not been consulted and for which it could not guarantee any m easure 
of success.
Faced with this fait accom pli, von B rauchitsch and Haider 
developed-OPERATION PLAN YELLOW (Fall Gelb) for an attack in the 
West. By la te  October, however, the C om m ander-in-C hief and his 
Chief of Staff w ere try ing .to  persuade H itler to postpone the attack 
until spring. The many b itte r argum ents between H itle r  and .the Army 
over the timing, of the attack in the w est and the evolution of the o p e ra - ' 
tion plan ,itself a re  recounted in the following .chapter.
Although the generals did not cease  th e ir  clandestine r e s i s ­
tance to H itler a fte r the Polish  campaign, and although the H aider 
cabal continued to plot against the F u eh re r , no fu rth e r plans of any 
consequence w ere developed for a m ilita ry  Putsch on the sca le  of that 
a rranged  for Septem ber 1938. The cam paign in the w est in 1940 was 
executed essen tia lly  by the sam e high command that had controlled the 
arm ed  fo rces since the resignation  of Ludwig Beck. . Supported by 
K eitel and Jodi at OKH and aided by his adjutant Colonel Rudolf 
Schmundt, H itler personally; d irec ted  the w estern  cam paigns. , In 
doing .so, he paid ever m ore attention to the details of the tac tica l 
battle even though von B rauchitsch and H aider opposed his b rash  in te r­
ference with purely tac tica l m ilita ry  m a tte rs . The resu lting  .civil- 
m ilita ry  dichotomy met with mixed success dependent upon the degree 
to which battlefield  tac tics  w ere dictated by H itler and based upon 
political ra th e r  than m ilita ry  considerations.
CHAPTER II
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING
On 10 January 1940--four months before the Nazi invasion of 
the W est-- a. Germ an a irc ra f t  with engine trouble made a forced .land­
ing ;12 m iles north  of M aastrich t at M echelen-sur-M euse in Belgian 
Limbourg. The pilot and his passenger w ere apprehended by Belgian 
au thorities, and the official G erm an documents they w ere carry ing  
w ere impounded by the Belgian governm ent.
This incident, re la tive ly  unimportant, in itself, may have had 
fa r-reach in g  consequences for the success of the Germ an invasion of 
the low countries and F rance, and perhaps for the outcome of the 
en tire  w ar in-Europe.
This p articu la r a irp lane was carry ing  M ajor Helmut Rein- 
berger, an.im portant Luftwaffe staff officer and Commandant of the 
P arachute School at Stendal, who had been detailed to help form  the 
plans for the a irborne invasion of Holland. For personal reasons, 
M ajor R einberger was anxious to hasten the tr ip  from  M uenster, 
w here he had been delayed awaiting tra in  connections, to his head­
q u arte rs  in Cologne. . Im patient at the delay, M ajor R einberger vio­
lated secu rity  regulations requ iring  him to trav e l by ra i l  and accepted 
the invitation of a M ajor Hoenmanns, an old friend and pilot, to fly him 
to Cologne. U nfam iliar with the type o.f plane he was flying, M ajor 
Hoenmanns se t a course taking them  over a bit of Belgian te rr ito ry , and
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became lo st in.the clouds. 1 It was at th is ex trem ely  inopportune m o­
ment that the a irc ra f t developed engine trouble and shortly  th e reafte r 
the plane, pilot, passenger, and the papers they, ca rrie d  w ere on the 
ground , in Belgian territo ry*
M ajor'R einberger attem pted to burn his papers as soon as 
the plane landed but was stopped in  the ac t by B elgian .so ld iers who 
hastened to the scene. Later,, at the Belgian headquarters where he 
was taken, he again attem pted to destroy  the documents by grabbing 
them  from  a table where they had been placed and throwing them  into 
a stove. Again the papers w ere saved when an a le r t Belgian officer 
re triev ed  them before they w ere burned. The documents w ere then 
delivered to the proper Belgian au thorities who im m ediately d e te r­
mined: th e ir  significance and com m unicated their, contents to the 
B ritish  and French governm ents. 2
The documents ca rried  by M ajor R e inberger included a draft 
.of the Germ an Operation P lan--com plete  with m ap s--fo r the invasion 
of F rance through Belgium and Holland. Only the date was blank.
The attack had been planned, however, to s ta r t  in seven, day s.
The German. ^Embassy, in B ru sse ls  reported  that R einberger 
had burned the papers to "insignificant fragm ents, the size of the 
palm of his hand. G eneral A lfred Jodi, Chief of H itle rTs Supreme 
Staff (OKW), in his d iary  of 12 Jan u ary  1940 repo rted  consternation in
1 Telford Taylor, The M arch of Conquest (New York: Simon 
and .Schuster, 1958), p. 61.
^Shirer, op. c it. , p. 671.
3 Ibid.
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Berlin. . "If enemy is in possession of all files, the situation i s  ca ta ­
strophic. "4 At 1300, 12 January 1940, Jodi telephoned the Chief of the 
Arm y G eneral Staff to stop .a ll troop m ovem ents forw ard fo r the planned 
. attack. 5
The Germ an attack, which had been .delayed sev era l tim es 
because of changes in plans and bad w eather, was now postponed again 
on the basis of the com prom ised plan.
The G erm ans had good reason  to doubt M ajo r‘R einbergerTs 
statem ent that he had .destroyed .the plan. The Belgian governm ent 
o rdered  "Phase D" (the next to la s t step .in th e ir  m obilization) into 
effect and called up two new c lasse s . On. 17 January T940, the Belgian 
Foreign .M inister, P au l-H enri Spaak, told the Germ an am bassador that 
the Germ an documents that had recen tly  come into Belgian hands con­
tained c lea r and detailed proof of an intention to attack. 6
■ Winston=S. Churchill, in. his war m em oirs, 7 acknowledges 
rece ip t of the captured G erm an plans, although he gives .a wrong date 
for the a irp lane mishap.; and re feren ce  to rece ip t of the inform ation.is 
found in the d ia rie s  of sev e ra l of the h igh-ranking.officers on.the French 
G eneral Staff of the period. . In .every case, the inform ation appears to 
have confirm ed the belief of the B ritish  and F ren ch  governm ents that
 ^Jodi diary, 12 January ,1940.
^Ibid.
^Shirer, op. c it . , p. .672.
^Winston .S. Churchill, The Second ..World War, Vol I: The 
Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Co.., The.R iverside 
P re ss , 1948), pp. ,556-557.
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th e ir  cu rren t w ar plans to m eet the anticipated Germ an attack w ere 
sound and requ ired  no revision.
The reaction  of the German w ar -leaders to the news that 
th e ir  w ar plans had been ■compromised is in teresting . G eneral A lbert 
K esselring, in B erlin  at the tim e, described  it:
On .12 January. .1940, as Chief of the B erlin  Air. Command, I 
as usual conveyed to the R eichsm arschall our birthday greetings.
. . . W hispers had been cu rren t the day before that th e re  had 
been a .fla re -u p  between Goering and H itler, though nobody knew 
the reason . . When m y appointment with Goering was put forw ard 
an hour I guessed this had something to do with this ro tten  busi­
ness. I was right. Never before or afterw ard  did I see Goering 
, so down in the dumps, and that is saying something with Goering?s 
tem peram ent. But he had reason  enough for his depression. It 
turned out that a flying officer had m ade a forced ..landing in 
Belgium with a passenger carry ing  a d raft of our plan of campaign. 
That th is should have happened to an airm an  of a ll people was 
enough to unsettle s tronger nerves than GoeringTs. The extent of 
the harm  done, however, could not be gauged, as no c lea r rep o rt 
of the incident was available; we did not know parts  of the plan 
the pilot had been unable to burn and had thus fallen into the hands 
of the Belgian G eneral Staff and consequently. into those of the 
French and B ritish .
When.Air M arschal Winninger, our som etim e A ir Attache in 
London, who rep resen ted  our a ir  in te re s ts  in the Benelux coun­
tr ie s ,. a rriv ed  soon a fte r me, he was unable to give an entirely  
. satisfactory, explanation.either. . We had none of us any doubts on 
that day that a co u rts -m a rtia l sentence hung over the two unfor­
tunates. But here, as altogether in the f ir s t  cam paigns,, luck was 
on our side inasm uch as the im portance of the capture -  to put it 
briefly  - was not recognized by. the enemy ^ and on our side the 
o v er-a ll plan was soon changed. °
A ir M arshal Helmuth Felmy, Com mander of the Air F leet to 
w hich'M ajor R einberger was assigned, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel 
Josef Kammhuber, w ere both relieved  by Goering over the airp lane 
incident although th e re  was no proof of th e ir  complicity, in the m atter. 
A ir M arshal Felmy, was re tire d  to civilian life  and Colonel Kammhuber
^K esselring, op. c it. , p. 48.
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• was sent to B avaria to command a bom ber group. . A fter joining the 
Nazi P arty  in May 194.1, Air M arshal Felm y was reca lled  to active 
duty ; Colonel Kammhuber survived -the w ar to eventually become the 
head of the West Germ an Air Force. ^
G eneral K esselring  was made Commanding G eneral of A ir 
F leet Two supporting G eneral Fedor von BockTs Arm y Group B afte r 
the previous com m ander,, A ir M arshal Felmy, had been relieved. In 
describ ing his f irs t  conversation with G eneral Bock a fte r assum ing com ­
mand of A ir -Fleet Two, K esselring  says: "The offensive had actually
been o rdered  for the m iddle of February, but though we considered it 
probable th e re  would be changes in the plan they w ere not of sufficient 
moment for us to d iscuss them.
It appears, therefore, that though acknowledging,the original 
plan would have to be changed as a re su lt of the com prom ise, the high 
ranking field com m anders felt that these changes would be slight.
When the Polish  campaign was successfu lly  term inated, the 
F u eh rer had turned quickly to the task  of mounting an offensive against 
F rance. The Germ an high command,, desiring  tim e to re tra in  the d is ­
organized divisions which had been engaged in Poland and to rep lace 
the key lead ers  and c r itic a l m a te rie l that had been lost, was not 
overly  enthusiastic about the proposed sudden attack against such 
form idable opponents as B ritain  and F rance. Spurred on, however, 
by H itler, who demanded instant action, the OKH produced the original
^Taylor, The M arch of Conquest, p. 62. 
^ K e sse lr in g , op. c it. , p . . 51.
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OPERATION PLAN YELLOW of the 19 and 29 October 1939 as the 
basis for offensive action.in.the w est. This .was the plan that was 
captured by the Belgians and placed im the hands of the B ritish  and 
■ French.
Germ an c r itic s  of the plan immediately, attacked it as only, a 
slightly-m odified v ersion  of the tim e honored .SCH.LJEF.FEN PLAN of 
1914. They questioned its  application to the conditions prevailing in 
1939--som e 25 y ea rs  a fte r its inception.
For two generations p rio r to 1939,. the SCHLIEFFEN PLAN 
had been a magic phrase to German m ilitary , students and planners.
The g rea t plan of G raf. Schlieffen,. worked out while he was Chief of 
the Germ an G eneral Staff from  1891 to 1905, had received  the approval 
and adm iration of the apologists for the G erm an defeat of 19,18. Had 
the plan been followed as originally  conceived by.-Schlieffen, they said, 
ra th e r  than modified as it was by the younger Moltke, Germ any would 
have very, easily, achieved g rea t v ic tory  over F rance in the west.
Although much has been attribu ted  to the SCHLIEFFEN PLAN, 
very, little  was actually, known about its  details until G erhard R itter, an 
em inent Germ an h istorian , uncovered the orig inal Schlieffen papers in 
the United States A rchives in Washington afte r World. War II. They 
had been ca rrie d  th e re  a fte r the w ar along with a m ass of other German 
documents captured at Potsdam  by United States fo rces. R itter, in his 
book, The Schlieffen Plan, C ritique of a Myth, published in 1958, p re ­
sents the orig inal Schlieffen papers in detail. As B. H. Liddell 
H art points out in his foreword to R itte r’s book, the magic of the 
SCHLIEFFEN PLAN was actually  a myth. "As a s tra teg ic  concept it
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proved a snare  and a .delusion for the executants, with fatal conse­
quences that w ere on balance inherently  probable from  the outset.
The problem  faced by/Schlieffen in .1900 was much the sam e 
as that faced by H itler in the fall of 1939. Both, men w ere haunted by 
the sp ec tre  of a w ar on two fro n ts--o n e  against the R ussians in the 
east and the other against the A llies in the west. In .1939, as in .1900, 
the combined strength  of G erm any’s opponents was vastly  superio r to 
her own. Although H itler had recen tly  signed a trea ty  with the Soviets, 
he was se riously  concerned.about the secu rity  of his easte rn  fron tier.
Schlieffen1 s solution to his s tra teg ic  dilem m a was to deal 
with the ad v e rsa ries  separa te ly : f irs t, knock F rance out of the war 
and then tu rn  east to deal with the R ussian forces.
Tactically , Schlieffen’s plan was a bold one--Napoleonic in 
concept and scope. It has been described  as "little  m ore than a 
gam bler’s belief in the v irtuosity  of sh eer audacity.
In sim ple te rm s ,, Schlieffen’s plan for the conquest of F rance 
envisioned a g rea t wheel of the G erm an A rm ies ac ro ss  northern  
Belgium to the channel coast and then southwest to the r e a r  of the 
opposing French fo rces. Under th is plan, the Germ an form ations 
facing the m ain .French Army, in the cen ter would attack to hold them 
in place while the bulk of the G erm an Arm y would envelop the northern  
flank of the F rench by m arching deep through-Belgium and Holland.
The pivot point of th is g rea t envelopment was to be .in the vicinity of
^ G e rh a rd .R itte r , The Schlieffen Plan, critique of a m yth, 
tran s . Andrew and Eva,W ilson (New York: P raeg e r [1958J), p. 4.
12Ibid.
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Metz,, with Germ an strength  stead ily .increasing  toward the outside of 
the wheel or righ t flank. . If the French could be induced to cooperate 
by /.launching a sim ultaneous attack south of Metz, the effect would be 
much the sam e as a g rea t revolving door with the heavier forces on the 
G erm an 'righ t gaining momentum as French p re ssu re  was exerted 
against German, defenses south of the Ardennes.
The orig inal OPERATION PLAN YELLOW, prepared  by 
G eneral F ranz Haider and the Germ an Arm y G eneral Staff, was un­
doubtedly, insp ired  by Sch.lieffen7s tactical concepts, but resem bled 
.Schlieffen7s plan only in the proposed in itia l action of the right wing in 
Belgium and the placing of preponderant fo rce including panzer units 
on the north. The s tra teg ic  aim  of the OKH o rd er was far le ss  am bi­
tious than the SCHLIEFFEN PLAN.
The OKH Plan called for the m ain weight to be placed on the 
north where Arm y Group B under G eneral Fedor von Bock would make 
the main effort. G eneral Gerd von R undstedt's Arm y Group A in the 
cen ter would make a secondary attack and pro tect BockT's left flank. 
Army, Group C,. under G eneral Wilhe.lm R itte r von Leeb, facing the 
Maginot Line, was to attack to pin down the French forces deployed-to 
pro tect the fron tier. Arm y Group B on the north was to have a to tal of 
thirty, divisions for I ts  task, including, all of the mobile fo rces (nine 
arm ored  and .four m otorized divisions). Arm y Group A., in the center, 
was allocated, twenty two divisions, none of which w ere arm ored .
Army. Group G in the south was allocated eighteen divisions to hold the 
line from  Luxembourg to Switzerland. [See figure ,1. ]
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OPERATION PLAN YELLOW fFall Ge.lbl was received with 
mixed emotions by the Germ an G enerals who had to execute it.
G eneral Heinz Guderian, whose panzer corps was to p la y a  
m ajor part in leading.the a ttac h ,. sta ted : !,It is true  that this plan had
the advantage of sim plicity, though hardly the charm  of novelty.
Other distinguished Germ an m ilita ry  planners thought even 
le ss  of the OKH plan. Lieutenant G eneral E rich  von M anstein, then 
Chief-of-Staff for G eneral Rundstedt, com m ander of Army Group A, 
who would partic ipate in the execution of the plan, had this to say:
I found .it humiliating, to say the .le a s t,. that our generation 
could .do nothing better than repea t an old recipe, even when this 
was the product of a. man Tike Schlieffen. . What could possibly be 
achieved by turning up a w ar plan our opponents had a lready  r e ­
h earsed  with us once before and against whose repetition  they 
w ere bound to have taken full precaution
G eneral Manste.inTs previous duty as Chief of the Operations 
and .Plans Staff Section of the Germ an G eneral Staff certain ly  would 
seem  to have made him an au tho rized .critic  of the m erits  of the OKH 
plan. As finally accepted and adopted by ■Hitler, M anstein 's recom ­
mendations for m odification of this f irs t  plan a re  both in teresting  and 
pertinent to the investigation of the causes behind .the eventual and 
fateful course of events.
Manstein. objected both to the narrow  stra teg ic  concept of the 
plan and .to the tactics to be employed to achieve the stra teg ic  end. 
F irs t, the plan as w ritten  did not contem plate the u tter and final defeat
^ H e in z  Guderian, P anzer Leader (New York: E. P ..D utton  
and C o .,. In c ., 1952), p. 89.
^M anste in , op. c it. , p. 98.
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of the F rench Army, Rather, the aim  of. the operation expressed  in 
paragraph one of the OKH operation o rder of 19 O ctober 1939, was:
G eneral intention*. To defeat the la rg e s t possible elem ents 
of the F rench and Allied A rm ies and sim ultaneously to gain as 
much te r r ito ry  as possible in Holland, Belgium and N orthern 
F rance as a basis for successfu l a ir  and sea  operations against 
B rita in  and as a broad protection for the Ruhr.
That the Arm y Operation O rder expressed  a lim ited stra teg ic  
aim  is understandable. Its "G eneral Intention" m erely  re ite ra ted  the 
"Purpose of the Offensive" as w ritten  in the OKW D irective No 6 fo r 
the Conduct of the War (signed by H itler and dated 9 October 1939), 
upon which the Arm y plan was based. It was peculiar that the OKW 
D irective No 6 itse lf  did. not d irec t the annihilation of the A llies and, 
in th is sense, was not in consonance with H itle r’s s tra teg ic  concept 
as presented to the Arm ed F orces C om m anders-in-C hief and the ir 
Chiefs of Staff on 10 October 1939.
G eneral H aider rep o rts  the conference on 10 October 1939 at 
which H itler gave his s tra teg ic  guidance: "10 October 1939: F uehrer
Conference 1100—He reads us a m em orandum  giving us the Reasons 
for his decision to s tr ik e  a swift and shattering  blow in the West in case 
he is com pelled to continue hostilities. . . .. ’D irec tiv e’ w ill be issued 
s till today.
The m em orandum  re fe r re d  to by Haider was the Memorandum 
and Guiding P rinc ip les for D irecting the W ar in the W est. This is a 
lengthy and detailed document dealing with Germ an w orld-wide s tra teg ic
15Ib id ., p. 97.
l^H alder D iary, 10 October 1939.
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aim s .and policies. It is  rep le te  with .references to the requirem ent 
fo r 'th e  annihilation of the A llies.
The Germ an w ar aim  . . . m ust be to elim inate com pletely 
the m ilita ry  power of the west. . . . It is  and rem ains the d es tru c ­
tion of our w estern  enem ies. . . .  It m ust be the Germ an w ar n im  
to attem pt to annihilate the F rench and ..British fo rces . The gain in 
te rr ito ry , is of im portance only to the extent that it helps to destroy  
our enem ies,, and this is what counts in the long.run. T herefore 
f ir s t  of a ll the aim  should be to destroy, the enemy fo rces and not 
until then to occupy enemy, te rr ito ry . . . ... An.offensive which Is 
not aim ed from  the very  beginning at annihilating the enem y-forces 
is m eaningless and w ill only, re su lt in the use less w aste of human
. How this guidance from  H itler to .''annihilate1 the enemy could 
have been tran sla ted  by, the Germ an G eneral Staff into the lim ited objec­
tives of ..D irective No 6 is  difficult to fathom.
G eneral M anstein believed that by, placing the preponderance 
of strength  on the right, as contem plated in OPERATION PLAN 
YELLOW, . the Germ an main effort in the coming attack would come 
face to face with the strongest A nglo-French fo rces  and be forced to 
attack  them  frontally. Even if successfu l, the best that could be 
expected would be to drive them back behind the Somme. T h e re ,. re in ­
forced by. troops from  the Allied stra teg ic  r e s e rv e ,. they would have a 
very-strong defensive position. Thus, having lost the initiative, G er­
man fo rces would be faced with a w ar of a ttritio n  against a form idable 
foe w hich.still had m ajor fo rces intact. The German com m anders 
would.at one tim e be faced with the th rea t of a.Soviet attack from  the
^ U .. S. D epartm ent of the Army, F uehrer-D irectives and 
Other Top-Level D irectives of the G erm an Arm ed .Forces 1939-1941, 
T 223 C, Germ an Naval Staff A rchives (Washington:. 1949).
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east while the m ajor offensive power of the Germ an Army was being 
effectively entertained by-the B ritish  and the French.
G eneral M anstein 's s tra teg ic  solution in 1939 was to attack 
F rance f i r s t , . elim inate her-from  the w ar quickly by a , lightning arm ored  
th rust, then re tr iev e  and regroup the Germ an m ilitary, forces before the 
Soviets could m a rsh a l an effective offensive in the east. The tactical 
tr ic k  in this plan was to achieve a sudden victory-in the w est and quickly 
; disengage forces before the Soviets could achieve the m ajor troop red e ­
ployment necessary -fo r a s tra teg ic  offensive against the Reich.
M anstein im m ediately prepared  an alternative plan embodying 
;his own ideas. .He felt that if a su rp rise  attack employing m assed  
arm ored .d iv isions w ere launched through the hilly, and wooded Ardennes, 
it would achieve g rea t success and quickly gain the r e a r  of the Allied 
. a rm ies advancing east into Belgium. The m ore troops the A llies 
would.send into Belgium, the m ore would be trapped and liquidated by 
/the G erm an panzers. Then it. would be an easy m atte r to tu rn  the 
Germ an attacks south, capture P a ris , and attack the re s t  of the Allied 
forces in the Maginot Line from  the re a r .
Thus conceived, the plan embodies the conditions of success.
By. ski.llfully; distributing fo rc e s ,. von M anstein counted on obtaining 
maximum effectiveness by m eans of su rp rise , speed and power at 
the decisive place and moment. Appearing unexpectedly and in  
force out of a weakly defended region, he would crush  the defenses,
. c ro ss  the Meuse,, and then assem bling all his tanks he would push 
in the d irection  of the sea,, ac ro ss  the Allied lin es  of com m unica­
tion, inflicting.a staggering blow,, while a secondary th ru s t toward 
the south would, ensure freedom  of action and continuity of m aneuver.
It would.not be Cannae again; it would.be Arbela.
'■18J e a n  Vanwe.lkenhuyzen,. "The Origin of the Von M anstein 
■Plan, ” M ilitary/R eview ,. XXXVI (June 1956), p. 96.
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Once the draft of his plan was. com pleted, M anstein called 
G eneral Guderian, the forem ost Germ an authority  on arm ored  w arfare ,
. to h is  headquarters to d iscuss it with him . The m eeting was friendly 
. and inform al as the two w ere old friends.
M anstein asked Guderian to exam ine his plan from  the  point 
of view of a tank man. After carefully  studying the m ost up-to-date 
m aps of the Ardennes and reca lling  his experiences in the a re a  during 
the F irs t  World War, Guderian assured. M anstein th a t the operation he 
proposed was feasible and .'’could in fact be ca rried  out. The only 
, condition I attached was that a sufficient num ber of a rm ored  and 
m otorized divisions m ust be em ployed,. if possible a ll of them . " ^  
Encouraged by G uderian 's favorable comments on his plan,
• M anstein prepared  the f irs t  of sev era l m em oranda for OKH, proposing 
m ajor changes in the Yellow Plan. This f i r s t  m em o,: over R undstedt's 
. signature, was sent to OKH on 31 October 1939. , It m arked the begin­
ning of a sev ere  struggle with the Army G eneral Staff which vigorously 
opposed M anstein1 s proposals. On 1 November 1939, when G eneral 
H aider received  the c ritic ism  of his orig inal plan, he noted simply, in 
his journal: "Report from  Army Group A: Lacks positive aspects. "20
While M anstein and Guderian determ ined that a.G erm an arm ored  
attack through the Ardennes was feasible, the F rench High Command 
d ism issed  the possibility. G eneral M aurice Gamelin, Chief of the French 
G eneral Staff,, fe.lt that the heavily wooded hills of the Ardennes and the
^G u d erian , pp. c it., p. .89.
^ H a id e r  Diary, 1 November 1939.
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steep banks of the Meuse w ere im passable to m ajor arm ored  or m ech­
anized form ations. In his analysis of PLAN D--th e  plan the Allies 
w ere to use against the Germ an attack--G am elin  did not even discuss 
the possib ility  of a. Gorman th ru st in thi3 area .
Things could only happen in the north. Gamelin left only the 
possibility  of an outflanking,attack through Belgium, a renew al of 
the Schlieffen Plan of 1914. Our p lan  [French] therefo re, was to 
oppose th is with our best troops, at the expense of the cen tra l 
sec to r of the Ardennes itse lf  where, it was said, "The te rra in  
would defend itself. "21
The French preoccupation.with the old. SCHLIEFFEN PLAN 
was apparent to the younger and m ore astu te  Germ an genera ls. 
Guderian determ ined from  an analysis of F rench troop dispositions 
along the border that the F rench w ere deployed.against an anticipated 
repetition  of the SCHLIEFFEN PLAN, .and that the French counter 
s tra teg y  was to bring the m ajority  of th e ir best m otorized troops fo r­
w ard to m eet the expected G erm an th rust in the north through Holland 
and.Belgium. "A. sufficient safeguard of the hinge of th e ir  proposed 
advance into Belgium by re se rv e  un its—in the area ,, say, of C harle- 
v ille  and V erdun--w as not apparent. It seem ed that the F rench High 
Command did not reg ard  any alternative to the old SCHLIEFFEN 
PLAN as even conceivable. "22
Although slight m odifications w ere made in  the original plan 
by OKH, .none of them sa tisfied  ..Manstein,, and he continued his memo
21a .. Goutard, The Battle of F ran ce , 1940. t r a n s . . A. R. P. 
B urgess (New York: I . . W ashburn,. 1959), p . . 85.
22Quderian, QP* c i t . , p . . 97.
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w riting over Rundstedt’s signature. In addition to the orig inal memo 
■of. 3.1 O ctober-1939, M anstein sent six  other m em oranda to General 
H aider and-General W alter von B rauchitsch, Com m ander-in-Chief of 
the Germ an Army, proposing that the Army, Group A Plan be su b sti­
tuted, for that of the high command. . In response  to queries as to what 
action was being- taken on these m em oranda, he was told that they 
w ere "being considered. M
The degree to which Army. Group A’s recom m endations were, 
in fact, being, considered by'OKH is unclear. On 6 D ecem ber 1939, 
M anstein w rote H aider another personal .letter recapitu lating a ll the 
advantages of the Arm y Group A Plan. This le tte r  contained the de­
ta ils  of the en tire  plan. . On. .15 D ecem ber 1939, when his le tte r  had 
not evoked a reply, M anstein telephoned G eneral von.Stulpnagel, the 
O berquartie rm eiste r of the Army G eneral S taff,, and asked .when he 
could expect an acknowledgement of his .latest communication. This 
prom pted a re tu rn .ca ll from  H aider who, although he expressed  com­
plete agreem ent with the Arm y Group A. proposals, - sta ted  that he was 
u n d er■**s tr ic t  instructions** to leav e  the m ain effort with Arm y Group
13,, at le a s t until the offensive had begun. 23
M anstein might have assum ed.from  this that von Brauchitsch 
and Haider had come around to Army. Group A ’s way of thinking, in the 
m a tte r of the operation plan. He learned, however,, from  G eneral 
W arlimont, G eneral Jodi’s Deputy, that the Army G eneral Staff had 
never, subm itted the M anstein .Plan to H itle r  in any form . M anstein’s
^ M an ste in , op. c it . , p. 112.
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comment on this was: , "It was a ll ra th e r  perplexing as far as we w ere
f.
concerned. "24
The F uehrer himse.lf apparently never com pletely believed in 
the original OPERATION PLAN YELLOW and accepted it only with 
rese rv a tio n s. "His disenchantm ent with the plan m ay have been due to 
his "s tra te g ic -f la ir"; or perhaps he felt, as did M anstein,. that his new 
Reich could conjure up a newer and better plan. "His g rea tes t fear 
seem s to have been that the many bridges over the route of the northern  
wing could not be seized intact and that his arm ored  form ations would 
be slowed or halted before the m ain Allied a rm ies. "25
H itle rTs actions and o rd e rs  in November contribute to the 
picture of his d issatisfaction  with the plan. On November 1.1th, he 
form ed a new, fast-m oving, s trik ing ,fo rce  under Guderian to be em ­
ployed in the assau lt of the Meuse r iv e r  line at Sedan. M anstein r e ­
ports the rece ip t of the. follow ing,m essage from  OKH on. 12 November 
1939:
The F uehrer has now d irec ted  that a th ird  group of fast- 
moving -troops w ill be form ed on the southern wing of Twelfth 
■ Arm y o r in the sec to r allotted to Sixteenth-A rm y,. and that this 
w ill be d irected  , against Sedan, and the a rea  to the east of. it, 
taking advantage of the unwooded te r ra in  on either, side of Arlon, 
Tintigny and F lorev ille . Composition: Hq ,19th Corps, 2d and 
10th Panzer"D ivisions, one m otorized division, the Liebstan- 
darte  and the G ross-D eutschland Regim ents.
The task  of th is group will be:
(a). To defeat enemy m obile fo rces thrown into south­
ern  Belgium and thereby to lighten the task  of Twelfth and Six­
teenth-A rm ies ;
24Ibid.
2°Goutard, op. c it . , p.. 92.
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(b); To gain a su rp rise  hold on the west bank of the 
Meuse by or sou th -east of Sedan, thereby, creating.a.favourable 
situation fo r the subsequent phases of the operation,, specifically  
in the event of the arm ored  units under command of Sixth and 
F ourth 'A rm ies proving unsuccessful in th e ir  own sec to rs . 26
On 20 November 1939, H itler issued  a warning o rder (D irec­
tive No 8 for the Conduct of the W ar)27 for the possible employment 
of Bock7s a rm o r in the zone of RundstedNs Army, Group A after opera­
tions had begun. . Although this o rd er did not change the plan as w rit­
ten, today7s analysis of. it indicates that. H itler was considering a l te r ­
native co u rses  -of-action that closely, resem bled  M anstein7s plan. The 
. F uehrer apparently wanted to p repare  for a possible switch in the 
m ain effort from  Arm y Group B to Army Group .A in the event 
Rundstedt achieved g rea te r  In itia l success. This provision for a 
change in effort would give the suprem e command m ore flexibility of 
action a fte r the hattle  had been,joined and the in itial reaction  of the 
F rench and B ritish  fo rc e s  had been.determ ined.
It is  doubtful whether H itle r, in November and D ecem ber of
1939,. was aw are of the existence of the M anstein Plan. . M anstein 
him self is  unclear on th is point.
It is not c lea r w hether'H itler him self conceived the idea of 
shifting the main weight of the operation to Arm y Group A. or 
w hether he was even then [end of Novem ber] aw are of Army 
, Group Ais views.
On 24th'November, ,the day. a fte r he had addressed  the heads 
of the th ree  se rv ices  at Berlin, H itler received .Co.lonel-Genera.l 
v. Rundstedt. and G enerals Busch and Guderian. . . . .  I consider 
it m ost unlikely that v . . Rundstedt used this occasion to present 
H itler with our own draft plan, particularly , as v. B rauchitschls 
position was so p recarious ju st then.
26Manstein, op. c i t . , p.. 108.
^ F uehrer D irec tiv es , . Document T-320.19, p . . .140.
60
A few days la te r  B lum entritt '[Chief' of Operations Army-Group 
A] with my consent (given only  very  reluctantly , though with v. 
Rundstedt1 s approval), sent Colonel Schmundt [H itlerTs personal 
adjutant] a copy of my la s t mem orandum . W hether-it was passed 
on to H itler or even to - Jodi I cannot say. A.t a ll events, when 
H itler sent for me on the ,17th of F ebruary  to hear my views on an 
offensive in the west, he gave not the leas t hint that he had seen 
any of our memoranda, to OKH. 28
In any event, on 9 January, .1940, H itler o rdered  OPERATION 
PLAN YELLOW, only slightly modified by OKH, to be executed on 17 
January, 1940. The Germ an juggernaut was poised to s trik e  when the 
G erm an Staff received the news of the downed airp lane and the captured 
plans. The F u e h re r s  violent reaction  to th is news has been.well r e ­
ported by G eneral K esselring  [page 45 su p ra ] . . Goutard rep o rts  it 
from  the French point of view ?-
This incident [the captured plans] was laden with consequences, 
not only because it contributed to the scrapping of the Yellow Plan,
, which was already  in disfavor, but because it lent fu rth er weight 
to the F rench conviction that the G erm ans w ere going.to re -en ac t 
the Schlieffen.Plan, and.it re inforced  th e ir  intentions of sending 
into -Belgium as many troops as possible. This Flieqer.pech (a ir 
m ishap) made a substantial contribution to the success of the 
M anstein Plan.- 29
Although January .1940 saw the beginning of the end for OPERA­
TION PLAN YELLOW, including its  eventual abandonment and rep la ce ­
m ent by the M anstein Plan, tim e was running out for Manstein. as Chief- 
of-Staff for Rundstedt. D ism ayed by the OKHTs la te s t change in plans, 
which would have sp lit up the arm ored  divisions between the a rm ies 
ra th e r  than.em ploy them  in-m ass, M anstein w rote the ..last of his now 
famous m em oranda to the General. Staff pro testing  this decision. The
2^Manstein, op. c it. , p. 110. 
29Goutard, op. c i t . , p . . 92.
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fact that Guderian was in com plete accord with his action was but sm all 
consolation,, as this la s t mem orandum  cost him his job and the oppor­
tunity-to partic ipate  w ith 'the staff of Army Group A in the execution of 
his 'plan. Guderian said of his [Manstein* s] objection;
Any subdivision of our already  weak tank fo rces would have 
been the g rea tes t m istake that we could make. But it was p re ­
cisely  this that the High-Command was intent on-doing. M anstein 
becam e insisten t and, by so doing aroused such-anim osity in the 
High ..Command that he was appointed Commanding G eneral of an 
Infantry, Corps. . . .  ..A s  a re su lt our finest operational brain 
took the field as com m ander of a. corps in the th ird  wave of the 
attack, though-it was largely  thanks to his b rillian t initiative that 
the operation was to be such an outstanding success. 30
This memo was apparently "the straw  that broke the camel*s 
back" as fa r as OKH was concerned. . M anstein was prom oted to corps 
com m ander and placed where his propensity-for w riting em barrassing  
m em oranda was not as annoying to-Haider and the G eneral Staff,, and 
where von.Rundstedt was not p resen t to sign the m em oranda.for him.
The reason  given M anstein for h is tran sfe r  was that he could 
not be passed over in the selection of new corps com m anders. Since 
G eneral Reinhardt, who-was his ju n io r ,. was being given a corps, he . 
too should be promoted. This was a perfectly  norm al advancement 
procedure,, although there obviously w ere other m eans of solving the 
rank problem . If Rundstedt had pro tested  strongly to Brauchitsch, it 
is  probable that M anstein would have been prom oted in his position as 
Chief of Staff of the Arm y Group.
The audacity of M ansteinTs Plan, the vigor with which he bom­
barded OKH with his, recom m endations, the personal d islike felt by
^^Guderian, op. c it. , p. 90.
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H aider'fo r the younger officer, and .the suspicion held by. some that 
M anstein was a ttem pting ,a .backstairs approach to the F u eh re r- -a l l  
these fac to rs--co n trib u ted  to his unpopularity with the lead ers  on the 
Arm y G eneral Staff.
In reporting  the sentim ents of the OKH in"this m atte r, it was 
also said: "T heir so re  feelings w ere aggravated when it cam e to th e ir  
e a rs  that many of the younger m em bers of"the G eneral Staff w ere 
saying.that ’M anstein .ought to be made Com m ander-in-C hief. ’"31
M anstein him self was under no delusions as to the cause of 
his rem oval from  the Army Group staff. He re p o rts : "It can hardly 
be doubted, therefo re , that my. replacem ent was due to a d es ire  on the 
part of OKH to be rid  of an im portunate nuisance who had ventured to 
put up an operation plan at variance with its  own. "32
M anstein left Coblenz on 9 February. 1940 for Stettin and 
command of his corps. His absence was immediately, fe.lt by the Army 
Group staff. He was rep laced  by - Lieutenant G eneral Georg von. Soden- 
s te rn  who G uderian .considered . "m ore prosaic . "33
In commenting on the irony of M anstein’s rem oval at this 
tim e, Liddell H art points out:
Prom otion was a.convenient m eans of moving him out of the 
way, to the re lie f  of his su p erio rs  yet with honour to both parties.
N evertheless, it was iron ical that the man who had shown the m ost
im agination in grasping the potentialities of highly mobile arm oured 
w arfare  - though not him self a tank sp ec ia lis t - should have been
3^Liddell Hart, The Germ an G enerals Talk (New York:
W illiam M orrow and.Company, 1948), p. 114.
32]y[anstein, op., c it, , p. 120.
33Guderian, op .. c it. , p. 90.
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sent to take charge of "an infantry, form ation (which m erely  played 
a walking-on part in the offensive) ju st as the new type of mobility 
■ was to achieve its suprem e fulfilm ent. 34
Although the irony of M ansteinTs rem oval is apparent, there  
is  little  to justify  the contention that he should have been given command 
of an. arm ored  corps in the coming offensive. P rio r  to the campaign.in 
F rance and-Flanders, M anstein was known as a b rillian t staff officer 
and p lanner--one, however, without com bat experience or trooprduty 
with la rg e  units In. the field. The fact that la te r  experience was to 
prove him an able and com petent F eldherrn  has no bearing on his sta tus 
at th is tim e. . Each of the Germ an panzer corps was commanded by 
genera l officers sen io r or equal in rank to ■Manstein and acknowledged 
experts in th e ir speciality . 35
Ait ho ugh. ensuing events w ere to prove the validity of M ansteinTs 
position, he was, , for the moment, rem oved. - As Vanwelkenhuyzen 
rem ark s  of M ansteinTs battle with'.Haider and. the OKH Staff: "It is not 
enough to be righ t; one should also be forgiven for it. "36
■ M ansteinTs banishm ent to Stettin by no m eans ended the opera­
tion plan controversy. It had p rec ise ly 'th e  opposite effect. It is  highly 
iron ica l that M ansteinTs re lie f  as Chief-of-Staff, and .appointment as 
corps com m ander should have afforded him the opportunity to personally  
express his opinions to H itler and obtain the F u eh re rTs approval. The
34Liddell H art, op. c it. ,. p. .1.14.
35corps com m ander s. w ere W ietersheim , XIV C orps; Hoth,
XVI C orps; Guderian,. XIX C orps; R.. Schmidt, XXXIX Corps;, and 
Reinhardt,. XLI.Corps.
35Vanwelkenhuyzen, op. c it. , p. 96.
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action taken by OKH to silence the im portunate M anstein precipitated  
the golden opportunity/for him to speak. What a shock it m ust have 
been to Haider when he realized,, on receiving. H itle r’s o rder to modify 
/th e  OKH plan to incorpora te  M anstein*s ideas, that.he him self had 
. ind irectly  given M anstein his g rea t opportunity.
On .17 F ebruary  .194G, H itler, as. was his custom,, entertained 
his newly appointed corps com m anders a t a luncheon .recep tion .. During 
the luncheon,, the F u eh re r ,, as usual, did .all of the talking. . A fte r‘the 
luncheon, however,, while d ism issing ,the other officers, H itler invited 
M anstein .to accompany, him to h is  .study. There he requested  M anstein 
to p resen t his plan .for the projected offensive in the west.
M anstein a ttribu tes his opportunity, to speak to the F uehrer to
the efforts made by his Army Group A colleagues after his departu re .
He re fe r  s. to his. " tru sty  colleagues," Colonel B lum entritt and Lieutenant
Colonel von,Tresckow, and s ta tes  that they  apparently  had no intention
of "throwing up the sponge" and giving up on.the operation plan on
which they all had ..labored .so long and -hard; 37
It was Tresckow, I imagine,, who induced -his friend Schmundt, 
H itle r’s m ilita ry ;a ss is ta n t,. to fix  an opportunity,for m e to ta lk  
to H itle r  personally, about the way we thought the offensive in the 
w est should be conducted. 38
;During M anstein’s presentation  to H itler, he could not d e te r­
mine the degree, if any, to which Schmundt had inform ed the F uehrer 
of the details of the Arm y Group.A plan. ..Hitler, .how ever,, im m edi­
ately  agreed  to the proposals put forth  by M anstein. . "I found him
3-7M anstein, op. c it. , p .. 120. 
3®Ibid.
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[H itler] surprisingly, quick to g rasp  the points which our Arm y Group 
had been;advocating.for m any'm onths past,, and he en tire ly  agreed with 
what I had to say. "39
M anstein’s long, struggle .for his plan had ended in victory. 
Although it m ust be adm itted that M anstein had by now acquired much 
experience extolling the v irtues of his ideas, his b rillian t exposition 
c leared  up H itle r’s .last doubts and the F u eh rer adopted the plan.
On the day following, his audience with M anstein, H itler 
instructed  his staff to shift the Schwerpunkt [center of gravity] from  
Arm y Group B to Army Group.A. in o rd er to c a rry  out M anstein7 s 
scythe stroke on the axis Sedan-Am iens-Abbeville, "Six days .later, 
a fte r a g rea t deal of work, the OKH produced the SIC HE LSCHNITT 
[Scythe-stroke] PLAN on 24 F ebruary  1940. "40
So, with the dem ise of OPERATION PLAN YELLOW was born 
SICHELSCHNITT. [See figure 2] Arm y Group A was to make the main 
effort with the m assed  panzer divisions through the Ardennes a re a  and 
then on to the channel coast. The ra tio  of divisions between the two 
Arm y Groups was reversed , with; Arm y Group A now having by far the 
preponderance of strength  and the Arm y Group boundary adjusted to 
fu rth er strengthen Rundstedt7s fo rces. The successfu l execution of the 
plan spoke well for the genius of M anstein who conceived.it. Its adoption 
by H itler spelled doom for the Allied a rm ies .
39Ib id ., p. 121.
^ G o u ta rd , op. c it. , p. 93.
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Although M anstein.was the principal progenitor of SICHEL- 
SCHNITT, and it was his energy, d riv e ,/an d  determ ination that kept 
it alive in the face of form idable opposition, he had by no m eans a 
monopoly on its  development. It was the product of m any/factors, 
personalities, and coincidences,, each contributing in part to i ts  
evolution. . At-Army Group.A,. B lum entritt and Tresckow  made th e ir 
contribution and ■ Rundstedt1 s distinguished .support enabled.it to s u r ­
vive the d isp leasu re  of OKH. Hitler*s d istaste  fo r the original 
Yellow P la n ,. the a irp lane m ish ap ,, and the staff w ar game of the plan 
at Coblenz on 7 February. 1940 that revealed  OPERATION PLAN 
YELLOW*s shortcom ings w ere additional facto rs that led to the 
rev ision  of the orig inal plan. The com petent OKH staff strengthened 
-the M anstein varian t.in  i ts  final form ,, and. Haider h im self added his 
professional touch to the polished.final product.
. What conclusions may- be drawn from  a study of the operation 
plan con troversy? F irs t, it. is virtually, certa in .tha t OPERATION 
PLAN YELLOW would have failed to be decisive* In any. event, it would 
not have achieved the strik ing , sue cess of SICHE LSCHNITT. Liddell 
H art, , from  a detailed study of the plans of the opposing arm ies and 
his y ea rs  of fam iliarity , with the te rra in .o v e r  which m ost of the battle 
was fought, has come to the sam e conclusion;
It is c le a r  now that if that plan [Operation O rder Yellow] had 
b een .carried  out it would have failed to be decisive. For the 
B ritish  Army, and the best equipped part.of the F rench Army, stood 
in its  path. The G erm an a ttack  would haye m et these fo rces headon. 41
41 Liddell H art, op. c it . , p. 112.
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The airp lane m ishap and subsequent capture of OPERATION 
PLAN .YELLOW by the A llies played .a. significant pant in .-Hitler’s 
final decision to abandon the Yellow P lan; these incidents also 
strengthened the French and B ritish  conviction that. Germ any intended 
to re -en ac t the SCHLIEFFEN PLAN, The Allied action in sending the 
cream  of th e ir  a rm ies into -Belgium was as responsib le for the suc­
cess of SIGHE LSCHNITT as the audacity of the Germ an arm ored  
th ru sts  through the Ardennes. The d irection  of the actual Germ an 
attack cam e as a com plete su rp rise  to the A llies, G eneral Alanbrooke, 
then, commanding, a. B ritish  ..Corps in.the B. E. F. reported  the s u r ­
p rise  of the French.High Command. "The German, plans for the 
coming offensive w ere not those the French High Command had an tic i­
pated. "42
Although-the capture of the operation.plan'm ay.-not have been 
the p rim ary  reason  for the decision to adopt another course of action, 
this event, occurring.w hen it did, is bound to have exerted a profound 
influence upon the decision. H itler had o rdered  the OPERATION PLAN 
YELLOW attack to begin om.17 January-1940. Had the plan not been 
captured on ,10 January, 1940, the attack may well have proceeded as 
planned and,, as has been pointed out, probably with Je ss  than complete 
success. Had.this been the case, the course of World W ar II in.Europe 
might have been considerably  altered .
42A rthur Bryant, The Turn of the T ide, The-D iaries of Field 
M arshal Lord,Alanbrooke (New York: . Doubleday and Company, In c ., 
1957), p. . 64.
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Thus, the d es ire  of a young. Luftwaffe m ajor to spend a few 
m ore precious m inutes in Cologne for purely personal reasons, and 
the poor judgment exercised  in transporting  se c re t papers by. airp lane 
in.violation of security  regulations to gratify  this d esire , precipitated 
significant reactions on the part of m ajor world powers that changed 
the course of h istory . M ajor R einberger, the courie r, and M ajor 
Hoenmans, his pilot, never received  the co u rts -m a rtia l they so 
rich ly  deserved. When the Germ an attack began on .10 May 1940, 
they w ere taken to-England and eventually to Canada where they spent 
the r e s t  of the w ar as p riso n ers. 43
Human foibles and follies have often been destined to play as 
la rge  a part in the fate of mankind as the best laid  plans of nations. 
Those of the y ear .1940 w ere no exception. For the f ir s t  and la s t 
tim e in the h isto ry  of the Third Reich, Adolf H itler, his general staff, 
and his field com m anders m utually contributed to a successfu l m ilita ry  
effort. The F u eh re r , however,, did not consider SICHELSCHNITT in this 
light. Confirm ed in his own mind as an in fa llib le  m ilitary, leader, he 
considered his acceptance of the M anstein. varian t as fu rther evidence 
of his m ilita ry  prow ess. Once again, in his opinion, he had proved 
B rauchitsc lrand  H aider wrong in a m ilita ry  m atter. In his v ictory  
speech to the Reichstag [page .113 in fra ] H itler claim ed.so le cred it 
for the success of the plan. The contributions made by Rundstedt, 
M anstein, B lum entritt, and Tresckow w ere quickly forgotten as was the 
detailed staff work of Haider and the OKH. .As the self-acknowledged
^ T a y lo r , The M arch of Conquest, p, 61.
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political and m ilita ry  genius of the Third Reich, H itler was to exert 
an ever increasing  influence upon ta c tic a l arm y m atte rs  with d is ­
astrous consequences to the conduct of the Germ an campaign in the 
w est in 1940.
CHAPTER III
CIVIL-MILITARY RE LATIONS 
IN THE STOP ORDER
The defeat of Nazi Germ any and the liberation  of Europe 
began on the 24th of May .1940. The A llies would not have been easily  
convinced of this at the tim e for th e ir situation was indeed black. The 
Nazi w ar machine had launched its attack two weeks e a r l ie r  and the 
G erm an panzer columns had now reached the sea  and turned north 
toward .Dunkirk. The co rrid o r made by G eneral Ewald von K le ist’s 
panzer group through Belgium had been widened and strengthened by 
the infantry  corps which followed. . The sm all Allied counterattack at 
A rras  had been repulsed  and.C alais was now isolated. Only., the ports 
of Dunkirk and Os tend rem ained as escape routes for the French, 
Belgian, and B ritish ,A rm ies that w ere heavily engaged by G eneral 
Fedor von Bock’s Arm y Group B attacking re len tle ss ly  from  the north 
and east. G eneral Gerd von R undstedt’s Arm y Group.A, .spearheaded 
by von K le ist’s arm or, had cut off the Allied arm ies in Belgium from  
French reinforcem ents in the a rea  south of the.Somme. The Anglo- 
F rench force that had been hurried ly  grouped together to attem pt to 
break out of the encirclem ent and .link up with the F rench forces to the 
south had been diverted north  to m eet von Bock’s heavy attack on the 
boundary between the Belgian, and B ritish  A rm ies. The la s t Allied 
re se rv e s  in F landers thus had been employed in a blocking, and.defensive
7.1
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ro le  while F rench .forces in cen tra l F rance w ere as yet too d isorgan­
ized to launch an effective counterattack to re lieve  the besieged A llies 
in the F lem ish . salient.
At this tim e ,, wken the defeat of the Allied a rm ies appeared 
. im m inent--only  a m a tte r of days--and  the audacity of the new B litz­
krieg , had paralyzed a ll res is tan ce , H itler and his generals collaborated 
in the f ir s t  of a se r ie s  of tac tica l and stra teg ic  e r ro rs  that would 
eventually bring about the defeat of the T hird  Reich.
. What has frequently been described .as "The M iracle of Dun­
k irk" was not so much the fantastic escape of the B ritish 'E xpeditionary  
Force ac ro ss  the channel as it was the behavior of the Germ an leaders 
who abetted it. . Although von Bock’s fo rces m aintained heavy attacks 
on the north and east against the Belgian and B ritish  fronts, von 
• Rundstedt’s panzer divisions, which w ere practica lly  unopposed, w ere 
o rdered  to halt within sight of Dunkirk w here they rem ained imm obile 
for two days. .During this tim e, the A llies moved fo rces into defensive 
positions in front of von Rundstedt and prepared, evacuation plans 
unm olested. [See figure 3]
The origin of th is incredulous "Stop O rder" to the panzers 
of Arm y Group A and the reasoning behind it rem ain  one of the g rea t 
m y steries  of the w ar. A m ajor controversy  has a rise n  among 
h isto rians over th is incident,, and conflicting, analyses have been 
offered by both G erm an and Allied partic ipan ts. The Germ an generals 
unanim ously.blam ed H itle r--an d  H itler a lo n e--fo r the o rder,, while 
ce rta in  noted h isto rians on the Allied side have produced evidence from  
documents of the period that would , place the blam e on the Germ an
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professional m ilita ry 'le ad e rs . As frequently  happens in ,con troversies 
of th is nature,, each side has established what it considers convincing 
evidence to support its  position. Analysis of the d iverse  beliefs 
involved revea ls  m erit in the argum ents of both sides.
Several explanations for the "Stop O rder" have been p ro­
pounded. Among, these a re : H itle r’s concern with the political goal 
of P a r is  ra th e r  than the tac tica l battlefield ; his d es ire  to let the 
B ritish  escape in o rd er to make political settlem ent possible after the 
defeat of F rance, on the theory  that a to tally  im potent B ritain  would 
make an unfavorable balance of power v is -a -v is  the Soviet Union; 
H itle r’s concern that his tanks might bog down in the m arshes of the 
F lem ish coast and not be available for the main attack south of the 
Somme; and his belief that the Luftwaffe could destroy  the B ritish  on 
the beaches.
Those who would blame the genera ls have a m ultitude of 
reasons. . Some of these a re : von Rundstedt was concerned about his 
southern flank and about the future operations planned .for the south, 
and that in any. event he p re fe rred  to le t von Bock do the d irty  work 
of cleaning out the pocket of surrounded Allied arm ies while his own 
troops re s te d ; vom K leist and G eneral Gunther von Kluge w ere w orried  
about the Allied .foray on,their flank at A rra s  and wanted to wait for 
m ore of the ir m otorized divisions to close up before sending the ir 
tanks into the Dunkirk a re a  ; that tan k 'lo sses  w ere an astounding, fifty 
percent and the men w ere exhausted. Another reason  offered is the 
extrem ely, confused Germ an command situation that existed around
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Dunkirk, as the Germ an A rm ies converged th e re  and-waited while the 
assau lt troops ."untangled and regrouped. "
Then there  a re  those who m ain ta in --no t without reason .--that 
the B ritish  w ere not "perm itted" to escape. They ..say. that the superio r 
tac tics  of Lord Gort, the B. E. F. Com mander ; the valor of such m en 
. as G enerals Alexander, Montgomery, and .Alanbrooke; the efficiency 
of new S p itfires; the courage of the RAF; and the heroism  of the Royal 
Navy brought the B. E. F . . home in sp ite  of a ll the Germ an efforts to 
prevent it.
This tangled web of d iverse  opinion and prejudice does much 
•to obscure the evidence and makes it extrem ely.difficu.lt to determ ine 
exactly, who was to blame.
The Germ an generals interview ed at the end of the war w ere 
unanimous in th e ir  opinion that H itler was to blam e for the now famous 
"Stop O rder. " Among them was Siegfried .Wesphal, la te r  Chief of Staff 
for vomRundstedt,, who said:
At the end of May,, the Germ an 18th Army coming from  the 
north was engaged in a .sev ere  strugg le with the b itterly-fighting 
B ritish . The vanguard of the P anzer Group vom Kleist had already 
penetrated from  the south to the English re a r  and threatened the 
escape route to ■•Dunkirk. The final closing of th is route was only 
a m atte r of days. On May 30th the two Germ an forces w ere 
a lready  so close together that it becam e n ecessary  to agree on 
.lines a fte r crossing  which they would cease  f ire  to avoid shooting 
each other. Lord GorPs. troops had now been p ressed  into so 
narrow  a co rrid o r that by righ ts no chance of escape existed. Then 
occurred  something which was beyond the com prehension of the 
front line com m anders, K leist was o rdered  to h a lt,. and forbidden 
to take another step  northw ards. He even had to withdraw som e of 
his advance units. In this.w ay the English troops w ere given a 
c lea r passage to Dunkirk. . Heads w ere scratched. Could it be that 
the two German, A rm ies w ere to form  a lane for the withdrawing 
English? What could be the reason  for such a proceeding? Who 
could have given the o rd e r?  It was H itler who had intervened. . He 
was u fra id  that K leisPs panzers would suffer such sev ere  lo sses  in
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the battle with Gort that they would be unable to take part in 'the 
final and.im m inent struggle with.the F rench Army. In this,
H itler was apparently influenced by an en tire ly  false  idea of what 
the F landers te rra in  was like. 1
H itler had-served in F landers in.the F irs t  World War. , His 
m em ory of the a rea  was of.a .vast plain, , deep in mud and flooded sa lt 
flats. This tim e, however, the situation was not the sam e, the g rea t 
sluice system  which flooded the en tire  a re a  and which had .been 
designed by M arshal Vauban, the g rea t F rench m ilita ry  engineer of 
the Bourbon Kings, had been seized  by Germ an troops before it could 
be opened. In spite of th is fact, von B rauchitsch was unable to con­
vince H itler that the attack should be p ressed  forw ard rapid ly  into 
Dunkirk before the B ritish  had an opportunity to p repare  the defense 
of the town.
B rauchitsch was unable to dissuade H itler 'from  ordering the 
halt. In o rd er to make su re  that his -will prevailed against the 
opposition of the C om m ander-in-C hief of the Army, he sent offi­
ce rs  of his own personal staff, K eitel among them, to all the 
appropriate com mands. He may have been, confirm ed in his 
reso lve by Goering*s prom ise that the Luftwaffe would prevent 
the English from  escaping. Both overlooked the fact that even 
the Luftwaffe had its lim itations. It m ight be in a position to 
ham per movements on the ground and to make them  very, costly, 
but not to paralyze them altogether. Unhappily the* w eather now 
becam e very  unfavorable so that the Luftwaffe was only-able to 
devote com paratively weak forces for sho rt periods to this task  
throughout the decisive days. This in te rva l was sufficient to 
allow the B ritish  Arm y to take up positions around Dunkirk to 
cover its w ithdrawal, and it was thus possible for Lord Gort to 
c a rry  back to England the overwhelming m ajority  of his troops. 2
■ What is  perhaps a m ore  unbiased opinion than G eneral W est- 
phalTs is expressed  by C hester Wilmot in his book The Struggle for-E urope.
^General Siegfried Westph&l, The Germ an Army, in the W est 
(London; C assell, 1951), p ..87.
2Ibid.
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The Dunkirk decision was H itle r’s 'f i r s t  g rea t m ilita ry  m istake, 
but it was not. so -irrational and .short-sigh ted  as som e German 
genera ls have asse rted . . Although H itler was influenced by the lu re  
of P a ris ,, the goal of all G erm an.conquerors,, a m ore im portant 
facto r was his determ ination to-avoid .the costly  m istake of 1914.
He would not fa lte r and be stopped on the Somme,, as von Moltke 
had been.stopped on the M arne through excessive concern.about the 
B ritish  on the flank and. thro ugh fa ilu re  to m aintain the momentum 
of the righ t wing. He felt he could-safely, ignore the B ritish  for th e ’ 
moment, and he was soon to confide to von .Kleist the opinion:
'’They w ill not come back in this w ar. " Although he had often 
warned his m ilita ry /lead ers  that B rita in  was the m ore form idable 
enemy, his personal trium ph at Munich had profoundly affected his 
judgment of B ritish  ch a rac te r. He was fond of declaring: "Our
enem ies a re  little  w orm s; I saw them at Munich. " —(Speaking to 
his C om m anders-in-C hief, August 22nd, 1939. — Nurem burg
Document 789P S ,)
H itler considered that any troops who escaped from  Dunkirk 
would be im prisoned in the B ritish  I s le s . The im portant task, 
therefo re , was to gain quick and undisputed possession of the 
F rench coastline,, as a ram p a rt against fu rther B ritish  in te rference 
in .E u ro p ean .a ffa irs ,. and of.the continental bases from  which B rita in  
could be bombed and starved  into subm ission. 3
Much has been said of H itle r’s v is it to von Rundstedt’s Head­
q u arte rs  on the 24th of May. . During this v isit, he rescinded an order 
of von B rauchitsch placing .all troops surrounding the northern  Allied 
a rm ies  under command of von Bock’s Arm y Group B,. and d irected  the 
panzers under von Rundstedt to halt before Dunkirk. T here a re  sev era l 
accounts of th is v is it and ensuing events.
B ritish  h isto rians a re  generally  in .accord on the significance 
of the H itler - von Rundstedt meeting of 24 May. Winston Churchill 
te lls  of the B ritish .in tercep tion  of a.G erm an m essage sent in,the c lear 
at 1142 on:24 May, to the effect that the attack  on Dunkirk was to be
^Wilmot, op., cit. ,. pp. 19-2,1.
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halted, 4 and continues to recount his version  of events in his h is to r­
ical s e r ie s  The Second.W orld.W ar.
H itler v isited  Rundstedt [on 24 May] who rep resen ted  to him 
that his arm our, which had come so fa r  so fast,, was much reduced 
in strength  and needed a pause w herein to reo rgan ise  and regain  its 
balance for the final blow against an.enemy, who his staff d iary  says 
was "fighting with ex traord inary  tenacity. " M oreover, Rundstedt 
foresaw  the possibility  of attacks on his widely d ispersed  forces 
from  north and south; in fact, the Weygand Plan, which, if it had 
been.feasible, was the obvious allied  counter stroke. H itler 
"agreed entirely" that the attack east of A rras  should be ca rried  
out by infantry, and that the mobile fo rces should .continue to hold" 
the line L ens-B ethune-A ire-S t. O m er-G ravelines in o rder to in te r­
cept the enemy forces under p re ssu re  from  Arm y Group B in the 
northeast. He also dwelt on the param ount necessity  o,f conserving 
the arm oured  forces for fu rther operations. However, very  early  
on the 25th a fre sh  d irec tive  was sent from  B rauchitsch as the 
C om m ander-in-C hief ordering the continuation of the advance-of 
the arm our. . Rundstedt, fortified  by H itle r’s verbal agreem ent 
would have none of it. He-did not pass the o rd er on to the Fourth 
Arm y:- Commander, Kluge, who was told to continue to husband the 
panzer divisions. Kluge pro tested  at the delay, but it was not till 
the next day, the 26th, that Rundstedt re leased  them,, although even 
then he enjoined that Dunkirk was not yet itse lf  to be assaulted . The 
d ia ry  reco rd s that the Fourth Army protested  at this res tric tio n ,
. and its Chief of Staff telephoned on the 27th: "The picture in th e .....
Channel ports is as follows. Big. ships come up to the quayside, 
boards a re  put down.and the men crowd on the ships. All m aterie l 
is .left behind. But we a re  not keen on finding these men, newly 
equipped, up against us la te r . " It is the re fo re  ce rta in  that the 
arm our was halted; that th is was done on the initiative not of H itler 
but of Rundstedt. Rundstedt no doubt had reasons for his view both 
in the condition of the arm our . and in the general battle, but he ought 
to have obeyed the o rd ers  of the Army, Commander, o r at leas t told 
him what H itler had said in conversation. There is a general
agreem eni among the German. Com m anders that a g rea t opportunity 
was .lost. 5 
C hurchill’s in te rp re ta tion  of events was based to a degree upon 
German documents captured after the w ar. L. F. E llis, in his official 
B ritish  h isto ry  of the war,, explores these documents in m ore detail and
.^Winston S. Churchill, TheSecond^WorldWar, Vol II: T heir F in­
es t Hour (Boston:, Houghton M ifflin Co., The R iverside P re s s , 1949), p. 76.
vlb id . , p. 78.
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quotes H itler as saying, in justification  of his decision to halt on.the 
canal, line: ". .: .. Any fu rth er contraction of the ring encircling,the 
enemy could only have the highly undesirable re su lt of re s tr ic tin g  the 
ac tiv ities of the Luftwaffe. M E llis1 authority, in th is case is the Germ an 
w ar d iary  of Army-Group A. for 24 May 1940, which m entions H itle r’s 
v is it at. .1130 that day. It is in teresting  to note that the intercepted 
Germ an radio m essage to w hich.C hurchill re fe rs  [page 77 su p ra ] m ust 
have been, sent during the tim e H itler and Rundstedt w ere actually 'in  
conference. E llis continued his story, of the 24 May v is it:
Thus it is  c lea r that the decision to halt the arm our on the 
canal line on the 24th (taken .the day before H itler a rriv ed  and 
endorsed it) was orginally Rundstedt’s decision. But a fte r H itler 
had.left, Rundstedt issued  a d irec tive  which read : "By,-the
F u eh re r’s o rd ers  . . . the general line L ens-B ethune-A ire-S t. 
O m er-G ravelines (canal line) w ill NOT be passed [Nicht zu. uber- 
sc h re iten ]. (E xtract from  Arm y Group w ar diary. App 32, 24 May 
1940). The arm oured  divisions w ere to close up to the cana.1 .line 
and use the day. as fa r as practicab le for re p a irs  and m aintenance. 
This hold-up puzzled divisional com m anders strain ing  to get fo r­
ward, . and th e ir  w ar d ia rie s  show how disappointed they w ere by 
. "The F u eh re r’s" o rd ers  to halt. They, w ere to quote this years 
la te r ,, as an instance of H itle r’s in te rfe ren ce  with conduct of the 
campaign, for so it m ust have appeared to them  at the tim e. "By 
the F u eh re r’s o rd e rs"  was all they could know of the origin of'.this 
decision; but Rundstedt and. Hi tie r  knew the tru e  facts,, and, while 
H itler was only, too anxious to appear the d irec to r of operations, 
Rundstedt saw that if he was to get his own way when it differed 
from  the intentions of OKH he m ust make it appear that what he did 
was by, "The F u eh re r’s o rd ers . "6
If H itle r’s decision was influenced by his conversation with 
von: Rundstedt, the general h im self was acting out of consideration for 
his subordinates. On the 23 May, von K luge,, the com m ander of the 
Fourth Army, is  repo rted  to have said his troops "would be glad.if they
. 6'L. F . . E llis, The War in F rance and F landers (London: 
H.M . S. O ., 1953), p. ,139.
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could close up tom orrow . "7 G eneral H aider reco rd s a talk with von 
Glydenfeldt [Chief of Staff, P anzer Group Kleis.t] who Mcom municated 
K le is t’s anxieties. He feels he cannot tackle his task  as .long as the 
c r is is  at A rras  rem ains unresolved—tank lo sses  as high as fifty p e r­
cent. "8 These and other ex trac ts  from  contem porary  reco rd s form  
the basis for the B ritish  contention that the "Stop O rder" was initiated 
by. the G erm an genera ls ra th e r  than .H itler.
G eneral Guderian, com m ander of the panzer corps c losest to 
Dunkirk, was under the im p ressio n  that the "Stop O rder" had originated 
with ; H itle r . The following .extract from  his book P anzer Leader con­
firm s th i s ; it also indicates that, w hatever the sentim ents of von 
Kluge and von K leist for a "breathing spell, " Guderian thought that a 
continuation of the attack was necessary .
On the 24th of May the 1st P anzer Division reached the Aa 
'  Canal between Holque and the coast and secured  bridgeheads 
'• ac ro ss  it a t Holque, St. P ie rre -B ro u ck , St* Nicholas and B our- 
bo u rv ille ; the 2nd P anzer D iv ision  c lea red  up Boulogne ; the 
bulk of fhe 10th P anzer D ivision reached  the line D esv res-S am er. y
Guderian described  his o rd er of battle for the attack on the 
beaches and then described  what he re fe rre d  to as "H itle r’s m om en­
tous o rd er to stop. "
On th is day (the 24th) the Supreme Command intervened in the 
operations in p rog ress, with re su lts  which w ere to have a m ost 
d isastrous .influence on the whole fu ture course of the w ar. H itler 
o rdered  the left wing to stop at the Aa. It was forbidden to c ro ss  
that s tream . We w ere not informed, of the reasons for th is. The
^Fourth Arm y War D iary, 23 May 1940. Quoted from  
ex trac t of d iary  contained in  Appendix II, E llis, op. c it. , p, 398.
^Haider D iary, 23 May 1940.
^Guderian, op. c i t . , p. 116.
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o rder .contained the w ords: . “Dunkirk is  to be left to the Luftwaffe, 
Should the capture ,of Calais prove d ifficu lt,.th is  port too is to be 
le ft to the Luftwaffe. u (I quote here fro m  m e m o ry .) We w ere 
utterly; speechless. But since we w ere not inform ed of the reasons 
for this order, it was difficult to arque. against it. The panzer 
divisions w ere the re fo re  ordered*. “Ho,ld .the line of the canal.
Make use of the period of res t, fo r genera l recuperation . "
F ie rce  enemy a ir  activity  m et little  opposition from  our a ir  
force,
. Evidence indicates that both .Hitler , and von' Rundstedt m ust
sh a re  the responsib ility  for ‘the “Stop O rder, “ As Telford Taylor so
aptly puts it in his form idably documented bool The M arch of Conquest:
“As is not infrequent in the d iscussion of competing propositions,, the
protagonists of each have overlooked the possibility  that they a re  not
mutually, exclusive, d l
A fter the w ar,, von Rundstedt, in a personal interview  with
.Milton.Schulman, • a Canadian intelligence officer,, expressed  Ms
recollection  of the incident as follow s:
To m e, rem arked  the  Field M arshal ra th e r  ruefully, Dunkirk 
was one of the g rea tes t turning points of the w ar. . If I had had my 
y way /the English would no t have got off so lightly, at Dunkirk. But 
my.hands w ere tied by .d irect o rd ers  from  H itler him self. .While 
the English w ere clam bering into their, ships off the beaches, I was 
kept use lessly  outside the port, unable to move. . I recom m ended to 
the Supreme Command that my. five panzer divisions be im m ediately 
, sent linto the town and thereby, com pletely destroy  the re trea tin g  
English. But I received .defin ite o rd e rs  from  the F ueh rer that 
under no circum stances was I to attack, and I was expressly  fo r­
bidden to send any, of my troops c lo se r than le n  k ilom eters from  
Dunkirk. The only, weapons I was perm itted  'to use against the 
English w ere my medium guns. . At th is distance I sa t outside the 
town, watching the English-escape, ,,while, my tanks and infantry 
:. w ere prohibited from  moving. This incred ib le blunder was due to 
H itle rTs personal idea of generalship. The F uehrer daily received  
sta tem ents of tank lo sse s  incurred;,during .the cam paign,. and by, a 
sim ple p rocess of arithm etic  he deduced that there  was not
10Ib id ., p.. 117.
 ^ Taylor, M arch of Conquest, p. 256.
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sufficient a rm o r available-at this tim e to attack the English. . He 
did not rea lize  that many of the tanks reported  out of o rder one day 
could,, with a little  extra, effort on the part of the re p a ir  squads,, be 
able to fight again in a very, short tim e. The second reason  for 
•H itler’s decisiom was the fact that on the map available to him at 
B erlin  the ground surrounding the port appeared to be flooded and 
unsuitable for tank w arfare . With a shortage of arm o r and the 
difficult country, H itler decided that the cost of an attack would be 
too high, when the F ren ch 'a rm ies  to th e  south had not yet been 
destroyed. . He therefo re  ordered  that my forces be reserved , so 
that they could be strong enough to take part in the southern drive 
against the French, designed to capture P a ris  and destroy-all 
F rench res is tan ce . 12
Contributing at least in part to the circum stances surrounding 
the 11 Stop O rd e r1’ was the tac tica l command situation at the front. The 
Sixth, Twelfth and .Eighteenth .A rm ies--p lus K leist’s two panzer corps 
- -w e re  converging omthe rapidly:shrinking Dunkirk pocket. Coordina­
tion between the two arm y groups commanding, these troops was im p era ­
tive but difficult. Communications between the two headquarters was 
inadequate,, and the personalities of the two com m anders m itigated 
. against friendly  cooperation. T hree a lternative  solutions w ere 
possible. F irs t, OKH could coordinate the advance of the two arm y 
groups. OKH, how ever,, was fa r  from  the scene of operations and 
unfam iliar with the details of the rapidly, changing ,situation. It was 
also deeply involved in the planning, for fu ture operations south of the 
Somme. . Second,. Arm y Group A could assum e command of all troops 
surrounding, the salient. This would place a. trem endous burden on 
von Rundstedt who, in addition to paying,attention to the canal line, 
was. supervising the tricky  operation of integrating The movements of 
m ore than forty  divisions through the battle co rrid o r and .into -line on
^ M ilto n  Shulman, Defeat in the West (New York: E. P. 
Dutton, 1948), p. - 43.
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the Germ an south flank on the Somme. The OKH situation map of 24th 
May shows twenty one divisions already  in the line facing ,south, and 
twenty th ree  additional divisions on the road  moving into th e ir assigned 
sec to rs . P lans for the attack south w ere being,completed, and.supplies 
and com m unications w ere being readied  fo r the impending operation.
To im pose upon von Rundstedt the additional responsib ility  to su p e r­
v ise the m ajority  of Army Group B’s divisions would have been as 
unsatisfactory, a solution as to have OKH attem pt it. Von Brauchitsch 
made the co rre c t decision by placing , the Fourth A rm y and ..von K leist’s 
C orps--both  facing the Dunkirk fro n t--u n d er von Bock’s Arm y Group 
B. This decision has been widely critic ized , but it was a sound one.
It placed the responsib ility  Tor reducing the narrow ing pocket firm ly  
upon one com m ander on.the spot, and .freed von.Rundstedt to properly 
superv ise  the two arm ies  moving into position for the operation to the 
south. Against H aider’s recom m endation, von Brauchitsch issued.the 
o rd er tran sfe rrin g  Fourth A rm y -to von Bock’s command on .the evening 
of the 23rd. H aider was much put out. He. wrote in his d iary  that 
night:
The sta ted  d es ire  of Obd. H [von B rauchitsch] to unify, d irec ­
tion of operations under A Gp B for the la s t phase of the encircling 
battle w ill get us into serious trouble owing to the personalities of 
Cine A Gp B and his staff, and the difficulties for von Bock to get 
through to a ll com m anders at a point of the battle when to do so 
would be difficult even through w ell established, com m unications.
Obd. H’s insistence of unification of command looks to me 
like a device to sidestep  responsib ility . . He keeps arguing that he 
has no choice but coordinate the efforts of the various elem ents 
converging on the pocket under his own command or under that of 
von.Bock. The f irs t  alternative, which I should think he would 
accept as the logical and manly one, he feels unsure about. He 
seem s to be glad to d e t someone else take the responsib ility . But
with that he. also foregoes the honors of v ictory . Operational 
O rder -5852/40-GK goes out without my. signature to signify my 
, disapproval of the o rd er and its tim ing. ^
N evertheless, the o rder went out from  OKH on the 23rd to 
attach von Kluge’s Fourth Army to von Bock, and the next day H itler 
chose to v is it von Rundstedt at his command post. Colonel Rudolf 
Schmundt, H itle r’s m ilita ry -assistan t, repo rted  .later to von M anstein 
that H itler a rriv ed  in very  good humor but becam e furious when he 
was inform ed of von B rauchitsch’s o rder. G eneral Jodi reco rd s 
H itle r’s d isp leasu re  in his d iary  entry of 24 May.
F uehrer -is very  much d ispleased and thinks th is o rd er is a 
m istake, not only m ilita rily  but also psychologically. . Comman- 
der-in -C h ief [von B rauchitsch] is o rdered  to repo rt, and shifting 
of the Army 
confidence. ^
Von B rauchitsch had left early- in the morning of the 24th to 
v isit von Bock on the Belgian front. H ere H aider contacted him by 
•telephone and.inform ed him of the F u e h re r’s action:in.counterm anding 
the OKH order. . H aider’s d iary  reco rd s the details.
. 24 M ay:1' 1530; The F uehrer a rr iv ed  at Rundstedt’s Hq this 
m orning. f
a. ‘ He o rd ers  that the new boundary .line is not to go 
into effect today. . Wants to talk to Obd.. H.
b. Obd. H .. summoned to F uehrer.
1600-; Talk th is over' on phone with Obd. H .,. who is at Hqrs Sixth 
Army. O rders to comply with F u e h re r’s w ishes a re  issued  to A. 
Gp A by m yself, to A. Gp B by Obd. H.
^ H a id e r  D iary, 23 May 1940.
^ Nazi Conspiracy and A ggression, IV (Washington: US 
Government P rin ting  Office, 1946),, Document 1809-PS,. "G eneral 
Jodi’s D iary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from  1 F ebruary  to 26 
May 1940, " (H ereinafter re fe rre d  to as Jodi D iary NCA), p. 410.
(Croup boundary, is rescinded. New c r is is  of
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2000; Obd., H. re tu rn s  from  OKW. Apparently again a very  
unpleasant interview  with .H itler. At 2020 a new o rder us issued, 
cancelling yesterdays o rd er and d irecting  encirclem ent to be 
effected in a rea  D u n k irk -E sta iris-  L ille-Roulaix-O stend. The 
left wing, consisting of a rm o r and m otorized forces, which has 
no enemy before it, will so be stopped dead in its  track s  upon 
d irec t o rd ers  of the F uehrer I F inishing off the encircled  enemy 
arm y is to be left to the A ir Force 11^5
T h u s,. it is c lea r that the official MStop O rder" was issued  by 
H itler over von B rauchitsch’s strong objections. Undoubtedly, the 
v is it to von Rundstedt influenced H itle r’s thinking, but the actual 
decision was his. Von Rundstedt had undoubtedly been influenced by 
von Kluge and von K leist. . Also, during th is tim e Goering had been to 
see H itler and had made an ill-adv ised  and boastful com m itm ent to the 
Luftwaffe to destroy  the cutoff Allied a rm ie s  with no fu rther assis tan ce  
from  the arm y. • G eneral A lbert K esselring, com m ander of the Germ an 
a ir-flee t in the Dunkirk area , was much annoyed by Goering rs 
im prudence:
My Command - [Air -Fleet 2] perhaps as a rew ard  for our 
.late achievem ents ? :-  was given the task  of annihilating the rem ains 
of the B ritish  - Expeditionary Force alm ost without assis tan ce  from  
the arm y. The C-in-C  Luftwaffe m ust have been sufficiently  aw are 
of the effect of alm ost th ree  weeks of cease less  operations on my 
airm en  not to o rder an operation which could hardly be ca rrie d  out 
successfu lly  by fresh  fo rces. I expressed  this view very  c learly  
to Goering,and told him it could not be done even.with the support 
of VIH Air Group [recently taken away from  K esselring ’s command). 
A ir M arshal Jeschonnek [Luftwaffe Chief of Staff} told me he 
thought the sam e, but that Goering fo r some incom prehensible 
reason  had pledged him self to the F ueh rer to wipe out the English 
with his Luftwaffe. It is ea s ie r  to excuse H itler with so many 
operational tasks to occupy his mind for agreeing than Goering 
for making th is un realistic  offer. I pointed out to Goering that 
the m odern Spitfires had recen tly  appeared, making our a ir  
operations difficult and costly - and in the end it was the Spitfires
^ H a id e r  Diary,. 24 May 1940.
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which enabled the B ritish  and French to evacuate ac ro ss  the 
w ater. ^
-While research in g  m ate ria l for his book, The R ise and .Fall 
of. the Third Reich, W illiam L .. Shirer, much puzzled over the reason  
for-G oering’s .actions in ;th is  m atter, queried G eneral Haider by le tte r  
on .this and o ther m atte rs  re la ted  to H a id e r’s d iary . H aider’s reply, 
dated .19 July .1957,. sheds additional .light on the Luftwaffe’s p a rtic i­
pation in. events preceding the nStop O rder. ’’
During .the following days [i. e . a f t e r  May 24] it becam e 
known that H itle r’s decision was m ainly influenced by Goering.
To the d ic tator the rapid  movement of the Army, whose r isk s  
and prospects of success he did not understand because of his 
lack of m ilita ry  schooling, becam e alm ost s in is te r . He was 
constantly oppressed by a.feeling of anxiety that a .reversa l 
loomed. . . .  , .
Goering, who knew his F uehrer well, took advantage of this 
anxiety. He offered to fight the re s t  of the g reat battle of 
encirclem ent alone with his Luftwaffe, thus elim inating the r isk  
of having to use the valuable panzer form ations. . He made this 
proposal . . . .  for a reason  which was ch a rac te ris tic  of the un­
scrupulously  am bitious Goering. He wanted to secu re  for his 
A ir Force,, a fte r the surprisingly, smooth operations of the 
Army, up to then, the decisive final act in the g rea t battle and 
thus gain the glory of success before the whole world. ^ '
G eneral Ha.lder recounted a conversation he had with von 
B rauchitsch afte r the la tte r  had.spoken to Luftwaffe G enerals Kesse.l-
ring  and .Milch while they w ere awaiting, t r ia l  at N urem berg in 1946.
%
According to these o f f ic e rs ^
G oering.at that tim e [May .1940] em phasized to H itler that if 
the g reat victory, in battle then developing,could be claim ed ex­
clusively by. the Arm y generals, the p restige  of the F uehrer in 
the Germ an homeland would be damaged beyond rep a ir . That
l^K esselrincf,, Qpo. g it. , pp .. 58-59. 
l^S h irer, op. c it. , p. 733.
could be prevented only if the Luftwaffe and not the Army, ca rried  
out the decisive battle. 1°
The day after the issue of the "Stop O rder" began with another 
clash  .between von .Brauchitsch and H itler. , H aider’s diary, entry of the 
25th reco rd s the event.
The day s ta r ts  off with one of those painful w rangles between 
Obd., H. and the F uehrer on the next move in the encircling battle.
The battle plan I had drafted for A. Gp A, by heavy fron tal attacks, 
m erely  to hold the enemy, who is making a planned withdrawal, 
while A Gp B, dealing with an enemy already whipped, cuts into 
his r e a r  and .delivers the decisive blow. This was to be accom ­
plished by our arm or. Now political command has fixed the idea 
that the battle of decision m ust not be fought on F lem ish soil, but 
ra th e r  in northern  F rance. To-camouflage this political move, 
the asse rtio n  is made that F landers, c r is s -c ro s s e d  by a m ulti - 
... .. tudecoLwaterways, is unsuited for tank w arfare . Accordingly, 
all tanks and m otorized troops will have to be brought up short on 
reaching the line St. Om er-Bethune.
This is a com plete re v e rsa l of the elem ents of the plan. I 
wanted to make A Gp A the ham m er , and .A Gp .B the anvil in this 
operation. Now B will be the ham m er and A the anvil. As a Gp 
B is confronted with a.consolidated front, p rogress w ill be slow 
and casualties high. The A ir Force, on which all hopes a re  
pinned, is dependent on the w eather.
This divergence of views resu lts  in  a .tug-of-w ar which costs 
m ore nerves than does the actual conduct of operations. . However, 
the battle will, be w on,. this way or that. 19
Jodi, in his diary, rep o rts  .von B rauchitsch’s 25 May v isit 
to H itler and mentions the recom m endation of the fo rm er that the 
panzers resum e the ir attack north of the canal line.
In the morning. 25 May the C om m ander-in-C hief of the Army 
■arrives and asks perm ission .fo r m echanized divisions to push fo r­
w ard from  the high te rra in  Vimy-St. Omer-Grave.lines tow ards the 
w est into the level te rra in . Fuehrer, is  against it, leaves decision 
to Arm y Group A [von Rundstedt]. They decline for the tim e being 
because tanks should re s t  a while to be ready for tasks in the south. 20
18Ibid.
^ H a id e r  D iary,. 25 May-1940. 
20jodl D iary  NCA,, 25 May 1940,
88
U ndeterred by his failu re to get H itler to issue the order, and 
apparently. determ ined to keep .the reco rd  stra igh t, von Brauchitsch 
sent a m essage to vom Rundstedt giving OKH!s perm ission  :to begin an 
advance toward Dunkirk. . Colonel Guenther B lum entritt, operations 
officer of Arm y Group A, w rote on the OKH m essage "By o rder of the 
Com m ander-in-C hief [Rundstedt], and Chief of Staff [Sodenstern] NOT 
passed to the Fourth Army, as the F ueh rer has delegated control to 
the C om m ander-in-C hief of the Army Group. " The Army Group War 
D iary adds the comment:; "The C -in-C  [Rundstedt] considers that, 
even.if th e ir fu rther advance is extrem ely, desirab le , it is in any. case 
urgently n ecessa ry  for the m otorized groups to close up. "21 
In commenting upon .Rundstedt’s action of not passing 
B rauchitsch’s o rder to'Kluge, E llis [Official B ritish  War H istorian] 
rem inds the read e r  that "The F u eh re r’s" o rd ers  of the previous day 
WERE passed to all form ations. The la s t entry  of the Arm y Group A 
War. d iary  for 25 May contains the cryptic statem ent, "The task  of 
Arm y Group A can be considered to have been com pleted in the main. "22 
This certain ly  indicates that von Rundstedt did not contem plate becoming 
too deeply, involved in the confused battle developing in front of Dunkirk. 
As the Arm y Groups, A rm ies, Corps, and Divisions converged upon 
the dwindling pocket of res is tan ce , boundaries w ere crossed , command
rela tionsh ips become confused, and troops got in te rm ing led 't a r tille ry
y
fire s  w ere difficult to coord ina te ; m issions and objectives became
21 E llis, op. c it. , p. ,150. 
22Ibid.
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obscure and.the situation unclear. It is en tire ly  possible that at this 
sta te  .of the battle Lord .Gort-.-'-encircled as he w as—had m ore complete 
command of the battle situation than did the besieging forces.
Von B rauchitsch was unhappy with the situation  generally.
This is indicated in  H aider’s d iary  en try  f o r -26..May which describes 
the C-in-C  a s '"v e ry  nervous. "
No'Significant change in situation. Von Bock, suffering 
lo sses ,, is pushing.slowly, ahead between inner wings, of 18th and 
6th A rm ies. KLuge’sT I Corps gains som e ground around 
LaBassee.. Our arm ored  and m otorized .forces have been stopped 
as if paralyzed on the high ground between Bethune and St. Omer 
•in com pliance with top .level o rd e r s , . and m ust not attack. In this 
way, cleaning out the pocket'm ay take weeks, very  much to the 
detrim ent of .our prestige and our fu rth er plans.
All through the morning Obd. H., is  very  nervous. I can 
fully sym pathize with him, for these o rd e rs  from  the top ju st make 
no sense. In one a rea  they ca ll for a head-on attack against a 
front withdrawing in an orderly .fashion and s till possessing  its 
s trik ing  power, and elsew here they freeze  the troops to the spot 
when the enemy re a r  could be cut into anytim e you wanted to 
attack.- Von Rundstedt too, apparently could not stand it any 
longer and went up front to Hoth and K leist, to get the lay of the 
land for the next move of his arm or.
Around noon,, a telephone call notifies us that the F uehrer 
has authorized .the left wing to be moved within .a rtille ry  firing 
distance of Dunkirk in o rd er to cut off, from  the landside. the 
continuous flow of tran sp o rt (evacuations and a rriv a ls ). ^
By noon on the 26th, Lord Gort was in full re tre a t  to the 
beaches of. Dunkirk. He had been able to ex trica te  enough forces to 
protect the canal line and his flanks w ere re la tiv e ly  secu re  to protect 
the evacuation. When H itler lifted the "Stop O rder" on.the 26 th ,. the 
stalled  panzers began to move again toward the perim eter of the 
Allied forces around D unkirk—but it was, too ..late. The vision of the 
escaping B ritish  forces had alarm ed th e  "Fuehrer and tie  called for
^ H a id e r  D ia ry ,. 26 May 1940.
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von B rauchitsch. H aider briefly, rep o rts  the interview . "1330': Obd. H. 
summoned'.'to .Fuehrer. Returns beam ing.at 1430. At la s t the F uehrer 
has given perm ission  to move on.Dunkirk in: o rder to prevent fu rther 
evacuation. "^4
This word apparently was passed rapidly to the Germ an fo rces 
on the canal .line because Guderian, after m aking,a false  s ta r t  in the 
m orning when he was again re s tra in ed  by higher h ead q u arte rs ,. r e ­
ported he was re leased  from  re s tr ic tio n  "too 'la te. "
On this day [the-26th] we attem pted once again to attack tow ards 
Dunkirk and to close the ring  about that sea  fo r tre s s . But renewed, 
o rd ers  to halt a rrived ... We w ere stopped within sight of Dunkirk!
: We watched the Luftwaffe attack. . We also saw the arm ada of g rea t 
..and little  ships by means of which the B ritish  w ere evacuating . 
th e ir  fo rces. ^
In sum m arizing the battle of Dunkirk, Guderian offers his 
opinion as the com m ander on the spot:
It was not until the afternoon of May the 26th that H itler gave 
perm ission  for the advance on Dunkirk to be resum ed. By then it 
was too late to-achieve a g rea t v ictory.
The operation would have been com pleted very  much m ore 
quickly-if Supreme H eadquarters had not kept ordering XIX Corps 
[GuderianTs C orps] to stop.and thus hindered its rapid  and su c ce ss ­
ful advance. What the future course of the w ar would have; been if 
we had succeeded at that tim e in taking the B ritish  Expeditionary 
F orce p risoner at D unkirk ,. it. is now- im possible to guess. In any 
event a m ilitary, v ic tory  on that scale would have offered a g rea t 
chance to capable diplom ats. Unfortunately the opportunity was 
wasted owing to H itle r 's  nervousness. The reason  he subse­
quently gave for holding back my corps - that the ground in 
F landers w ith.its many, ditches and canals was not suited to 
tanks - was a poor one. 26
^ Ibid.
2^Guderian, op.- c it. , p. 118.
Ibid. ? p. HQ.
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In the foregoing.discussion, the m ilitary, reasons for th e : 
“Stop O rder" have been covered in considerable detail. It has been 
established that both H itler and Rundstedt'contributed .to-the'order.
The responsib ility  for the o rder, however, m ust r e s t  with H itler as 
D ictator.
The political reasons for the "Stop O rder" a re  somewhat 
m ore obscure, although they have been alluded to in general te rm s by 
sev era l of the partic ipants. P o litical objectives may have signifi­
cantly affected H itle r’s thinking. In this respect, H aider’s d iary  
entry  of 25 May [page 87 su p ra ] is in teresting . It re fe rs  to "Political 
command, " "This political move, " and "The battle of decision m ust 
not be fought on F lem ish soil. M There w ere innuendos in H aider’s 
words which hinted that th e re  was m ore to the m atte r than the insinua­
tions and veiled re feren ces to "political decisions. " In his 19 July 
1957 .letter to Shirer, H aider reca lled  H itle r’s political reasons for 
not wanting to finish the battle fo r Dunkirk on F lem ish soil. He said 
that H itler,, in subsequent re feren ces to the episode, supported his 
"Stop O rder" on two bases. The f irs t, of course, was m i l i t a r y th e  
second\was purely political. He fe.lt that the generals could not argue 
with the political reasons involved as these w ere outside th e ir  sphere 
of com petence.
The second reason  was that for political reasons he did not 
want the decisive final battle, which inevitably would cause g rea t 
damage to the population, to take place in te rr ito ry  inhabited by 
the F lem ish people. He had the intention, he said, of making an 
independent National Socialist region out of the te r r i to ry  in­
habited by the G erm an-descended Flem ish, thereby binding them 
close to Germany. His supporters on F lem ish soil had been 
active in th is d irection  for a .long tim e; he had prom ised them to 
keep th e ir  land free  from  the damage of w ar. If he did not keep
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this prom ise now, th e ir confidence in him would be severely  
damaged. That would be a political disadvantage for Germany 
which h e ,. as the politically  responsib le  leader, m ust avoid. 27
Another interesting, sta tem ent a ttribu ted  to H itler,, apropos 
the political desirab ility  of avoiding.a decisive defeat of the B ritish  
•Expeditionary F orce,, was made to Liddell H art by G eneral Guenther 
B lu m en tritt,. Chief of Staff for von'Rundstedt. B lum entritt re fe rs  to 
the 24 May 1940 v isit of H itler to von Ruuds ted tTs headquarters.
H itler was in very  good humor, he adm itted that the course of 
the campaign had been " a  decided m irac le , " and gave us his 
opinion that the w ar would be finished in six weeks. After that he 
wished to conclude a reasonable peace with France,, and.then the 
way would be free  for an agreem ent with B ritain .
He then astonished, us by, speaking,with adm iration of the 
B ritish  Em pire, of the necessity  for -its existence, and of the 
civilization that B rita in  had brought into the world. He rem arked , 
with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation  of its em pire had 
been achieved by m eans that w ere often harsh , but "where there  
is planing, the re  a re  shavings flying. " He com pared the B ritish  
• E m pire with the Catholic Church - saying they w ere both essen tia l 
elem ents of stab ility  in the world. He said all he wanted from  
B rita in  was that she would acknowledge German^As position on the 
Continent. The re tu rn  of G erm anyTs lost colonies would be de­
sirab le  but not essen tial, and he would even offer to support 
B rita in  with troops if she should become involvedfn difficulties 
anywhere. He rem arked  that the colonies w ere largely  a m atte r 
of p restige,, since they could not be held in  war, and few Germ ans 
could se ttle  in the trop ics.
He concluded by saying that his aim  was to make peace with 
B rita in  on a basis that she w ould.regard as com patible with her 
honour to accept.
F ield M arshal von Rundstedt, who was always for agreem ent 
with B ritain  and France, expressed  his satisfaction, and la te r, 
a fte r H itle rTs departure , rem arked  with a sigh of re lie f  - "Well, 
if he wants nothing else, then we shall have peace at last. "2°
B lum entritt felt that the halt had been called for m ore than 
purely m ilitary, reasons. He felt su re  it was but part of a la rg e r
27shirer, op .. c i t . , p. 734.
28Liddell H art, op. c i t . , p. ,134.
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political schem e to make peace term s' ea s ie r  to obtain. Liddell H art 
describes B lum entritt as believing that: "If the B ritish  Army had been 
captured at Dunkirk, the B ritish  people might have fe.lt that the ir 
honour had suffered a stain  which they m ust wipe out. B y le ttin g .lt 
escape, H itler hoped to conciliate them. "29
Liddell H art questions whether H itle r 's  attitude was d e te r­
mined only by his political asp ira tions of the moment or whether, 
perhaps, the re  w ere som e deeper psychological m otives involved.
Was this attitude of his toward England prom pted only by the 
political idea, which he had long entertained, of securing an 
alliance with her ? Or was it insp ired  by a deeper feeling which 
re a s se r te d  itse lf at this c r itic a l m om ent? There w ere some 
complex elem ents in his m ake-up which suggest that he had a 
mixed love-hate feeling toward England s im ila r to the 
K a ise r 's . 30
H itler at tim es d iscussed  the political im plications of his 
ac tiv ities m ore freely  with his Italian a llies than with his own staff. 
The u tte r candor of some of his adm issions to .Mussolini is s tartling . 
The Ciano d ia rie s  a re  revealing  in this resp ec t. The situation 
v is -a -v is  the B ritish  was included .in H itle r 's  correspondence with 
II Puce during this tim e. The Italian Foreign M inister repo rted  in 
his diary, that he was astonished to find the Nazi D ictator, then at the 
zenith of his power, [17 June 1940] harping,about the im portance of 
m aintaining the B ritish  Em pire as "a.factor in world equilibrium . "31 
Ciano, analyzing H itle r 's  sentim ents at the tim e of the "Stop O rder, "
3^Ibid. , p? 135.
30Ib id ., p. 136.
3-*-Count Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano D iaries 1939-1943 
(Garden City, N, Y .: Doubleday & C o ., .1946), p. 265.
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described  .the F ueh rer as ."the gam bler .who has made a big scoop and 
would like to get up from  the table risk ing  nothing m ore. ir^ 2
On the evening of May' 26th-~the sam e day the "Stop O rder" was 
cancelled—the B ritish  Royal Navy, supported by. the Royal. Air Force, 
began the evacuation .of the B ritish . Expeditionary Force from  the port 
and beaches of Dunkirk. OPERATION DYNAMO, ; as it was called, was 
in effect. - An arm ada of 850 v esse ls ,, ranging in size  from  heavy 
. c ru ise rs  to'Sloops and harb o r craft, began taking, the so ld iers from  the 
battered .sho re . . Even the fireboats from  the port of London w ere 
p ressed  into serv ice , and one of them  was mentioned in dispatches 
for her actions.
, In. the .first four days, 125, 000 m en  w ere re tu rned  to England. 
The Germ an staff finally cam e to re a liz e  exactly what was occurring. 
Although Germ an troops on the canal line had been reporting  the 
intense B ritish  nava.1 activity, fo r days, the magnitude of the evacuation 
was not apparent to the G erm an generals who w ere ignorant of the 
power and .flexibility of seapow er.
H alder!s d iary  en tries of, 29, 30,. and 31 May. revea l the 
growing aw areness of the significance of the evacuation.
29 May: The enemy: pocket has again ■ shrunk. It w ill indeed 
be in teresting  to see how much of the enemy did get caught in this 
pocket, 45 Km in length and .30 Km in width.
. 30 May: Morning conference With Obd.. H. . He is angry, and 
the reason  is that the effects of the blunders forced on us by 
. O. K. W .. a re  beginning, to be fe.lt now. . . . .  the pocket would have 
been closed at the coast if only, our/arm or-had not been held back.
As it is,, the bad w eather has grounded our a ir-fo rce  and now we
3 2 I b l d , , p . - 2 6 6 .
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m ust stand by and watch how countless thousands of the enemy are  
getting away to England right under our noses.
31 May: The rep o rts  received  during the day confirm  the 
picture given by the m orning rep o rts . . . . An in tercepted  radio 
signal would Indicate that the enemy, is  going to resum e evacuation 
operations during the night. It will be difficult to stop him. . We 
a re  now paying for our failu re, due to in terference from  above, to 
cut off the coast. 33
The Luftwaffe, when it was not grounded by bad w eather, was 
severe ly  attached by the new Spitfires of the R. A. F. Even when the 
G erm an bom bers w ere able to penetrate the B ritish  a ir  defenses over 
Dunkirk, the soft sand of the beaches muffled the effect of the bombs; 
and B ritish  engineers, exerting superhum an effort, kept the dock fac ili­
tie s  rep a ired  and the port open. Churchill, in his address to the House 
of Commons on 4 June 1940, a ttribu ted  the "deliverance at Dunkirk" to 
the R. A. F.
By 4 June 1940, 338, 226 B ritish  and French so ld ie rs  had been 
evacuated. . Not only was the port s till in Allied hands; it was being 
, stubbornly defended by 40, 000 F rench so ld ie rs . The epic of Dunkirk 
was over.
The .last B ritish  ship sailed  from  Dunkirk just before dawn on 
June 4th. At noon, H itler conferred  with his Naval Com m ander-in - 
Chief, R aeder, and told him he planned to reduce the size of the Army 
, as soon as F rance had been overthrown, and to re le a se  a ll older men 
and skilled  w orkers. "The A ir Force and Navy, " said  H itler, "will 
have top prio rity . " The invasion of England was not d iscussed . 34
33;Halder D iary, 29, 30, and 31 May 1940.
34"Fuehrer Conferences on Naval A ffairs, 1939-1945, " (e d .), 
R ear A dm iral H. G. Thursfield, B rass  ey^s Naval Annual, 1948 (New 
York: The M acm illan C o ., 19 48)(H ereinafter re f e rred .to  as FCNA), p. 76.
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In re tro sp ec t, there  rem ains one singularly-im portant aspect 
of the nStop O rder. M Apparently it never occurred  to H itler or his 
genera ls that the B ritish  w ere not help lessly  trapped with th e ir backs 
to the sea. Having,always been woefully ignorant of naval m atte rs, 
H itler and his generals could not conceive of the sea being used to 
evacuate a .significant num ber of troops. This, however, is not as 
strange as it may seem , Even the B ritish  w ere aw are of the dangers 
as well as the possib ilities attendant upon a .la rg e -sca le  evacuation by 
sea. The B ritish  in fact su rp rised  them selves by the success of the 
operation. Initially, the B ritish  estim ated  that a maximum of only 
45, 000 troops could be evacuated by sea.
Thus, by analysis it is apparent that the ram ifications of the 
MStop O rd er” w ere lost on those who d irec ted  it. The generals who 
opposed the o rd er contended that its  issuance would prolong .that 
particu lar phase of the campaign. To them, the ports of Dunkirk and 
Ostend w ere significant only as routes for funneling supplies to the 
Allied a rm ie s--n o t as escape routes. Apparently, even von-Rundstedt 
saw no need to hasten the closing of the pocket. As fa r as he was con­
cerned, the pocket was already  closed by Germ an arm ies on th ree  
sides and by the unfriendly sea  on the fourth.
Right or wrong, / ttm "Stop O rder" at Dunkirk had many and 
varied  reaso n s: some m ilitary , som e political, and som e even that 
resu lted  from  sheer ignorance of the actual conditions. The la tte r  
pertain  m ore exclusively to H itler. As J. F. C. F u ller has said in  
re fe ren ce  to -H itlers  ignorance of the te r ra in  and the tac tica l situation 
on the canal line on 24 May: "As we shall see in other campaigns, the
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dominant defect in H itle r’s generalship.w as that he would.em ulate that 
G ilbertian hero, the Duke of P laza-T oro , who led his army, from  
behind. "^5
The cxvil-m ilitary  re la tions under.lying,the "Stop O rder" a re  
indeed difficult to understand without f irs t  comprehending the monu­
m ental German ignorance of the sea. In any case, it may be said that 
both .Hitler and his generals contributed.to the issuance of the order, 
but in the la s t analysis, H itler alone m ust bear responsib ility  for it. 
Besides assum ing responsib ility .fo r a ll political decisions, H itler 
had a sse rted  his command over the en tire  A rm y; and by im petuously 
counterm anding the o rd ers  of the Arm y C om m ander-in-C hief in a 
tac tica l situation, he re se rv ed  for h im self com plete responsib ility  for 
the consequences. This the Germ an generals w ere perfectly  willing 
for him to do. Ignoring th e ir  com plicity in the m atter, von Rundstedt, 
K leist, and-Kluge unanimously, indorsed the thesis that the F uehrer 
alone was responsib le for the "Stop O rder. "
^^Maj Gen J. F. C, Fuller, The Second W orld.W ar (New York: 
Duell, S.loane and P earce , .1949), p. 76.
CHAPTER IV
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE 
FAILURE TO INVADE BRITAIN
At dawn on 5 June 1940, the day after the la s t B ritish  ship 
sailed  from  Dunkirk, the Germ an Army unleashed a m assive assau lt 
south ac ro ss  the Somme r iv e r . Against the well tra in e d ..W ehrm acht, 
the confused and disorganized French fo rces w ere able to offer but 
little  resis tan ce . The m orale of the poorly .led French A ir Force was 
shattered , and .little ass is tan ce  could be provided by the R. A., F. as the 
B ritish  w ere even then husbanding the ir strength  for the coming Battle 
of B ritain . The French High Command, now led by the defeatists 
Petainand.W eygand, i was exploring means of ending the unequal s tru g ­
gle and of salvaging,som e part of the rapidly, d isin tegrating French 
Arm y:for use as a pawn in a rm is tice  negotiations.
On 14 June, French hum iliation was complete when German 
fo rces occupied P a r is  and hoisted the Swastika over the Eiffel tower. 
Two days la te r,, the Reynaud governm ent, which had fled to Bordeaux, 
resigned and on .17 June, M arshal Petain, the new head of state, asked 
the Germ ans for a rm is tice  te rm s.
H itler was at his headquarters W olfsschlucht [WolfTs la ir ]  
near Bruly le Peche when he received the news, F rau lein  Schroeder, 
a woman se c re ta ry  who was p resen t at the tim e,, recorded  the scene
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upon.delivery of the a rm is tice  m essage. . She told how the Fuehrer 
was beside him self with joy:
He gave his shanks a slap and went into a wild jig. . . . The 
secreta ry , could think of nothing .like it except St. V itus!s dance.
This was one of two occasions when she saw H iller utterly, carried^ 
away. . . . Only"'-Keitel seem ed equal to the moment* He made a 
..little speech and hailed H itler as the g rea te s t Field Commander of 
all tim e,--der q ro esste  Feldh'err a lle r  ze iten . ^
At .1850 on 22 June 1940, G eneral C harles Huntziger, head of 
the French A rm istice delegation, and G eneral K eitel signed the a rm i­
stice  trea ty . ' The Battle of F rance had ended and H itler stood tr iu m ­
phant on the channel coast. According to the planning of Graf Schlieffen 
[see page 47 su p ra ) this m ilita ry  victory.'should have solved all attend­
ant political problem s,' H itler was soon to d iscover the fallacy of this 
theory. "After the war, Field M arshal von K leist, that very, enlightened 
man who commanded the tanks that ro lled  over France, rem arked  as 
follows: T. . . The Germ an m istake was to think that a m ilitary, suc­
cess could .solve political problem s, Indeed, under the Nazis we 
tended to re v e rse  C lausew itzls dictum and reg ard  peace as an in te r ­
ruption of w ar.
Om22 June 1940, the mighty. W ehrm acht, on the threshold of 
its  g rea te s t victory, was in undisputed control of W estern Europe. One
-^Walter Ansel, H itler Confronts England (Durham, N. G,: 
Duke U niversity P re ss , 1960), p. 92. , quoting from  A lbert Zalder, 
H itler P riv a t (Dusse.ldorf, 1949), p. 156. "Keitel was probably the 
f ir s t  to bring the F eldherr appellation into prom inence. Goering 
followed , suit in lik e  te rm s and the p ress  brought it into public use. 
Some of the professional m ilita ry  shortened it,, as tim e went on, into 
an uncom plim entary nicknam e: G RO FAZ--G RO (sste)F(eldherr) 
A (ller) _Z(eiten). "
^G oerlitz, op .. c it. , pp. .376-377.
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prim e question, however, rem ained to plague "The G reatest Field 
Com mander of All T im e"--W hat Now?
The success of the Nazi offensive in F rance and the rapidity  
and com pleteness of the F rench collapse su rp rised .even  the m ost 
optim istic of the Germ an leaders. H itler and his generals, however, 
w ere s ti ll  confronted with a battered  but uncowed foe in G reat B ritain  
whose leaders vowed to continue the, struggle against Germ any to the 
b itte r end. The Germ ans, m oreover, w ere without a plan to invade 
the B ritishT sles to adm in ister 'the  coup de g race .
The absence of a German plan to ca rry  the fight to the B ritish  
homeland is recognized today as a serious s tra teg ic  e r ro r . H istorians 
differ as to the reasons for this e r ro r  and who should bear the blame. 
As might be expected, the Germ an generals unanimously blamed H itler 
for the poor planning.and stated that H itler never intended to attack. 
England d irec tly  for either of two main reasons. One reason  was that 
H itler desired  to m aintain the B ritish  Em pire as a force in European 
po litics; the other was that he was convinced the B ritish  would sue for 
peace when F rance fell and England was blockaded by sea and subjected 
to heavy bombing from  the a ir . Other apologists contend that the 
e r ro r  was a stupid oversight on the part of the Germ an m ilita ry  leaders 
who, because of th e ir  continental orientation,, could not appreciate the 
stra teg ic  possib ilities of an invasion of the B ritish  homeland. They 
point out that by 194U H itler had banished from  his im m ediate c irc le  
all the re a l b rains of the W ehrm acht, and had surrounded him self with 
acquiescent m ental pygmies w ho,. though they had a f la ir  for tac tica l 
m ilita ry  operations, w ere hopelessly, incompetent to deal with s tra teg ic
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m atte rs  transcending the movement of Army, corps on the battlefield. 
Although much can be sa id .fo r each proposition,, the fact is indisputable 
that in May and June of .1940 the Germans had no operation plan to 
invade B ritain .
C hester Wilmot, World .War II h istorian , supports the thesis 
that H itler •intentionally did not plan fo r  an assau lt on England as he 
considered such an operation unnecessary . Wilmot re fe rs  to H itle r’s 
original plan of campaign in the w est which the F uehrer outlined to the 
C om m anders-in-C hief on 23 May 1939 during.a conference in his study 
at the Chancellery. On this da te --th e  day afte r the signing of the "Pact 
of Steel" with ■Italy--Hitler told the assem bled generals and adm ira ls:
If Holland and Belgium a re  successfu lly  occupied and if 
F rance is also defeated, the fundam ental conditions for a su c cess­
ful war against England w ill have been secured . England can then 
be blockaded.from  w estern .F rance  at close q u arte rs  by the Luft­
waffe, while the Navy with its U-Boats can extend the range of the 
blockade. , When that is done, England will not be able to fight on 
the continent and daily attacks by the Luftwaffe and Navy will cut 
her life ,lines> 'The moment England’s supply routes a re  severed, 
she will be forced to capitulate. 3
The evidence is strong that H itler did not expect B ritain  to 
continue the struggle a fte r the ignominious defeat of her forces in 
F rance. On 20 May 1940, the day G uderian’s panzer columns reached 
the channel coast at the mouth of the Somme, H itler told G eneral Jod.l 
that "The B ritish  can have a separa te  peace at any tim e after re s ti tu ­
tion of the colonies. "4
^Wilmot, op. c it . ,. p. 21, quoting from  a tran sc rip t of H itle r’s 
speech presented in.evidence at N urem berg (Document L-19); see also 
S hirer, op., c i t . , pp. 484-489; and.Allan Bullock, H itler, a Study in 
Tyranny (rev, e d .; New York: H arper and Row, 1962), pp. 509-511.
^Jodi D iary, NCA, 20 May 1940.
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At noon the following day, A dm iral Raeder m et with H itler and 
in a "private d iscussion" talked.about the "details concerning the inva­
sion.of England which the Naval Staff had been working on since Novem­
ber [1939], " That H itler was not considering .an invasion in the near 
future is evidenced by the fact that in the course of the m eeting with 
R aeder he approved the la t te rTs recom m endation that the battle c ru ise rs  
S charnho rst,G neisenau , and H ipper--in  .company with four des tro y ers 
- -b e  deployed to the a rc tic  to "threaten enemy com munications between 
the B ritish  Isles and N orthern Norway.
Two weeks la te r, on 4 June ..1940--the day the evacuation of 
the B. E, F. from  Dunkirk was com pleted--R aeder and H itler again con­
fe rred  on naval m atte rs . No mention was made of Dunkirk, the cam ­
paign in N orthern  France, o r a planned cross-channel pursuit of the 
defeated B ritish  Army. ^ These H itle r-R aeder conferences strongly  
indicate that neither H itler nor his Naval Staff considered invasion of 
England im m inent o r necessary, at the tim e.
The French position as to why H itler failed to invade England 
im m ediately a fte r Dunkirk was expressed  by Adolphe G outard ,. a French 
officer who partic ipated .in  the Battle of F rance, who said the F rench 
w ere am azed at the lack of a Germ an plan to .continue the assau lt against 
B ritain . Goutard com mented:
A German leader w ill do nothing without a plan, and at this 
juncture [5 June 1940] no plan for the invasion of B ritain  had as 
yet been prepared  by the OKW. F urtherm ore , H itler was
-^FCNA, p. 105. Both the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau w ere 
se riously  damaged in action.against the B ritish  Home Fleet in June 1940.
6Ib id ., pp. 107-108.
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convinced that victory, could be obtained on the continent. . F rance 
had to ,be liquidated -first in o rder to rem ove all B ritish  hopes in 
this direction. ^
Ronald Wheatley, author of the offic ial B ritish  h isto ry  of 
OPERATION SEA. LION [German invasion of England] told of a m eeting 
on .17 June .1940 between .Colonel W alter 'W arlimont,. Chief of the Opera­
tions Division OKW and R ear A dm iral K urt Fricke, Chief of the Naval 
Staff Operations Division, during which ■'W arlimont told the A dm iral 
that "with reg ard  to a.landing in B ritain, the F ueh rer , . . has not up 
to now expressed  such an intention, as he fully appreciates the unusual 
difficulties of such an operation. T herefore, even at this tim e no p re ­
parato ry  work [has] been c a rr ie d  out in OKW.
On the sam e day that. W arlimont confided to F ricke that OKW
had no plan to land  in B ritain, Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian
Foreign M inister, m et with von Ribbentrop. . In his diary, entry, for 17
June 1940, Cia.no described  the m eeting in which he found the Reich
Foreign M inister
exceptionally calm  and m oderate, and in  favor of peace. . . .
If London wants w ar-it.w ill be to tal w ar. . . . But H itler m akes 
many, rese rv a tio n s on the desirab ility  of dem olishing the B ritish  
Em pire, which he co n s id e rs ,. even today, to be an im portant factor 
in w orld  equilibrium . I ask von Ribbentrop .a c lea r-cu t question.
. "Do you p refer the continuation of the war, or peace?" He does 
not hesitate  a moment. "Peace. "9
In his postwar w ritings, Germ an ..Field M arshal von M anstein 
.cha rac te ris tica lly  placed upon H itler the responsib ility .fo r fa ilu re  of
^Goutard, op. c it. , p . . 245.
^Ronald Wheatley, Operation.Sea Lion:, Germ an P lans for the 
Invasion of England, 1939-1942 (Oxford: Clarendon P re s , 1958), p. 16.
^Ciano, op. c it. , p. 265.
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Germ an planning. Von M anstein stated, with considerable justification,
that H itler discouraged fo rthrigh t m ilitary, advice by intim idation, by
re lie f  of those generals who disagreed  with him, by intrigue against
those personages who w ere too popular to be im m ediately re lie v ed ,, and
by favor toward those who-consistently;-trusted his in tu ition--the net
re su lt being reduction of his m ilitary, advisory, staffs to adm inistrative
instrum ents of silen t com pliance. M anstein attributed  the .lack of a
Germ an invasion plan to H itle rTs intuition that the B ritish  would give
up short of a G erm an assau lt on th e ir homeland.
As for H itle r !s m ilita ry  adv isers, they, c learly  felt obliged to await 
a !!F u eh re rTs decision. 1 . . . The above sta te  of affa irs  strik ingly  
; exemplified the . . . organization that had em erged in Germany 
, when H itler assum ed, suprem e command. . . . F rom  its very  in­
ception H itler had relegated  OKW to the sta tus of a m ilita ry  s e c re ­
ta ria t. . In any case, its  chief, K eitel, would not have been in the 
leas t capable of advising H itler on strategy .
-After taking a swipe at K eite l,. whom he thoroughly, despised, von Man­
ste in  fu rther commented on the situation that perm itted  the Germ an 
fo rces to reach  the channel coast and win the Battle of F rance without 
a plan to invade England:
As for the C om m anders-in-C hief of the th ree  se rv ices , H itler 
allowed them  practically  no influence w hatever on grand strategy . 
F rom  tim e to tim e they w ere able to express an opinion on policy 
m a tte rs  at personal interview s, but ultim ate,ly.H itler alone made 
the decisions on the basis of his own deliberations. . . . .  Since 
no o n e--lea s t of a ll OKW--was authorized to d raft a "War P lan ,.1 
the effect in practice was that, everyone le ft things to "the 
F u eh re r?s intuition. " Som e,. like K eitel and G oering ,. did. so in 
credulous adulation; o thers, like B rauchitsch and Raeder, in a 
mood of resignation. . . . The re su lt of this pattern  of command 
was, as I have stated ,, that when the campaign in the w est was fin­
ished, we w ere confronted with the problem  of what to do next. ^
^M an ste in , op. c it. , p.. 153. 
^ Ibid. , pp. 153-154.
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Many of the Germ an troops and junior officers considered the 
w ar won when the campaign in .F rance ended. To them  the lack of a 
plan to invade England presented no problem , One young Germ an offi­
cer, Lt Baron Tasgilo von Bogenhardt, reported :
We rea lly  did feel that the war was over now. It .looked as if 
we should not even have to land in.England. . With o.un U-boats 
blocking the sea routes, it seem ed,as if the B ritish  hadn’t a dog’s 
chance of getting help from  the Em pire or A m erica. This meant 
that eventually they would sim ply have to throw up the Sponge; all 
we had to do was send in the Luftwaffe to help them make up th e ir 
mind. 12
Once H itle r’s decision to land in B rita in  was announced in the 
Germ an p ress, the Nazi propaganda machine began to p repare  the pub­
lic for the invasion. Songs w ere w ritten, cartoons and posters w ere 
placed in b arracks and public places, and the en tire  apparatus of public 
inform ation was geared to perform  its task, E lse Wendel, a German 
H ausfrau, reported  the sentim ents of the homefolk:
F everish ly  we waited for the invasion of England. , Some of us 
w ere astonished that it did not at once follow the defeat of the 
B ritish  Army at Dunkirk. But this tim e I did not become skeptical. 
I had lea rn t m y-lesson that I rea lly  could not judge political or 
m ilita ry  situations at all. . We must leave these things to H itler 
and tru s t his judgment. The P re s s , too, assu red  us daily that the 
day was not far d istan t when we would land in England. 13
The possib ilities of success of a Germ an invasion of B ritain  
have been debated by h isto rians since 1940. The tim ing of the invasion 
was of param ount im portance in any evaluation of its probable success. 
Thus, in postwar d iscussions of the pros and cons of the m atter, those
^D esm ond Flower and Jam es Reeves (e d .), The T aste of 
Courage: The W ar, 1939-1945 (New York: H arper and Row, 1960), 
p. 115,. quoting Louis Hagen, Follow My Leader (Wingate, 1951).
^ I b id . , p. 152,. quoting E lse Wendel, Hausfrau at War 
(London: Odhams, 1957).
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who believe an invasion would have succeeded have theorized that 
H itler should have attem pted a hasty crossing  of the channel im m edi­
ately or shortly  a fte r Dunkirk with forces available at the tim e. The 
proponents of this theory argue-that the F rench Army, south of the 
Somme was so disorganized that it presented  no th rea t to the German 
forces, and that the B. E. F. was not only whipped and disorganized 
but without weapons. The Germ ans on the other hand, had m ore 
troops in the field than could profitably have been deployed against the 
French.
G eneral K.esselring, com m ander of the Germ an Air F leet 
im m ediately concerned with the invasion and the Battle of Britain, 
was convinced that "at least until the middle of August [1940] a prop­
e rly  organized offensive m ust have been successfu l. "14
G eneral B lum entritt, Chief of Operations for von Rundstedt 
in May and June .1940, was also of the opinion that "H itler should have 
tr ied  an invasion of England imm ediately, a fte r Dunkirk. "15
G eneral Student, com m ander of G erm an parachute forces, 
considered that the m ost propitious tim e for an a irborne assau lt against 
England would have been im m ediately a fte r Dunkirk. Student was in a 
hospital in.the sum m er of 1940 recovering  from  a serious head wound 
received during the fighting, in Rotterdam , but he la te r  outlined his plan 
for employing the Parachute Division and the 22nd A ir Landing Division 
of the XI Corps in an invasion of England.
l^K esselring , op. c i t . , p. 78.
1 ^ Guenther B lum entritt, Von Rundstedt (London: Odhams, 
1952), p. 52. .
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I would f i r s t  have urged the use of the parachute forces against 
England while [B ritish] evacuation from  Dunkirk was s till in prog­
re s s , . . .. Even if this pro ject had been vetoed, . . . I should 
have used my.'force to capture a irfie ld s [and] transported  infantry 
divisions over by a ir . . . . The best tim e was im m ediately after 
■ D unkirk--before [B ritish] defensive m easu res w ere d e v e l o p e d .  16
G eneral K esselring  also believed the use of paratroops feasible 
for the invasion. . "With proper planning,enough parachutists and glider 
planes could have been m ade available to swamp the defenses . . . and 
seize a irfie lds on which the .landing of one or two airborne divisions 
would have been possible. "17 The opinions of both;K esselring.and 
-Student w ere voiced after the war, however, when any. obstacles to an 
• invasion that might have been presen t som e years e a rlie r  probably 
appeared m ore academ ic than rea l.
To have been successful, an invasion of England.during the 
course of the Battle of F rance would have had to be planned beforehand 
and as a.sequel to the fighting in F landers. In this wise, the operation 
would have been an additional phase of OPERATION PLAN YELLOW 
for. which tra ined  invasion troops w ere available and adequate shipping, 
naval support, and a ir  cover w ere earm arked  for the assau lt and 
-standing by.
Telford Taylor, in his analysis of the probable success of a 
c ro ss-ch an n el invasion a fte r D unkirk,. concluded that, "with sufficient 
fo resigh t and boldness this could have been done.
16 L iddell. H a r t,. o p .. c it. , p .. 152.
1 ^ K esselring, op. c it. ,. p . . 70.
1®Taylor, The M arch of C onquest,. p .. 353.
108
It is indeed possible that an assau lt on B ritain  under the c ircu m ­
stances prevailing in June 1940 would have been successfu l. N ecessary  
preparations for executing such an operation a re  norm ally made by 
■ arm ies planning the attack of a m ajor r iv e r  .line. They could and, as 
events w ere to prove, should have been made as part of OPERATION 
PLAN YELLOW. G eneral Haider, in his d iary  en try  for 3 July. .1940, 
re fe rre d  to the contem plated .invasion as " s im ila r  to a large scale  
r iv e r  crossing . " H itler, on the other hand, considered the difficulties 
inherent to such an operation m ore form idable. On 21 July 1940, at a 
conference with G eneral B rauchitsch and A dm iral R aed e r,. the F uehrer 
described  the operation as an "exceptionally daring undertaking. " The 
effort, continued H itler, "is not just a r iv e r  crossing , but the crossing  
of a sea which is dominated by the enemy. . This is not a case of a 
single crossing  operation as in Norway; s tra teg ic  su rp rise  cannot be 
expected. . . . .  Forty  divisions will be required . H itle rTs ap p re­
ciation of the "difficulties" and the "daring" aspects of the crossings 
may have been influenced by the "secre t"  briefings he had received  
from  A dm iral Raeder who viewed the en tire  operation with much 
apprehension.
Although many m ilita ry  experts and pseudo experts have 
advanced postwar opinions on the probable success of a Germ an c ro ss -  
channe.1 invasion of England and have speculated on the reasons why the 
G erm an W ehrm acht never attem pted the c ro ss in g ,, an even g rea te r  
num ber of opinions have been advanced as to why the invasion was not
l^FCNA, p. 119; also reported  in Wheatley, op. c i t . , 
p. 43; and Haider D iary, 22 July 1940.
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even contem plated by the talented German operations staffs p rio r to 
dune 1940.
Hit.lerTs intuition that the B ritish  would accept peace te rm s 
after the defeat of F rance is the only'logical explanation for the lack of 
a Germ an plan to invade B ritain . Also, his indecision to continue the 
attack in the face of continued B ritish  re s is tan ce  in June and July of 
1940 was influenced to varying degrees by a combination of m ilitary , 
political, and economic facto rs that prevailed throughout the sum m er 
and fall of that year.
In the la s t days of June, H itler waited im patiently for word 
that the B ritish  desired  to talk peace. . Even Winston Chur chill js speech 
to the House of Commons on 18 June, which re ite ra ted  the determ ination 
of the Churchill governm ent to fight on "whatever the odds, "20 did not 
shake the F u eh re rTs confidence that the B ritish  would soon sue for 
peace.
On 29 June, H itler re tu rned  to his field headquarters at Tan- 
nenberg. Situated west of F reudenstadt in the Black F orest, Tannen- 
berg.w as a .s trange  place indeed to locate the suprem e headquarters, 
as has been commented upon by many. H ere H itler sulked i n  i s o l a t i o n ,  21 
although he did take long walks in the woods while his staff officers 
v isited  the local wine gardens. It was here  that H itler drafted his 
v ic tory  speech to the R eichstag, w restled  with the s tra teg ic  dilem m a
20Bu.llock, op, c it. , p. 592. This well known speech con­
tinued - "so that if the B ritish  Em pire and its Commonwealth .last for 
a thousand years, men will s till say: This was the ir finest hour. "
^ C ian o , op. c it . , pp. 272-273.
110
posed by:continued B ritish  intransigence, and considered the m ajor 
problem  confronting him: What Now?
G eneral Jo d i,. second only to 'Keitel in his adulation of the 
F uehrer as "The G reatest F ield Commander of All Time, " but n ever­
the less a. capable staff officer,, was, by the end of June,, quite d is­
turbed by. the lack of a plan to deal with the stubborn B ritish . Spurred 
on by the "Young Turks" of the OKW staff such as von Lossberg and 
'W arlim ont, Jod.1 prepared  for the F uehrer a ram bling six  page m emo­
randum  titled  -"The Continuation of the War Against England. " This 
document was com pleted by the tim e H itler re tu rned  to Tannenberg,
. and on 30 June Jod.1 presented it to him for his consideration. 22
In th is staff memorandum, Jodi considered two broad courses 
of action against England: f i r s t , . a d irec t attack against the B ritish  
Is le s ; secondly, an attack on the B ritish  E m pire, o r , , as he put it, "an 
■ extension of the w ar to B rita in 's  periphery. "23 MThe final Germ an 
victory, " Jodi continued, ., "including, v ictory  over-England, is only a 
m atte r of tim e. " Considering v ic tory  assu red , Jodi theorized that 
Germany could "choose a .course  of action that sp ares her strength  and 
. avoids r is k s ;"  he concluded that an a ir  w ar alone against England would 
. destroy, her w ar potential and her c r itic a l supplies, and would "paralyze 
and finally break the w ill of the people to r e s is t  and thereby, fo rce the ir
22Ansel, op. c it . , p. ,116.
23i\fazi Conspiracy and. A ggression: Supplement A. (Washington: 
US G overnm ent.Printing,Office, .1948), (hereinafter re fe rre d  to as 
NCA-A), Document 1776-PS.
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governm ent to capitu late. [Italics a re  Jodi’s ] " ^  jodl believed that a 
landing in ;England was possible only if Germ an forces had .command of 
the a ir . . He also believed that a landing was n ecessary  only to "deal the 
death stroke. " The "death stroke, " however, would not be n ecessa ry  
until the "end of August or early  Septem ber. " Even so, Jodl considered 
that "the landing m ust be, p repared  in all details as ultim a ra tio . "25
For two days during his stay at Tannenberg.and his walks in 
the Schwartzwald, H itler studied JodTs mem orandum . Then on 2 July 
he d irected  K eitel to .issue the f ir s t  planning d irective for the invasion 
of England. Beginning.with the usual H itlerian  pream ble: "The 
F ueh rer and Supreme Commander has decided, " the d irective sta ted :
"A landing.in England is possible, providing that a ir  superio rity  can be 
attained and certa in  other [unspecified] n ecessa ry  conditions fulfilled. " 
The d irective ended with the admonition that "all preparations m ust be 
undertaken on the basis that invasion is s ti ll  only a plan, and has not 
yet been decided upon. "26
In the evening of 2 July, Force H, the B ritish  Naval strik ing  
force stationed.at G ibralter, "sortied  in, strength  and headed eastw ard 
into the M editerranean. It consisted of a c a rr ie r , th ree  battleships, 
sev era l c ru ise rs , and the usual d es tro y e rs . "27 During the m orning of
24Ibid.
2^Ibid.
26FCNA, pp. 112-113.
2^Ansel, op. c it . , p. 123. B ritish  ships in Force H included 
the a irc ra f t c a r r ie r  ARK ROYAL and the battleships HOOD, RESOLU­
TION and VALIANT.
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3 July, this strong B ritish  naval fo rce appeared off the French naval 
base at M ers-e l-K eb ir [Oran], Its com mander, Vice Admiral Sir Jam es 
S om erv ille ,. requested  A dm iral Gensoul, com m ander of the French fleet 
anchored inside the breakw ater, to accept any one of sev era l B ritish ' 
proposals for keeping the French ships out of Germ an hands. P recious 
tim e elapsed in polite but futile conversations. Meanwhile, A dm iral 
Gensoul1 s four French battleships and th ree  c ru ise rs , plus the destroy ­
e rs  and subm arines com prising his force, prepared  for an attack by the 
B ritish . 28
As the sum m er twilight deepened with no agreem ent being 
reached, Som erville requested  fu rther guidance from  the B ritish  govern­
ment. At 1820, the A dm iralty rep lied : " F irm  intention of H. M. G. that 
if F rench will not accept any of your a lternatives they a re  to be destroy ­
ed. " Som erville reported  the F rench in transigence to London and was 
instructed : "French ships m ust comply with our te rm s or sink them ­
selves or be sunk by you before dark. "29 Som erville im m ediately 
opened f ire  on the F rench fleet,, and before dark on the evening of 3 July 
m ost of the French ships w ere either destroyed or sunk in the harbor 
at M ers-e l-K eb ir. 30
3% bid. F rench ships anchored at M ers-e l-K eb ir w ere the 
battleships DUNKERQUE, STRASBOURG, PROVENCE and BRETAGNE; 
and the c ru ise rs  VOLTA, MOGADOR, TERRIBLE, LYNX, TIGRE, and 
KERSAINT.
2®Churchill, Their F inest Hour, pp. 234-236. Com pare these 
seventeen words of positive guidance with the .lengthy and equivocal 
wording of m ost of H itle r’s d irec tives. Sunset cam e at 1929 GMT in 
Oran on 3 July 1940.
30Anse.l, op .. c it. , p . . 123
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If positive and violent action on the part of B ritain  was needed 
to convince H itler that the B ritish  w ere prepared  to m atch with deeds 
the words of defiance they had voiced against the Reich, the attack and 
sinking of the French fleet at M ers-c l-K eb ir should certainly have suf­
ficed; for if B ritain  could bring h erse lf to attack her fo rm er ally, what 
force m ust she be prepared  to unleash against the Nazis ? As painful 
as its execution m ust have been for the B ritish , th is naval action was 
a trem endous defeat for the F uehrer psychologically.
Count Ciano reported  on 2 July that he was "convinced that 
th e re  is something brewing in [H itler’s ]  mind, . . . Now he is con­
sidering  many a lternatives, and is ra is ing  many doubts which account 
for his re s tle ssn e ss . "31 H itler was indeed having his doubts about the 
B ritish . "The little  w orm s" he had dealt with at Munich had turned 
overnight into B ritish  Lions. The faded m em ory of Cham berlain and 
his um brella at Munich had been-replaced at M ers-e l-K eb ir by the 
vision of a new and bold adversary  in the person of Winston Churchill, 
who presented a quite different personality  to the F u eh re r.
H itler waited until 19 July, a full month after the fall of 
F rance, before summoning the Reichstag to hear his v ictory  oration. 
The month’s silence, punctuated only by the guns of the B ritish  fleet, 
.left no doubt in the F u eh re r’s mind that the w ar m ust continue. In this 
Reichstag speech, however, H itler intended .to make one la s t d irec t 
appeal to the English people. Ciano, who cam e to B erlin  to hear the 
oration, recorded  in his d iary : "H itler’s speech will be a .last appeal
31-Ciano, op. c-it, , p. 271.
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to G reat B ritain . I under stand, that, without th e ir saying, so, however, 
they, a re  hoping and praying that this appeal will not be rejected . "32
The F u e h re r s  speech was given at the elaborately  decorated 
Knoll Opera House in an atm osphere of pomp.and suprem e trium ph. 
H itler was in top form  as an o ra to r for the occasion. The tim e 
lavished on the speech, which had been so long.in preparation, was not 
wasted. It was a m asterp iece  of staging.and m etaphor and was ideal 
for German consumption. . Count Ciano,. seated in a diplom at1 s box for 
the occasion, considered the speech "solem n and stagy, " but delivered 
"sim ply and in an unusually humane tone. "33 The Fuehrer reported  to 
the Reichstag the details of the "astonishing" success of th e .W ehrmacht, 
assum ing personal cred it for every facet of leadership  including ;the 
details of changes to the OKH plans for OPERATION PLAN YELLOW,
He assu red  the Germ an solons that any possibility  of estrangem ent 
between G erm any and R ussia did not exist,, and he blamed. Wins ton 
Churchill and the other B ritish  lead ers  for continuing the w ar when 
"all is lost. " In a d irec t appeal to the B ritish  people, he sta ted:
In this hour, I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience 
to appeal once m ore to reason  and common sense in G reat B ritain  
as much as elsew here. I consider m yself in a position to make 
this appeal since I am not the vanquished, begging favors, but the 
v ic to r speaking in the name of reason.. I can see no reason  why 
this w ar m ust go on; 34
The New York T im es, im commenting on the speech, reported :
3?,Ibid, ■ p. 277.
33Ibid.
34The New York Tim es. 20 July 1940, p. 4.
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In form  and in substance, Hit.lerTs ultim atum  yesterday  was 
the sam e m ixture as before. . . .  It proffered the sam e, sweet 
reasonableness. '. . . It was another attem pt to underm ine the 
m orale of the-enemy, to weaken his w illpower,, to provoke a revo~ 
lution of opinion in  B ritain  which would give v ic to ry  to Germany 
without a long and costly struggle. 35
The im m ediate reaction  of the BBC to H itle r’s speech was, to 
say the le a s t , . disappointing to the F u eh re r. Without waiting for the 
official Whitehall reaction, the BBC flatly re jec ted  the Germ an over­
tu res . In so doing,. it reflected  the firm  opinion of the B ritish  "man 
on.the s tre e t. " Ciano, in the company of the Germ an leaders in Berlin, 
awaited .the in ternational reaction  to the speech. He reported :
Late in the evening of the 19th, when the f irs t  cold B ritish  
reaction  to the speech arrived , a sense of ill-concealed disappoint­
ment spread  among.the G erm ans. [H itler] would like an under­
standing, with G reat B ritain . He knows that w ar with the B ritish  
will be hard and bloody, and knows also  that people everyw here 
a re  averse  to bloodshed. 36
■ In spite of his disappointm ent at the B ritish  attitude toward 
his peace overtu res, H itler s till hoped for a B ritish  accommodation. 
Meeting, with the F uehrer on 20 July 1940, the morning afte r the Beich- 
stag,speech, Ciano reported : "Conference with the F u eh re r, . . .  He
confirm s m y im pressions of yesterday . He would like an understanding 
with G reat B ritain . "37
M ussolini was concerned that the speech might influence the 
B ritish  to begin peace negotiations because, according to Ciano: . "More
35Ibid.
33Ciano, op. c it . , p . . 277.
37Ibid.
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than ever now [M ussolini] wants w ar. "38 Churchill, commenting on 
II Duce!s fea rs ,, sta ted : . MHe need not have fre tted  him self. He was 
not to be denied all the w ar he wanted. "89
The F u e h re r s  speech to the Reichstag was m ore than a v ictory  
speech. . He used.the occasion to honor and advance the rank of his m ili­
ta ry  leaders. Breaking a ll precedence, he stopped half way through his 
speech to award m edals and promotions to his generals and adm irals. 
Seated ..in the f ir s t  [m ilitary] balcony at the K roll Opera House, they 
stood and saluted as th e ir  nam es and aw ards w ere announced. ^0
The .large num ber of these aw ards and prom otions, however, 
and the attitude with which the F uehrer presented  .them, seriously  
detracted  from  th e ir worth.
The Officer corps was there  to be honored, but even as H itler 
spoke its .sta tu re  dwindled. This was no m ere chief of state, 
graciously  and gratefully  applauding the exploits of a. Wellington 
or Nelson, a Foch or Pershing. This was the very  Author of 
V ictory—this was Napoleon or F red erick  the G reat, pausing to 
acknowledge that his a ss is tan ts  had indeed been of serv ice . ^
H itler took com plete and sole c red it for the m ilita ry  v ic to ries.
I advised the Germ an forces . . . .  and gave them the n ecessary  
detailed o rd ers , . . . 1  the re fo re  gave o rd ers  for an im m ediate' 
attack. . . . C ontrary to the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, I arranged  
for the operation to bear m ainly on the left wing of the front. . . .
I planned to aim  for the Seine and Loire R ivers. ^
38Ib id ., p. 278.
89Churchill, T heir F inest Hour, p .-261.
^ T h e  New York T im es,. 20 July 1940, p. 5; see also Shirer, . 
op. c it . , p. 754;. and.Taylor, M arch of Conquest, p. . 344.
^ T a y lo r , M arch of Conquest, p. 345.
^ The New York T im es, 20 July 1940, p. 4.
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Small wonder that the observant S h irer thought Haider the 
!,saddest fig u re” in that m artia l assem blage, as Hitler, calm ly 
. assum ed parenthood of all the G eneral Staff’s brain  children of 
the recen t weeks of trium ph. 43
During the cerem ony ,. H itler awarded field m a rsh a l’s batons 
to twelve g e n e ra ls ; and awarded an ex tra  la rge  baton to Goering who 
was made Reich M arshal of the G reater Germ an R eich--a .position  
newly created  for the occasion. 44 Nine Arm y generals w ere promoted 
to field m arshal. In .order of rank, these w ere - B rauchitsch, Keitel, 
Rundstedt, Bock, Leeb, L ist, K luge,. W itzleben, and Reichneau. Also, 
th ree  Luftwaffe o fficers—Milch, K esselring , and Sperr.le--w ere made 
field m arsha ls. Haider was promoted one rank to the grade of general. 
This la rg e  num ber of prom otions was considered unusual in the sense 
that only five field m arsha ls had been made by the K aiser during the 
en tire  f ir s t  World War. As the name of each promoted officer was 
called he a ro se  and.saluted Hither with ra ise d  right arm . And when 
he sa t down he had to shake hands with all his colleagues in the 
im m ediate Vicinity, and the re  was much slapping of backs and smiling" 
among the officers. 45
Hans Gisevius, perennial p lotter against H itler and an eye­
w itness to the occasion, described it th u s :
Gray row upon gray row,, each gray  uniform  splashed with the 
red  of the coat flap, the victorious generals sa t and received 
decorations and honors from  th e ir "G reatest G eneral of All Time. ” 
New genera ls of the arm y, new colonel generals, twelve field- 
m arsha ls  and a Reich m arsha l! . . .  It was enough to take ones
4^Taylor, M arch of Conquest, p.. 346.
44The New York T im e s .. 20 July 1940, p. 5.
45Ibid.
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breath  away. Afterward the people tr ie d  to console them selves 
with a joke: . !IT hey 're  cheaper by. the dozen. "4°
Gisevius was convinced, and so confided to von H assell, that these
prom otions brought over to H itle r 's  side m ost of the generals who had
been engaged in underground opposition to the F u eh re r. On 7 August,
the ex-am bassador to Italy w rote in his d iary : "Gisevius no longer
expects anything from  the highest g e n e ra ls ; they a re  being fattened on
title s , decorations and gifts. "47
Telford Taylor considered the la rg e  num ber of prom otions no 
"m ere  burst of H itlerian generosity. It was a deliberate  and highly 
successfu l m aneuver to debase the coinage of m ilita ry  rank. "48 Taylor 
pointed out that the new profusion of batons was a perfect illu stra tion  of 
W. S .. G ilbert's  apothegm: "When ev 'ryone is somebodee, then no one's
anybody. "49 Many Army men also believed that the large num ber of 
promotions had the effect of cheapening the value of the ranks awarded. 
Von>Manstein said: "N atural as the G erm an people found it to honour
m erito rious s o ld ie rs , . we arm y men felt the distinctions now bestowed 
overstepped the bounds of necessity  both in ch a rac te r and scope. "50
The promotions of .19 July .1940 w ere not the only ones awarded 
a fte r the Battle of F rance. . When the Nazi attack began in May 1940,
4^Hans Bernd Gisevius, To The B itter End (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1947), pp. 455-456.
4^Von H assell, o p .. c it . ,. p. 137.
40Taylor, M arch of . Conquest, p . . 347.
49Ibid.
50Manstein, op. c it. , p. 150.
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there  w ere on,ly: forty  six sen ior Germ an generals on the rank ro s te r . 
After 1 A ugust,. there  w ere seventy one. 51 Besides the senior officers 
promoted at the K roll Opera. House, twenty six additional o fficers w ere 
advanced to general, 52 twenty- seven to -Lt. General, and twenty th ree  
to -Major G eneral.
. While thus increasing  his hold on the W ehrm acht, though 
cheapening,the rank of its leading officers, H itler continued to empha­
size  his own position by living a sim ple au s te re  life. In so doing, he 
hoped to stand in-clear con trast to the sta r-spang led  presence of his 
genera ls. On 2.1. October 1941, H itler confided to R eichfuehrer SS 
H im m ler:
. As fa r as my own private existence is concerned, I shall 
always live sim ply--bu t in my, capacity of F uehrer and Head of 
State, Lam obliged to stand out clearly, from  am ongst all the 
people around me. If my. close associa tes g litte r  with decora­
tions, I can distinguish m yself from  them  only by. w earing none 
at all. 53
The plethora of decorations awarded .19 July was but another of 
H itle rTs tools to dominate the W ehrm acht. Von H assell noted at the tim e 
of Dunkirk that "The Arm y fights anonymously as far as its leadersh ip  
goes. "54 Telford T aylor considered the K roll Opera House cerem ony 
a prim e example of the shrew d tac tics  by. which H itler "converted the
5lT aylor, M arch of Conquest, pp ..399-408.
52iQGluding. Corps Com m anders M anstein, Schmidt, and Rein­
hard t; and Sodernstern, RundstedtTs Chief of Staff.
53H ltle rTs Secret C onversations, trans.. Norman Cameron and 
R. H .. Stevens (New York: Signet B ooks,, 1961), p .. 102.
54von;Hasse.ll, op. c i t . , p. - 129.
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genera ls stunning v ic to ries to his own uses, and thus perpetuated his 
own domination of the officer corps. "55
The Fuehrer*s contribution to success in the west,' however,
cannot be overlooked. Even Goering made a d istinct contribution.
H itler and Goering together deserve th e ir  sh a re  of cred it; "yet the
accom plishm ents of the m ilita ry  leadership , the inherited qualities of
the old arm y, and the achievem ents of individuals, from  G e s s . l e r 5 6
and Seeckt to Beck and F ritsch , [were] sham elessly, suppressed. "57
Von H assell, although violently an ti-H itler, adm itted that:
nobody can contest the proportions of the success achieved by 
H itler, but that- does not a lte r  the re a l nature of his deeds or the’ 
crue l dangers now threatening a ll our higher standards. A 
demoniac Spartacus will wreak nothing but destruction if the 
opposition does not act in tim e. It is trag ic  not to be able to 
re jo ice  over such achievem ents. The m asses of the people take 
everything with an astonishing.sto lid  indifference; deafened, I 
suppose, by seven years of listening to loudspeakers. 58
The aw ards and prom otions dispensed so lav ish ly  by the 
F u eh rer w ere m ore than recognition of past accom plishm ents; they 
■were insurance of good behavior-in the fu tu re --b u t they w ere not 
issued  without cost. As proved by subsequent events, H itler made the 
generals "pay dearly  for th e ir  batons and s ta rs  and m edals. The 
p rice  was a pow erless anonymity, and it is  chiefly rem arkab le  that so
55Tay.lor, M arch of Conquest, pp. 350-351.
55jgr  Otto K arl G essler, Reich M inister of Defense under the 
W eim ar Republic.
57von: Has sell, op. c it . , p. 133.
58Ibid.
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few of the generals sensed the cost, and that so many w ere content with 
th e ir  m ess of pottage. ”59
The K roll Opera House cerem ony m arked the end of a phase of 
the w ar in the west. The generals and adm ira ls  re tu rned  to th e ir  com ­
mands to receive the accolade of th e ir subordinates and to get on with 
the planning for th e ir next g rea t adven ture--the  invasion of B ritain .
The Arm y plan for OPERATION SEA. LION was presented to 
H itler by Haider and von Brauchitsch in a m eeting.at the Berghof on .13 
July 1940. The meeting began with ^In troductory  rem ark s on ov er-a ll 
objectives of Arm ed F o rc e s--T a sk  of A rm y--B asis  for a tta inm ent-- 
Tim e fac to rs--S treng th . ”50 in m arked con trast to JodFs ram bling 
m em orandum  on ”The Continuation of the War Against England, ”
[page .110 su p ra ] the notes of the Army Chief of Staff .listed succinctly 
and m ethodically:
Conduct of the Attack:
I Enemy: G round,Forces, coastal defences, d is trib u ­
tion and expected actions.
II Own Deployment: Coast, te rra in , England, mounting
base, disposition and strength  at hop-off, 
fu rth er actions.
III Own Task Organization: and technical preparation.
IV Own Scheme: R iver crossing, .landing, development
of a ttack-streng th , estim ates and organiza­
tions.
V Summary of P roposa ls: And demands on other
se rv ices .
VI Time Schedule: And preparations initiated by now. 5r
"^Taylor, M arch of Conquest, . p. 351, 
5^Haider D iary, 13 July 1940.
61Ibid.
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Although no Naval Staff rep resen ta tiv es  w ere present, H itler 
approved the OKH plan and d irec ted  von B rauchitsch to begin p rep ara ­
tions. . A fter th e  conference, - which la s te d  ..less than two hours, Haider 
reco rded : "Recom mendations a re  accepted as a basis for p ractica l 
p reparations. . . . which a re  to begin im m ediately. "62 The Army 
Com m ander-in-C hief and the Chief of Staff imm ediately, retu rned  to the 
forw ard Arm y H eadquarters in Fontainbleau and commenced th e ir 
"p rac tica l preparations. "
The news of H itle rTs approval of the OKH plan did not reach  
A dm iral Raeder in B erlin  until 15 July. The Naval Com m ander-in- 
Chief. was astounded .at the F u e h re r s  decision.
P rac tic a l p reparations for invasion to begin at o n ce--it was 
unbelievable! Twice, fran tic  phone ca lls  w ere made to OKW r e ­
questing verification. . . . A dm iral R aederTs w o rs t.fea rs  seem ed 
rea liz ed --p rec ip ita te  o rd ers  for invasion, no tim e  to prepare, and 
certa in ly  no conception of what was involved. 63
Raeder had good cause for his consternation. On 11 July., 1940, 
two days before H itle rTs m eeting with von B rauchitsch and Haider, the 
A dm iral, in a detailed rep o rt to the F uehrer on naval operations, had 
recom m ended "that an invasion should be used only as a la s t r e s o r t  to 
fo rce B ritain  to sue for peace. . . . H itler was sym pathetic and 
seem ed m ore in te rested  in the development of Norway. "64 By 15 July, 
OKW had received  w ord of H itle rfs  decision and had inform ed the 
Nava.1 Staff that OPERATION SEA LION was to be p repared  for
62Ibid.
8 2 Ansel, op. c it. , p. 144.
84FCNA, pp. 113-114.
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execution at any. tim e afte r 15 August 1940. The following day, 16 July, 
H itler issued  his detailed D irective No. 16, "P reparations For The 
Invasion of England. "65
Initial Arm y plans called for a ...landing force of forty, divisions 
as the minimum requ ired  to secu re  the invasion attem pt. Such a force 
far exceeded Germ an Naval capabilities, however, and OKH la te r  
scaled  it down to th irteen  divisions in the f irs t  wave. 66 The rem ainder 
of the available A rm y.forces w ere to be sen t ac ro ss  the channel on suc­
ceeding days if conditions perm itted. The sm all num ber of barges 
suitable for landing arm ored  vehicles severely  lim ited the num ber of 
panzer units that could be used in the assau lt. This became a m atte r 
of grave concern to the OKH planners.
The m ajor Arm y-Navy controversy  involved the proposed 
width of the landing front. The Arm y m aintained that maximum secu r- 
ity .for the landing force, once it was ashore , could be assu red  only by 
.landing on a wide front in itia lly --a  front running from  Ram sgate to 
Lyme Bay as a minimum. [See figure 4] The Navy insisted  that naval 
protection for such a wide deployment of amphibious shipping was be­
yond its lim ited capabilities. A dm iral R aeder considered that a 
n arrow er front was m ore practicab le; such, for example, as that
65Ib id ., p. 116.
®®Ibid., p. 121 - E x tract from  Naval Staff W ar D iary  entry
for 29 July 1940. . "The Army req u ires  the tran sp o rt of 13 landing 
divisions (about 260, 000 men). In view of th e ir  anticipated tasks, the 
Arm y High Command reg ard s this as the minimum num ber, from  
which no departu re  can be perm itted, even if th e re  a re  difficulties in 
tran sp o rt. This is a considerable reduction [compared with previous 
estim ates]. "
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from  Dover to Beachy Head. 67 For th ree  weeks, the Arm y and Navy 
staffs tr ied  to negotiate a settlem ent. H aider declared that the narrow  
landing a re a  proposed by Raeder would be like forcing the landing 
troops "through a sausage g rinder. ”68 A dm iral Schniewind, Naval 
Chief of Staff, responded that it would be equally as suicidal to try  to 
protect naval fo rces deployed on such a wide frontage as that proposed 
by the Army. H aiderTs d iary  entry  for 7 August described the Arm y- 
Navy controversy  over proper frontage for invasion of England as an 
’'unbridgeable gap. "
On 13 August .1940, A dm iral R aeder conferred with H itler, 
Keitel, and Jod.l on the "Wide F ro n t--N arro w  Front" controversy. 
Requesting a prom pt decision on the m atte r, the A dm iral reported :
In view of the .limited means available for naval w arfare and 
transpo rt, O peration: "Sea-Lion, " as em phasized repeatedly, 
should be attem pted only, as a .la s t re so r t, if B ritain  cannot be 
made to sue for peace in any other way. The F uehrer ag rees 
com pletely. F ailu re  on our part would cause the B ritish  to 
gain considerable prestige. We m ust wait and see what effect 
our In tensive a ir  attacks will have. The F uehrer will make a 
decision on August 14 after a conference with the C-in-C ,
Army. 69
On 16 August, apparently, a fte r conferring with von B rau­
chitsch. H itler made his decision. In a Top. S ecret Memorandum 
titled  SEA LION, K eitel announced th a t
The following decisions w ere made by the F u eh re r- . . .
(b) P repara tions for a landing in Lyme Bay a re  to be abandoned,
. . . ( c ) . D ispositions should be made in such a m anner as not to
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exclude the possibility, of an attack on a narrow  fro n t,. should this 
be ordered  at the la s t minute, . . . 70
A fu rther OKW directive issued the sam e day. sta ted : "M aincrossing 
to be on a narrow  front,, sim ultaneous landing of four to five thousand 
troops at Brighton by m otor boats and the sam e num ber of airborne 
troops at D eaN Ram sgate. "71 [See figure 5]
H itle r’s decision was thus a com prom ise which pleased neither 
the Navy or the Army. Goering meanwhile had rem ained aloof from  the 
controversy. Presum ably, he considered the frontage m atte r to be of 
academ ic im port only, as,, in his opinion, the Luftwaffe alone could and 
would bring B ritain  to her knees. He considered that the Army would 
be able to make an adm inistra tive move a c ro ss  the channel to accept 
the su rren d er of the B ritish  a fte r th e ir  defeat by the Germ an Air 
Force. In any event, m assive a ir  attacks on B ritain  had begun on 8 
August .1940, and the generals and adm irals postponed th e ir  dispute to 
await the outcome of the a ir  battle. On one point, the A rm y and Navy 
staffs w ere in firm  agreem ent. This was that if the Luftwaffe gained 
control of the a ir  over. England, the invasion problem s would be 
im m easurably  reduced; on the other hand, if the Luftwaffe failed 
therein , the feasib ility  of the en tire  invasion would be highly question­
able.
F ield M arshal K esselring, [promoted 19 July 1940} comman­
der of the Air F leet charged with "softening up" B rita in  for the inva­
sion, considered that "as a prelim inary, to SEA LION the plan for the
7Qlbid. , p. 128.
71Ibid.
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f ir s t  phase of [the] a ir  offensive against England was ill-conceived.."72 
In the opinion of th is experienced .airm an ,, "the a ir  battle for England 
suffered from  the m uddle-headedness of the en tire  SEA-LION pro- 
g , r a m m e . " 7 3  v^ith the exception of Goering, the m ajority  of the Luft­
waffe leaders believed .that. "England could not be brought to tie r  knees 
by the Luftwaffe alone, "74 As a r e s u l t , . the a ir  war conducted by the 
A ir generals was an exerc ise  that could not possibly: succeed. This 
had a harm ful effect upon the m orale of the officers responsib le for 
the Luftwaffe effort and was largely  the cause of its  failu re.
The preinvasion attack conducted by K esselrfng’s A ir F leet 
between 8 August and 6 Septem ber 1940 was designed.to elim inate 
B rita in 's  a ir  defense and simultaneously, continue heavy, bombardment 
of her m erchant shipping. Strong Germ an fighter form ations pene­
tra ted  B ritish  defenses to attack the R. A. F. on or over its  bases. 
Irreg u la r  attacks w ere also launched against a ir  bases in. Southeast 
England, while Stukas and .Jabos attacked the sealanes and harassed  
unloading operations in B ritish  ports. T e r ro r  ra id s  w ere  forbidden 
during, th is period. 75
While the Luftwaffe m aintained p re ssu re  against B ritain  in an 
attem pt to gain a ir  superio rity  over the island, the A rm y staff con­
tinued.its planning.and R aederTs naval staff exerted  suprem e effort to
72Kesse.lring, op. c it , , p. 7 5 .
73Ibid ., p.. 73.
75lb id ,, p. 73.
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obtain the necessary: amphibious sealift to tran sp o rt the invasion forces. 
Von M anstein, whose corps was to lead the invasion, described the 
train ing  of his troops near Boulogne:
The troops had daily, exerc ises in the dupes and neighbouring 
fenland, which in many resp ec ts  resem bled  our;intended ..landing 
places. After the a rr iv a l of our ferry ing  equipm ent—converted 
Rhine and Elbe barges, sm all traw le rs  and m o to r-boats—we w ere 
able,, in calm  weather, to practice em barkation and d isem barka­
tion with the navy. . * . All personnel showed .the utm ost keenness 
in training for th e ir unaccustom ed task, and we w ere convinced 
that, , like everything else, it cou.ld .be m astered  in due course. 76
Although the .Naval Staff was not quite so optim istic, naval 
preparations continued nevertheless, and large  amounts of shipping 
w ere read ied  for movement to the channel invasion ports where it 
would be used in itially  for train ing  troops and boat crew s. . The num ber 
of ships was kept to a minimum to reduce losses from  B ritish  a ir  ra id s 
on the channel ports. ; On 1 Septem ber 1940,. the Germ an North Sea 
convoys s ta rted  toward the channel, and on 6 Septem ber Raeder r e ­
ported to H itler that the assem blage of tran sp o rt and personnel for 
SEA LION was p rogressing  well and would be com pleted by 21 Septem­
ber in tim e for the invasion. 77 Raeder, however, could not avoid 
making a final qualifying rem ark :
If a ir  suprem acy is increasingly  established it w ill be possible to 
m eet the deadline. The crossing  itse lf w ill be very  difficult. The 
Arm y cannot count on keeping the divisions together. The execu­
tion of operation "Sea Lion" appears possible, if attended by 
favourable circum stances regarding a ir  suprem acy, weather, 
etc. 7o
76Manstein, op. c it. , p. 152.
77FCNA, pp. 132-136.
78Ib id ., p. 133.
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The A rm y--perhaps .in its  chronic ignorance of the se a --c o n ­
tinued preparations to execute the invasion. A rm y/leaders, though not 
.overjoyed with the operation at hand,, expressed  confidence that the 
Arm y could execute its portion of the m ission. The Luftwaffe generals, 
on the other hand, considered-their efforts m isdirected;, and although 
Germ an a ir  units gained a ir  superio rity  over southern. England for a 
short tim e in early, September, they failed to m aintain this superio rity  
once te r ro r  ra id s  w ere begun on the London area . ^  The switch of 
em phasis of the a ir  attack to London had significant consequences for 
•SEA LION. As noted by Kesselring.:
The second phase of the a ir  battle for England, from  6 Sep­
tem ber 1940 to June 1941, saw the scrapping of the invasion idea.
. . . F rom  the new nature of our m issions [ te rro r  ra id s]  those 
who could read  the signs knew that sentence had been passed on 
Operation Sea- Lion.
Besides the m ilita ry  problem s associa ted  with SEA LION, 
th e re  w ere economic and psychological fac to rs that significantly influ­
enced. Hit.lerTs subsequent decision to abandon the cross-channel attack. 
Much postwar speculation has ensued as to the reasons for H itle rTs 
cancellation of SEA LION, but no unanim ity Of opinion has resu lted .
A generally, discounted factor is the s tra teg ic  p re ssu re  that was 
brought against Germany by the Soviet Union in the sum m er of 1940.
In se c re t protocols to the G erm an-Soviet N on-Aggression 
P act of 24 August 1939, Germany had agreed  that the Soviet sphere 
of influence included Finland,. Estonia, and Latvia on the Baltic, and
^ K e sse lr in g , pp. c it. , p. 75. 
^ I b id . , p. 80.
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the Rumanian province of B essarab ia. Lithuania on the Baltic and-the 
re s t  of Rumania rem ained in the Germ an sphere. 81 In m id- June 1940, 
while the Germ an Army was s till heavily-involved in F ra n c e ,. Soviet 
fo rces moved into the Baltic sta tes  and, in addition, occupied Lithuania. 
R ussian occupation troops rem ained in these countries despite violent 
Germ an pro tests . L ater in  the month, Soviet forces also moved into 
■ Rumania.and M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign M inister, told H. von.der 
Schulenberg, the Germ an A m bassador in Moscow, that Stalin intended 
to dem and.from  Rumania not only B essarab ia  but Bukovina. To avoid 
a m ilita ry  confrontation,' H itler advised the Rumanian governm ent to 
acquiesce, but he sim ultaneously inform ed Moscow that Germany 
henceforth unconditionally guaranteed the te r r i to r ia l  in tegrity  of the 
r e s t  of Rumania and Hungary. 82
Soviet moves into Rumania placed R ussian troops within 100 
m iles of P loesti, the m ain  source of G erm an oil. In Septem ber 1939, 
Germ an oil re se rv e s  w ere sufficient to support m ilita ry  operations for 
le ss  than six months,, and in the ensuing year the seven and a half 
m illion tons of oil obtained by Germany from  all sources w ere barely 
enough to m eet the daily demands of the W ehrm acht and the home- 
front. 83 The Soviet Arm y; in B essarabia, with its  expressed  intent to 
m ove into Bukovina, presented H itler with a serious stra teg ic  problem 
which had to be reckoned with in any decision to continue the war
8-1 Bullock,, o p .. c it. ,. p . . 530.
82wilmot, op., c i t . p. 23^.,see also  Bullock, op., c it. , pp.. 610-612. 
83wi.lmot, op., c it . , p. 22.
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against England. . If,, for exam ple,. the Soviet Arm y had m arched through, 
P loesti on its  way to the D ardenelles at the tim e the W ehrmacht was 
a s tr id e  the channel in an all-ou t assau lt against the B ritish  Is les ,, the 
F u eh rer would have been in a p recarious s tra teg ic  position.
On 29 July, 1940,. ten  days afte r H itler had assu red  the Reich­
s ta g , that any possibility, of estrangem ent between Germ any and -Russia 
did not exist, G eneral Jodi inform ed Colonel W arlimont, Chief of the 
OKW planning staff, that H itler intended to attack the Soviet Union in 
the spring of 1941. The word was not long in reaching OKH. . Haider 
entered in his d iary  for 31 July 1940-: " F ueh rer - with-Russia sm ashed, 
B rita in ’s la s t hope would be gone. . . .. D ecision: It follows from  
th is  reasoning  that R ussia m ust be done away with. Spring 1941. "85 
G erm an negotiations with the Soviets continued while H itler 
pondered the questions as to what to do about B ritain . On 3 September, 
Ribbentrop cabled von der Schulenberg in ,Moscow:
• P lease  call on H. Molotov and te ll him: . . . In a rtic le  3 of 
the G erm an-R ussian Nonaggression P act an obligation was agreed 
-  upon for rec ip ro ca l inform ation and consultation on questions of 
in te re s t to both parties. . . . Germany, . . . is vitally  con­
cerned in the rem aining.Rum anian te r r i to r ie s , . . . particu larly  
in the question of oil and grain. . . .
8^Nazi Conspiracy, and - A ggression: Supplement B (Washing­
ton: US Government P rinting Office, 1948), (hereinafter re fe rre d  to 
as N CA -B),. pp. 1635-1637.
^ H a id e r  D iary, 31 August 1940.
8?u s  Government, D epartm ent of State, Nazi-Soviet R ela­
tions 1939-1941.; Documents from  the A rchives of the Germ an Foreign 
Office (Washington: Government P rin tin g , Office, 1948),. document No. 
1580, Ih e re in a fte r  re fe rre d  to as NSR), ■ "Ribbentrop to Schulenberg,
3 Sep 40."
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From  12 to 14 November 1940, M. Molotov paid his famous 
v is it to H itler in Berlin. T o 'assu re  the Germ an m ilitary, staffs that the 
Soviet "Foreign M in iste r7s v isit did not connote a . change in Nazi policy 
to ward. Russia, the F ueh rer -issued "G eneral D irective No. 18, Nov 12, 
1940" which said, in ter a l ia ;
Political d iscussions have been initiated with the aim  of 
clarify ing .R ussia’s.attitude for the tim e being. Irrespective  of 
the re su lts  of these discussions,, all p reparations for the East 
-which have been verbally  ordered  w ill be continued. In stru c­
tions on th is w ill follow as soon as the general outlines of the 
A rm y’s operational plans have been subm itted to me and 
received my approval.
On 5 Decem ber, while busily, engaged in the preparation  of 
plans for the attack on Russia, Ha.lder entered notes in his d iary  con­
cerning Operations FELIX, MARITA, OTTO, and SEA LION. His 
entry  for SEA. LION was cryptic : "Need not en ter'ca lcu la tions. "
On .3 ‘D ecem ber, the Germ an .War Production Ministry, appealed 
to OKW concerning the A rm y’s demand for priority, for Its  tank building 
program , M inister Todt’s demand for p rio rity  for the national con­
struction  program , and the Navy’s demand for p rio rity  for SEA LION. 
When asked for p rio ritie s , K eitel told the W ar Production M inister 
(1) there  would be no invasion of England, and (2) f irs t  p rio rity  would 
go to the a ir  defense of Germany. 88 This guidance was followed by 
H itle r’s "D irective No. 21, OPERATION BARBA.ROSSA." which sta ted : 
"The Germ an A rm ed.Forces m ust be prepared  to crush  Soviet R ussia
^W heeler-B ennett, op., c it. , p. 510, quoting.from N urem ­
berg document. 444-PS.
^^Nazi Conspiracy., and A ggression ': Vol IV (Washington: US 
Government P rin ting  Office, 1946), p. 1083.
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in a quick campaign [italics in orig inal] (.Operation B arbarossa) even 
before the conclusion of the w ar against England. "89
OPERATION SEA. LION was an on again--off again proposition 
for months. . C onstantly-circum scribed by num erous qualifications,, the 
invasion was at best, an '"if,, as, and when” operation. . H itle r 's  in te re s t 
ran  .from hot to cold -and .byTate fall 1940, p re ssu re  from  the Soviets 
turned his attention toward the east. - What was happening.there con­
tributed  m ightily to the cancellation.of SEA LION. SEA. LION was not 
cancelled, how ever,, by-any c lea r-cu t documented decision;, ra th e r  it 
died a.slow  death which was not com plete until 22 June 1941 when,, one 
year to the day afte r the French a rm is tic e ,, the W ehrm acht invaded 
Russia.
. The dem ise of SEA LION was the re su lt of a number of cumu­
lative fac to rs. P r im a r ily ,. how ever,. the decision was a s tra teg ic  and 
political one made by H itler h im se lf--a s  was norm al--w ithout reg ard  
to e ither political or m ilitary.'advice. The Germ an Arm y was p re ­
pared.and willing to execute the plan;, but even the Navy would have 
under taken, the task  with a good shove from  the F u eh re r. A dm iral 
Raeder had consistently, considered .England to be G erm any's g rea test 
enemy. . Strong evidence of this is the fact that even afte r the decision 
had been made to execute OPERATION BARBAROSSA, Raeder s till 
harbored .serious doubts about attacking R ussia.before f irs t  conquering 
England. 90
89NSR, p. 260.
" B u llo c k ,  o p .1 c it . , pp. 680-681.
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Although the R. A. F. was never conclusively defeated ,. the 
Luftwaffe seriously  weakened its  tac tica l capabilities. The Luftwaffe1 s 
best effort,- however, m ere ly ,secured  a-stand-off in.Septem ber 1940. 
Field M arshal K esselring  said in defense of this effort; . ”It is  h is to ri­
cally- undem onstrable that SEA LION had to be abandoned because the 
Luftwaffe was not up to the task. . . . .  The fact was that . . . the 
Luftwaffe was thrown in as a stop-gap to bridge the in terval until the 
curta in  ro se  omthe g rea t a c t—R ussia. "91 K esselring thus concluded 
that nSEA. LION was often , contemplated, but never planned. . . . The 
High .Command continually flirted  with the idea of an invasion as a 
conscience salve for its fa ilu re  to make up its mind by reason  of a 
num ber of political and m ilita ry  m isgivings. "92
H itle r’s lack of enthusiasm  for SEA LION was not caused by 
m ilitary, considerations prim arily . Indeed, . the operation was m ore 
feasib le than many-he had em barked upon previously. The G eneral 
Staff’s opposition to SEA LION could not com pare with its  concern 
over H itle r’s decision in 1936 to occupy the Rhineland. In -1938 the 
W ehrm acht leadersh ip  shook in its m ilitary, boots at the prospect of 
assaulting .the strong, Czech border fortifications to .c lash  with a large, 
m odern ,. and well trained  Czech Army.. M any,tim es in,the p a s t,. the 
F uehrer -had brushed a s id e ,. with a wave of his hand,. considerations 
of fa r m ore form idable m ilitary /im pact an d ,. ignoring a ll m ilita ry  
advice,, had ca rr ie d  on reg a rd le ss  of the possible consequences.
9 ^K esselring, op., c it. , p. 90.
92Ib id .,. p . . 71.
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.■Hitler’s decision to abandon .the assau lt on B rita in  and attack the Soviet 
Union instead was based .largely upon his evaluation of,the political 
situation5 but even m ore upon his intuition—his m arvellous and hitherto 
'infallible intuition. For a man of such clairvoyance,, advice was con­
tem ptible, unwelcome and ,. in his opinion,, quite unnecessary .
In sum m ary, it can be said .that G erm an forces w ere prepared 
to make a serious effort to execute SEA LION; that.from  a m ilita ry  
point of view the invasion might have succeeded .either after'D unkirk  
or as .late as September 1940-;,,that.the decision to drop the. plan was 
H itle r’s alone;, and that in making the decision H itler was m ore 
influenced by Soviet p re ssu re  in the east than by. any other single 
-fac to r.
Field M arshal K esselring, the perceptive Luftwaffe field 
com m ander,. summ ed it thus: . "If H itler had rea lly  wanted to c a rry  
. through the project he would . . . .  have imposed h is will on the 
th ree  se rv ices . In that event so m any vague o rders would not have 
been issued which made agreem ent between se rv ice  chiefs difficult. "93
The definite sch ism  in G erm an.civ il-m ilitary , re lationships 
that becam e evident in e a rlie r  cam paigns widened to even g rea te r  
proportions during the development of plans for SEA LION. H itle r’s 
tac tica l e r ro r  in perm itting a defeated enem y-force to withdraw to 
sanctuary  without a vigorous pursuit was unwise though not n eces­
sa rily  fatal. His s tra teg ic  e r ro r  in abandoning the in itiative in the 
w est coupled w ith.his decision to attack the Soviet Union without f irs t
93Ibid.
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securing  the G erm an re a r  against B ritain  was m ore serious. . H itle rTs 
fatal e r ro r ,. how ever,. was his p ersis ten t application of the-. "F uehrer 
P rin z ip . " Not only, did H itler deliberately, degrade his top m ilita ry  
lead ers  in the notorious Kro.ll Opera House cerem ony, he intentionally 
encouraged d issension among the Germ an m ilitary; se rv ices . "In ter- 
se rv ice  m is tru s t and schem ing to gain the inside track  with the 
F uehrer was one factor that added yet another front to sap the v ita lity  
and honest purpose of the Germ an professional leadership . "^4 H itler 
accepted the Arm y wide front invasion plan without even consulting 
A dm iral R aeder. , He gave Goering full freedom  to prosecute the a ir  
attack against B ritain  without coordinating Luftwaffe plans with those 
of the Army and Navy. He gave A dm iral Raeder operational guidance 
without d iscussing.the m atte r with either OKH or the Luftwaffe;, and, 
as has been mentioned previously [page 102 su p ra ].H itler o rdered  
major, flee t units to the A rctic at the tim e they w ere so re ly  needed .to 
p repare  for the invasion of B ritain.
The furtive method he p ractised  of dealing apart with-each 
se rv ice  head insured subservience, and fed  personal ambition 
to thicken s till m ore the clim ate of jealousy, and m is tru s t. . . .
..H itler h im self epitom ized the basic d ifferences and his personal 
fee lin g s ,. when he used .to exclaim  to aides on.frequent occasions,
"I have a reac tio n ary  A rm y,. a C hristian  Navy, and a National 
Socialist A ir Force. "95
Adolf H itler effectively, and by design divided Germ an polit­
ic a l , , diplom atic, naval, a ir,, and arm y  efforts d irected  toward 
.achieving v ic tory  over G reat B ritain . As a resu lt, viable .c iv il-m ilitary
■^4 A n se l,, op. c it. , p. 330.
95Ibid., p. 331.
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relationships ceased to exist except through the person of the' F u eh re r. 
By; thus controlling the course of Germ an m ilitary, affa irs, H itler 
assu red  his r is e  to personal leadersh ip  of the W ehrm acht. In.the 
process, however, he personally  thw arted  any form  of collective effort 
toward Germ an victory . In.so doing he assu red  not only. the eventual 
eclipse of his" personal power but the com plete and.inglorious defeat 
of the German. Armed .Forces.
CHAPTER V
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE 
FAILURE OF GERMANY TO ACHIEVE 
VICTORY IN THE WEST IN 1940
The failu re of Hit.lerTs "Thousand Y ear Reich" to achieve 
victory, in the w est in 1940 was an event to which the F uehrer and .the 
genera ls contributed in nearly, equal m easure. . By failing to control 
the National Socialists at a. tim e when it. s t i l l  had the power to do so, 
the W ehrm acht. was not altogether b lam eless. . The Germ an General 
Staff,, however, viewed the Nazi se izu re  of power "with a good deal of 
lofty, indifference and with an equally lofty, assum ption that whatever 
happened.it would be able to control the course  of events at will.
F rom  .1933 onward, H itler slowly but su re ly  sapped the power of. the 
Germ an m ilita ry  leaders. By/1939,. the influence of the generals in 
s tra teg ic  m a tte rs  was p ractically  nil. . By-1941,. the military, leaders 
had become increasingly  pow erless .to affect even tactical decisions, 
as was evidenced in the development of OPERATION PLAN YELLOW, 
"the Stop O rder, " and OPERATION SEA LION.
It is generally, considered that responsib ility 'fo r assessing , a 
nation1 s. in ternational political situation 'from  the standpoint of possible 
w arlike operations re s ts  with its m ilita ry /lead ers . . It is incumbent
iRauschning, op .. c it. , p. 167.
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upon.them as professional so ld iers to provide the m ilita ry  means 
requ ired  to defend the nation and .insure its  success against the m ost 
unfavorable combination of m ilita ry  power conceivable.
It Is no le ss  the responsib ility  of national political leaders 
to determ ine whether in te rna tiona l political situations crea ted  by 
the pursuit of national political goals c rea te  the possib ilities of m ili­
ta ry  conflict, and to advise the m ilita ry  accordingly. P olitical 
le ad e rs  a re  also responsib le for considering the m ilita ry  im plications 
of th e ir  policies in te rm s of im pact upon the national economy to 
include im practical inc reases in arm am ents, infeasible expansion 
of m ilita ry  forces, or excessive r isk  taking in the event of war with 
m ajor powers.
Quite early  in the r is e  of the N ational Socialists in Germany,
the m ilita ry  lead ers failed, to m aintain the proper c iv il-m ilita ry
balance in national a ffa irs . In 1934,. for example, G eneral Blomberg,
Germ an Defense M inister at the tim e,, and la te r  the f ir s t  F ield M arshal
of the Third Reich, rem arked  to Hermann Rauschning, the Nazi leader
in Danzig, concerning G erm any’s foreign policy toward A ustria :
I have a so rt of je s te r ’s freedom  to say anything I like to  the 
Leader. But 1 shall never dream  of saying.anything to him about 
A ustria, and I strongly advise you to s te e r  c lear of the m atte r.
It is a point on which he is not quite sane. 2
Rauschning was astounded.and dism ayed at this adm ission by 
a sen io r Germ an m ilita ry  leader and fo rm er officer of the Im perial 
G erm an Army, that he had a " je s te r ’s freedom " with the F uehrer
^Ibid. , p. 144.
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whose political im portance had neither been confirm ed by. experi­
ence nor proved .by any genuine achievem ent. A M inister of the 
Reich declined, in a question of outstanding, im portance,, to in te r­
vene on the strength  .of his joint, resp o n sib ility ,. and yielded to a 
leader of problem atical qualities on a point on which the leader 
was not quite sane. I m ust say that few things so disturbed me 
as this revelation  of the pass we had come to, ^
With the possible exception of H itle r^  decision in early  
M arch 1936 to occupy the Rhineland, no serious, d ifferences developed 
between the F uehrer and the Officer Corps during the years  .1933-1937. 
The early, days of the Third-Reich w ere devoted to rearm am ent and the 
enlargem ent o,f the arm y. "Those w ere the golden days of rapid pro­
motion in the arm ed se rv ices . O fficers,. long starved  for advancement 
under the W eimar Republic, at la s t received  professional recognition 
.and overdue pay .increases. "4 The F uehrer was generous to his senior 
com m anders. . He frequently gave them sum s of money not appearing 
in the m ilita ry  budget and on which no income taxes had to be paid.
F ield M arshal Guenther von K luge,. for example,, received a birthday 
gift of 250, 000 M arks from  H itler. 5
The early  political success of the National Socialists in foreign 
affairs inspired .the junior m em bers of the Officer Corps and gave them 
confidence in H itle rTs. leadership . . The announcement on 16 M arch 1935
^Ibid.
^H. A.. De Weerd, "The Germ an Officer Corps versu s H itler," 
M ilitary. A ffairs, , XIII (Winter, 1949), p . . 199.
^Fabian von Schlabrendorff, They Almost Killed H itler (New 
york: The M acm illan Company, 1947), pp. ,39-40. The gift was 
received  by von Kluge on 6 A pril 1943 on his 6.1st birthday. . See also 
Ludwig K aiser, "G oerdeler Movement, " H isto rica l Division, E uro­
pean Command, [U.. S. Army], 1949, p.. 37. (Unpublished typed ms 
#B-285, Office Chief of M ilitary  H istory, U.. S. Army, Washington,
D. C .).
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of the sovereign .righ t of Germ any.to rea rm , which se t aside a de­
grading part of the T reaty  of V ersailles , was welcomed by the Germ an : 
m ilitary , as was the conclusion of the Anglo-Germ an Naval T reaty  of 
18 June 1935 which replaced .the d ic ta to ria l te rm s of V ersailles with a 
voluntary- agreem ent. 6
H itler employed every means at his d isposal to gain control 
of the Germ an m ilita ry  machine without which his plans for the future 
could not succeed. He used bribes, p rom otions,. cajolry, and th rea ts . 
He saw to it that these w ere cleverly  mixed with political maneuvering 
of all kinds, and the playing of the am bitions of individual m ilita ry  
■.leaders one against the o ther—all to the end that the F uehrer would 
em erge in com plete control of the W ehrm acht.
The F uehrer not only divided the m ilita ry :leadersh ip ; he 
in filtra ted  the ranks of the arm ed forces with his own "H itler Youth."
In one. of those ram bling ,postprandial monologues with which he habitu­
ally entertained his dinner guests during the w ar years, the F uehrer 
adm itted that during his early  years as Chancellor he had avoided any 
open, conflict with.the W ehrmacht until un iversa l conscription could 
be introduced and the ranks of.the arm ed forces filled with properly 
indoctrinated youth. 7
Once that was accom plished, the influx into the W ehrmacht of the 
m asses of the people, together with the sp ir it of National Socialism  
and with the ever-grow ing power of the National Socialist move­
ment, would, I was su re , , allow me to overcom e all opposition
^Kurt Assmann, "H itler and the Germ an Officer Corps, "
U. S. Naval Institute P roceedings, LXXXII (May 1956), p. 512.
7Hit.lerTs Secret. C onversations, , tran s . N orm an.Cam eron and 
R. H.. Stevens (New York: Signet Books, 1961), p. 403.
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among the arm ed forces, and in  particu lar, in ,the  corps of 
officers, 8
The m ajor failu re of Germ an m ilita ry  .leadership occurred  
during,the early^ 1930's when the German Arm y became the la s t refuge 
of the Germ an dem ocratic sta te . As the reposito ry  of the ultim ate, 
m oral and m a teria l re so u rces  of a sta te ,, an arm y is necessarily .in  
the forefront of any new or revolutionary process.1 "Even without 
setting up a m ilita ry .d ic ta to rsh ip  or desiring  to do so, it becomes of 
prim ary;im portance in .a ll functions of the life of the nation. "9 By 
abrogating th e ir responsib ilities to m aintain,a proper, balance between 
the -civil and m ilitary, fo rces in Germany, the arm y generals had by 
1939 become p risoners of the Nazi revolution ra th e r than a "d ic tato r­
ship within,a d ic tatorship" as they had in tended . ^
Looking back ,. it can be said that the year 1939 was the deci­
sive year for the fate of Germany, and the world. If it was neces­
sa ry  to rem ove H itler and his regim e, it had to be done before 
the w ar. [Italics in orig inal] D uring.the w ar,, wheri the entire 
Germ an nation was fighting,for its existence against a world .of 
enem ies, it was too late. M
H itle r 's  suprem e trium ph over the generals cam e at Munich 
in .1938. Here the F u e h re r 's  force of personality, political acumen, 
and-bluff not only, secured  the solid backing of Germ an public opinion 
in his behalf but rem oved the doubts of many m em bers of the Officer 
Corps as to his .ability. At Munich, H itler acted against the advice of
8 Ibid.
^Rauschning, op. c it . , p .. 129.
10Ib id .. p. 162.
■ llA ssm ann , op. c i t . , p. 514,
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the general staff for the th ird  tim e and was successful. The occupa­
tion of the Rhineland was an im portant and bloodless political v ictory 
for the new National Socialist governm ent. The Anschluss with A ustria, 
also taken.against the g en e ra ls1' advice, turned .into the "Blum enkrieq" 
ra th e r  than the d isa s te r  predicted by the genera ls. A fter H itle r’s 
phenomenal success at Munich, political and m ilita ry  opposition to 
his s tra teg ic  plans collapsed, H itle r’s confidence in the advice of his 
g en e ra ls—if he ever had any--likew ise vanished, . When in 1939 he 
ordered-the arm y to occupy all of Czechoslovakia, OKH was not even 
inform ed. Instead .the F uehrer Issued his o rd ers  directly, to the arm y 
corps concerned and personally, d irected  the operation.
The Arm y High Command .objected to H itle r’s dictation.of 
tac tica l movements during the. Germ an attack on Poland, but the 
extrem e, success of this operation fu rther strengthened H itle r’s opinion 
that the OKH was a collection of "hidebound peasants, " As early  as 
.1936 the F uehrer had said "If I listened to my generals, I would not be 
where I am .today. "12
H itler /strongly resented-and violently protested against arm y 
opposition to his tac tica l plans during the campaign In  Poland. . In a 
storm y' session  held on 23 November 1939 with von B rauchitsch and 
the com m anders of the arm y' corps selected  fo r the attack on . France, 
H itler '"declared  war" against the; G eneral Staff.
The generals of the arm y at that tim e, he stated, w ere the 
.last rem nants of an old fashioned trend of ideas whose incapabili­
ties had already  been proven in the F ir s t  World War. In Poland 
we have shown.that we .had not yet grasped the sp ir it of the tim es,
12Ib id ., pp. 518.-519.
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and we w ere s till being c h iv a lro u s th e n  he said that he knew the 
res is tan ce  in the arm y 'and  threatened, once at the beginning.and 
once at the end of the speech, the destruction  of all those who 
re s is ted  him. , , .  H itler told the Commander in Chief of the Army 
that he knew the sp ir it at Zossen [OKH H eadquarters]--and  he 
would destroy  it. la
According to G eneral Haider, von Brauchitsch returned  ."very 
upset and despondent" from  this m eeting which was punctuated by a 
violent to rren t of abuse from  H itler. The Com m ander-in-Chief visited  
H itler again, privately on the evening of 23 November to p ro test the 
F u eh re r’s indictm ent of the Army. In the course of the evening, von 
B rauchitsch-tendered his resignation, but H itler refused to accept it. 
Instead he ordered  the Field M arshal to continue in his post. 14
H itle r’s com plete d is tru s t of the arm y/leadersh ip  was exem-
/
plified by his announcement that arm y fo rces to be employed.in the 
occupation of Denm ark and Norway would be "directly  under my 
o rd ers . " Army: leaders w ere not even consulted about plans for 
-WESERUEBUNG [Occupation of Denm ark and Norway], H itle r’s 
"D irective for Case W eser-E xerc ise , " dated 1 M arch-1940, named 
the arm y generals and .specified the army, units to be re leased  by. von 
Brauchitsch and placed under d irec t control of the F u eh re r’s head­
q u arte rs . 15 By acquiescing to this degrading and insulting,subordina­
tion, the Army su rrendered  .completely, to-the F u eh re r. By now the
13 "E xtract from  Testim ony of Defense W itness F ranz H aider,” 
pp. 856-857.
^ ib ic l. , p . . 857.
15"D irective for Case W eser E xercise. " Document C-.174, 
P rosecution Exhibit 1129, TWC, pp .. 76.1-763; see also U. S. Govern­
ment, D epartm ent of the Army, F uehrer D irectives and Other Top- 
Leve.1.Directives of the Germ an Arm ed ^Forces 1939-1941 (Washington: 
1948), pp. .88-90,
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general staff had not only, ceased to advise on the m ilitary /im plications 
of political m a tte rs  and the s tra teg ic  aspects of m ilitary, operations,, it 
no'.longer exercised  .any. controlling influence over the tac tica l d ire c ­
tion of arm y fo rces in .combat. T hus,, a ll c iv il-m ilitary , relationships 
had ceased to exist. The tac tica l success of WESERUEBUNG con­
firm ed  H itle r’s opinion ,of him self as the g rea te s t Field .Commander 
of all tim es .and encouraged him in his next conflict with OKH in the 
OPERATION PLAN YELLOW controversy .
The rem arkab le  success of SICHELSCHNITT fu rther enhanced 
H itle r’s s ta tu re  as a tactic ian  .and prompted him to delve even deeper 
•into 'army, operations. Had.the rev ised  operation plan failed, or had 
it been only partia lly-successfu l, von B rauchitsch and H aider might 
have re triev ed  some of the ir .lost p restige. By- regaining a degree of 
the F u eh re r’s confidence, they might have been able to - re s tra in  him 
from  m eddling.in .arm y-tactics. “But,, as it was, he would no longer 
take advice on the m ost technical of m a tte rs  and he insisted  on 
dealing personally  and-directly  with,an ever widening, range of prob­
lem s. “16
H itler assum ed-full c red it for the success of SICHELSCHNITT 
--h e  pointedly/ignored the contribution made by his general officers 
: in the conception and execution of plans fo r this operation. The G er­
man generals, likew ise collectively- and unequivocally placed full blame 
upon the F ueh rer for issuance of the “Stop O rder, “ even ignoring the 
recom m endations in th is reg ard  by the sen io r m ilitary.-leaders on the
■^Wilmot, op., c i t . , p .. 87.
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spot; The reco rd  clearly /ind icates, however, that Rundstedt, Kluge, 
and K leist m ust share  the responsib ility  for the halt of the panzers 
outside Dunkirk. If von B rauchitsch and H aider w ere mis taken, about 
the m erits  of SICHELSCHNITT, . they were certainly, co rrec t in the ir 
denunciation of the "Stop O rder, " If it was w ise on H itle r’s part to1 
bypass OKH to take von RundstedtTs advice in the case of SICHEL­
SCHNITT, , it' was an e r ro r  -in judgment that caused him to accept the 
Arm y Group Com m ander’s recom m endation to stop the panzers outside 
Dunkirk against the expert advice of B rauchitsch and .Haider. Whatever 
the rationale behind H itle r’s decision to Issu e  the "Stop O rder"- -  
political, m ilitary , psychological, or In tu itive—it was a  serious m ili­
ta ry  e r r o r ; and the h isto rica l fact is that von Rundstedt contributed as 
much to the folly, of Dunkirk as he did to the overall success of 
SICHELSCHNITT.
OPERATION SEA LION was the culm ination of chaos in joint 
m ilita ry  leadership . The German. Army, Navy, and A ir 'F o rce  appeared 
to outfumble one another in the development of a plan for this operation 
while the "g rea test Field Commander of all tim e" contributed to the 
confusion by dealing .separately with the se rv ices  in adherence to his 
"F uehrer P rinzip . " SEA LION was the fourth 'instance during the G er­
man campaign in the w est in which H itler decided m omentous issues 
apparently on.the spur of the moment. In each 'instance, the outcome 
of the w ar hung in the balance. The F u eh re r,, on 27 January 1940, 
approved A dm iral R aeder’s plan.for employing arm y fo rces to occupy 
Norway, and.Denmark without consulting.either B rauchitsch or Haider.
On . 17 February  1940,. he approved M anstein’s recom m endation for a
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m ajor change in OPERATION PLAN YELLOW without consulting OKH. 
On 23 May. .1940, he approved G oering's suggestion that the Luftwaffe 
be perm itted to destroy  the B. E. F. in the Dunkirk pocket. He did this 
without consulting his own OKW staff despite the fact that von K le ist's  
panzers had .Lord G ortTs troops at the ir m ercy . Finally, on; 13 July 
.1940, H itler approved the OKH plan fo r ’invasion of England without 
consulting.the Navy leaders who would be responsib le for the planTs 
. im plem entation.
The generals justly, complained that command arrangem ents 
such as these com prom ised the planning.and execution of m ilita ry  
operations in.the Germ an campaigns in the west. They m ust share  the 
blame, however, for the c ircum stances which perm itted the develop­
ment of these arrangem ents. The W ehrm acht not only perm itted 
National Socialism  to survive in its  infancy but protected it as it grew. 
The generals made the ir "deals" with H itle r without questioning the 
price. Individually.and collectively, Germ an m ilitary/.leadership thus 
contributed m ateria lly  to the appalling ,civ il-m ilitary  .dichotomy that 
existed in 1940. '
Most of the well known German m ilita ry  leaders w ere captured 
by the Allied forces at the end of the war. The sen ior officers w ere 
assem bled  by the A llies as a working group to a s s is t with preparations 
for the N urem berg tr ia ls . They rendered  valuable assis tan ce  in this 
endeavor by analyzing.and indexing the m ass of official Germ an war 
reco rd s in The hands of the A llies,, and by preparing h is to rica l mono­
graphs to be used in w riting the Allied h isto ry  of the conflict. In addi­
tion to ^investigating the h isto rica l question of how the German nation
was defeated, they attem pted to depict the m ilita ry -"lessons learned" 
and to show how, in future w ars, the e r ro rs  made by the Germ ans could 
be avoided. Two of the m ost in teresting  papers on the general topic, 
"High Command in the Future, " w ere essays prepared  by G eneral Franz 
Haider and Field M arshal A lbert K esselring . ^  The substance of these 
two essays is especially  germ ane to this study as the authors thereof 
had actively partic ipated  in the development of OPERATION PLAN 
YELLOW, the "Stop O rder, " and OPERATION SEA LION. Haider and 
K esselring, though of widely different tem peram ents and d iss im ila r  w ar 
experiences and viewpoints, concurred in the belief that the failu re of 
H itle r’s command arrangem ents was a prim e factor in the defeat of the 
Germ an m ilita ry  forces. F o r success in future w ar,, the two proposed 
form ation of a Combined. Arm ed F orces GeneraL Staff under one Supreme 
M ilitary  Com m ander-in-Chief. In terestingly  enough, both generals r e c ­
ommended that the Com m ander-in-C hief be a m ilitary , ra th e r  than a 
civil,, leader. Although Haider acknowledged that the branch of the 
arm ed forces in which the C om m ander-in-C hief received  his education 
and train ing  was im m aterial, he specified that "he m ust in a ll respects  
be the best so ld ier. In H aider’s view,, the relationship  between the
^ F ra n z  Haider, "M ilitary Top-Level Organization, " Vol I of 
"High Command in, F u tu re ," tran s. and ed. by H. Heitman (Koenigstein, 
Germ any: H isto rical Division, European Command [U. S. A rm y],. 1949. 
Unpublished typed ms #P-01.3a, Archives Section, L ibrary  Services, U.
S. Arm y Command and G eneral Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, K ansas; 
and A lbert K esselring, "The P o litico -M ilitary  System of Control in a 
State: A Study in T heory ," Vol X V  of "High Command in F uture ," trans. 
J. B. Robinson, ed. Dr. F redericksen  (H istorical Division, European 
Command [U. S.. A rm y], 1948). Unpublished typed ms #P-013°,
A rchives Section, L ibrary-Services, U. S.. Arm y Command and G eneral 
Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
^ H a id e r, "M ilitary Top-Level Organization, " p. 43.
150
civ il leader and the military, com m ander should be one of mutual 
resp ec t and confidence; that the m ilita ry  leader "must believe in the 
head of State firm ly  . and unreservedly, and th is confidence m ust be 
.reciprocated-.in.full m easure. ^  As the epitome of a proper civ il- 
m ilita ry  relationship , Haider cited that which .existed in the la tte r  part 
of the A m erican Civil War between Abraham Lincoln as P residen t and 
G eneral G rant as Com m ander-in-Chief of the Union A rm ies. To ex­
p ress  th is relationship , Haider quoted from  a le tte r  Lincoln wrote to 
Grant in. 186 4:
The details of your plans a re  unknown to me and I have no 
d es ire  to know them. You a re  prudent and.self confident and this 
suffices for m e ,. so that I do not wish to im pose any p re ssu re  or 
re s tr ic tio n s  upon you. . . .  If you should lack anything. that I 
could obtain dont hesitate to l e t  me know. 20
K esselring ’s "ideal" com m and.arrangem ent also postulated 
an intim ate relationship  between the civil head of State and .the m ilita ry  
Com m ander-in-Chief. The Luftwaffe F ield M arshal believed that the 
collapse of the Germ an High Command began when H itler with a "single 
will pushed m in is te rs  and popular rep resen ta tiv es  fa rth er aside. " The 
resu lt,. im K esselring’s view,, was that "to an increasing  extent adv isers 
becam e men who sim ply received o rd ers , the Reichstag a forum  for the 
F u e h re r s  proclam ations to the people and the world .at .large, and the 
party  and its  form ations a .su p erv iso ry  and in part executive agency. " 
The major, consequence of the lack of a .c iv il-m ilita ry  balance in the 
Germ an High Com m and,, according.to K esselring, was that "no stra teg ic
J - ^ I b i d . ,  p .  4 4 .  
2Qlbid. , p. 45.
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w ar plan .existed.; the operational plans born.of suddenly, a rising  s itu a ­
tions had the ch a rac te r of im provisation and [were] therefo re  neither 
creatively, constructive for the future nor a compelling motive for 
■internal im provem ent. " In his postw ar essay, K cssolring concluded 
that the dissolution of the Germ an m ilita ry  organization began.at the 
tim e of B lom berg^ d ism issa l "when the F uehrer as a Inon-professional 
so ld ie r1 assum ed suprem e command of the W ehrmacht with an.extrem ely 
inadequate staff, " and that the final collapse of the Germ an m ilita ry  
machine was assu red  when !'as a re su lt of the increased  requirem ents 
caused by-’global w arfa re1 the loyalty, c r is is  between the F uehrer and 
his generals entered its final stage. "21
Although many German officers su rrendered .com pletely  to 
H itle rTs domination, there were some who deliberately  obstructed the 
F u eh re rTs designs or found them selves unable to perform  the unreason­
able and .im possible tasks he imposed upon them. These officers paid 
the price. Of ninety two Germ an generals who had active m ajor com­
mands or w ere in key positions in the High Command between 1933 and 
.1945--thirty, five w ere relieved or d ism issed  in .d isg race by reason  of 
d isagreem ent or dispute with H itle r while eight m ore w ere severely  
disciplined and given dishonorable d ischarges. Of seventeen.F ield 
.M arshals,, ten w ere relieved. Only one re ta ined .h is command through­
out the war. Of thirty, six fo u r-s ta r  generals, twenty, six  w ere relieved 
and only T hree survived the w ar in the ir positions. 22 Tim various
■ ^ K e s s e lr in g ,. »The P o litico -M ilitary  System, " p.. 16.
22Assmann, op., c it . ,. p. 520.
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form s of opposition of the Germ an officer corps to 'H itle r’s policies 
thus."m ake an in teresting  study in futility. "23
The re lie f  and suspension of high-ranking generals was at 
tim es accom plished with the knowledge and connivance of th e ir b ro ther 
officers. Ambitious for high rank and decorations, the generals, in 
■ their, in trigues within.the ■Heeres.leitunq, contributed to an appalling 
disunity within the officer corps itse lf and prevented the possibility  of 
a solid .front of opposition ever being presented  to the F u eh re r. A. con­
dition of von B rauchitsch’s appointment as C om m ander-in-C hief,. for 
example, was his agreem ent with the forced re tirem en t of six out­
standing arm y g en era ls—von Leeb, von K leist, von K ressenstein , 
von Pogre.1.1, Lutz,, and L eise—who apparently  w ere selected .in  con­
nection with H itle r’s d es ire  to rem ove those officers whose anti-N azi 
sym pathies w ere suspected, and to "loosen up" the ranks for the pro­
motion of sev era l officers of definite pro-N azi sym pathies. 24
Although it is  true  that Adolf H itler, in the course of his 
twelve year domination of the Germ an nation, imposed upon the Arm y 
a contro l m ore positive than any it had.ever before experienced and 
com pelled."the obedience of its  officers even to commands which vio­
lated th e ir h is to rica l trad itions, th e ir  political and m ilita ry  judgment, 
and th e ir code of honor, "25 it is equally.'true that the officer corps 
frequently and for its  own se lfish  ends perm itted  o r even encouraged
2 3 D eW eerd , .loc. c i t .
24Tay.lor,. Sword and Swastika, p, 170.
25crajg } pp, c it. , p. 469.
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H itle r’s in trusion into tac tica l and technical m ilita ry  m atte rs  in which 
he was le ss  than expert. T h u s,. the Germ an generals contributed to 
both the successes and the fa ilu res of the German m ilita ry  campaign 
in the west. The position of the generals with resp ec t to the F uehrer 
on 2 August 1934 when H itler demanded of them the ir oath of allegiance, 
on 4 February .'1.938 when H itler announced that he would assum e the 
office of Defense M inister, on 1 Septem ber .1939 when H itler invaded 
Poland and plunged the world into war, and again on 22 June 1941. when 
th e .W ehrm acht m arched ac ro ss  the border into the Soviet Union was, 
in each instance, a position for which they them selves w ere largely  
responsib le.
In.departing.from  the " c o rre c tn e ss” of the P ru ss ian  officer 
and adhering to the "duty of the Germ an officer to be crafty , "
[page 10 su p ra ] the Germ an generals departed from  th e ir tra d i­
tion with trag ic  re su lts  for th e ir profession and th e ir country.
In the past the Germ an officer corps was accustom ed to regard  
s tr ic t  objectivity, unambiguousness and acceptance of resp o n si­
bility as the m ark  of the corps of officers. The degeneration of 
the A rm y’s participation in the awakening of the new Germany, 
from  nationalism  into a n ih ilist revolution, was due to the Army 
le ad e r’s lack of elem entary  stra igh t-fo rw ardness. 26
Franz Haider, in his postwar analysis of H itler as W arlord , 
joined the host of German generals who blamed the F uehrer for G er­
m any’s defeat on the basis of his destruction  of the Germ an apparatus 
for high command.
P iece by piece the unity of the A rm y’s High Command was ■ 
whittled away and was finally, destroyed. . . .
This "divide and conquer" policy of the D ictator,, fo rever 
obsessed with the m aintenance of his own power, destroyed a 
well organized.system  of m ilita ry  command which no true leader 
would ever have given up.
^^Rauschning, op. c i t . , p. 123.
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In place of this organization, which for al.1 its faults, had 
been, capable of a high standard of .m ilitary  command, there  was 
left at the end of the process a chaos of im provisation which has 
already  become next to im possible fo r a h isto rian  to -unravel* 27
By examining the c iv il-m ilita ry  re la tionsh ips that existed 
prior, to and-during the Germ an cam paigns in the w est in l9 4 0 , Haider 
and the dozen or so other senior Arm y lead ers  who controlled the 
Army, should have been able to predict the course events would take 
under H itle r’s leadership . . Though H aider cannot be considered the 
sole author of the general postwar apologia ..for German m ilita ry  
' leadership , he was a generous contributor to it. As a professional 
m ilita ry  snob, H aider habitually deprecated H itle r’s prowess as a 
tactician  and s tra teg is t. Although he re s is te d  .H itler’s warmongering,; 
he, nevertheless,, along.with many other genera ls, collaborated in 
the m artia l events that took the W ehrm acht to W arsaw and positioned 
the Waffen SS on the channel coast. His re s is tan c e  was neither strong 
enough nor sufficientlyTong-lived.to be effective. That H aider was 
eventually relieved  .as Chief of Staff and im prisoned by. the Nazis is 
but one example of the fate that befell those who re s is te d  too little  or 
too .late. They, could neither gloriously win nor nob.ly fail.
The principal theme of the G erm an generals as w ritten  in 
the ir m em oirs and expressed  in the ir lengthy testim onies at the 
N urem berg tr ia ls  was the d iscrediting,of H itle r’s m ilitary, leadersh ip . 
F ortunately 'fo r posterity  but unfortunately, for the tru th  of the ir thesis, 
the reco rd  does not support them. OPERATION PLAN YELLOW, the
27Franz Haider, H itler as W arlord , tran s . Paul Findlay 
(London: Putnam, 1950), pp. 1.0-11.
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"Stop O rder, " and.SEA LION, w ere joint civ il-m ilitary , ventures for 
which responsibility, as to success o r-failu re  m ust be shared  m utually 
by the F uehrer and his m ilita ry  adv isers . In th e ir postw ar efforts to 
d isc red it H itle r 's  leadership, the Germ an generals neglect to mention 
his prew ar diplom atic successes. They, quickly, pass over the su c cess­
ful occupation of the Rhineland, the abrogation of the "war guilt" clause 
of the V ersa illes  Treaty, the bloodless Anschluss with A ustria, the 
Munich P a c t , . and the Nazi-Soviet agreem ent. . Instead, the generals 
point to H itle r’s good fortune in finding the two w eaklings—Cham berlain 
. and D alad ier—at Munich, to the. airp lane accident that delayed the s ta r t  
of the ineffectual OPERATION PLAN YELLOW until M anstein could 
p resen t his SICHELSCHNITT PLAN to H itler a t p recisely  the right 
moment. They dwell upon .the fortunate circum stances that placed 
lead ers  .like Guderian and Rommel at the head of the panzer columns 
which raced  ac ro ss  F rance in May 1940. C onversely ,. in justifying 
th e ir  thesis, they s tre s s  th e ir dism ay at H itle r’s "Stop O rder" and the - 
F u eh re r’s vacillation ..in executing OPERATION SEA LION. The 
generals fail to mention that it was H itle r’s force of w ill that ca rried  
the d iscussions a t M unich; that, it was the F uehrer alone who d iscerned 
the weakness of the opposition. They: neglect to point out that H itler 
saw im m ediately the genius of the M anstein variant, cancelled GELB, 
and d irected  the execution of SICHELSCHNITT over the objections of 
von.B rauchitsch and Haider. They fail to acknowledge that H itler 
personally  selected  Guderian and R om m el as panzer .leaders, that he 
was advised .to .issue the "Stop O rder" by von Rundstedt and von K leist, 
and th a t.it was. in te r-se rv ic e  bickering.and p rocrastination  that
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delayed ..SEA. T .TON unti l late fall of .1940 when the likelihood .of its 
success was problem atical a t best. If,, as the generals insist, H itler 
m ust bear sole responsib ility  for the m ilita ry  e r ro rs  of the Third 
.Reich, the F uehrer m ust also be accorded the glory, that attended .its 
successes.
The significance of SICHELSCHNITT,. the "Stop Order, " and 
SEA. LION,. lies not in the fact that H itler and his generals w ere f r e ­
quently; at odds in these cases, nor in the fact that the F uehrer received 
conflicting advice from  m ilitary .'leaders who frequently disagreed 
among them selves. Rather it lies in the pernicious estrangem ent that 
aro se  between civil and m i.litary; leaders of the Third Reich and the 
extent to which .this estrangem ent grew until H itler, as self-appointed 
w arlord, personally dictated all c iv il-m ilitary , re lationships. . From  
that point on,, the course of the w ar in Europe was but a.logical and 
predictable p rogression  of the basic conflict between Germ an m ilita ry  
and political lead ers  over objectives to be attained.
The F u eh re rTs frequently expressed, sentim ent that he would 
have gotten nowhere had he listened to his generals, and the generals! 
equally, b rash .asse rtio n s that the Germ an cause was doomed because 
Hitler, would not lis ten  to the ir advice w ere the key notes of the chorus 
that introduced the final act of the Germ an catastrophe. For the tru th  
was that neither could do without, the other-; yet cooperation between 
■ "The G reatest Field Commander of a ll Time, 1 and !’The G reatest 
G eneral Staff the World had ever Known" was im possible. This final 
fatal dichotomy of c iv il-m ilita ry  re la tio n s ,. which became so apparent
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during, the Germ an campaign in the west, increased  and fanned the 
flam es of the funeral pyre that finally, engulfed Field M arshal and 
F ueh rer alike.
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